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MINISTERIAL INSTABILITY IN FRANCE

CABINET government in France is usually described as a kaleidoscopic succession of different ministries. The description does not exaggerate. How rapidly does the kaleidoscope move? Are many different colors exhibited or are they pretty much alike? How symmetrical are the forms which are disclosed? Answers to these questions are rarely given. In part the answers must be statistical, even though it was a Frenchman who once defined statistics as a means of being precise about matters of which you are ignorant.[1]

[1] Data on the composition and tenure of French ministries are to be found in the *Journal Officiel, Doc. Parl., Annexes*; Guy Lavaud, *Les Déclarations ministérielles et les ministères (du 4 septembre 1870 au 1er janvier 1914)* (Paris, 1914); E. LeChartier, *La France et son parlement (1871-1912)* (Paris, 1911), pp. 61-90; Léon Muel, *Tableau synoptique de tous les ministères de la Troisième République (1870-1915)* (Paris, 1915), and *Tableau synoptique des ministères de la Grand Guerre* (Paris, 1920); René Samuel et Geo. Bonet-Maury, *Les Parlementaires français 1900-1914* (Paris, 1914); Société d'Histoire Moderne (Série des Instruments de Travail, *Les Ministères français (1789-1911)* (Paris, 1911), and *Supplément (1912-1922)* (Paris, 1922).

There is little agreement among these sources on either the number of ministries, their personnel, or the dates which mark the beginning or end of their terms of office. For example, the number of ministries from September 4, 1870 to January 1, 1914 has been given by Lavaud and by La Société d'Histoire Moderne as 52, but LeChartier lists 54 ministries for the same period and Muel, 56. This discrepancy arises mainly through counting as a separate ministry a cabinet which holds over into the term of a new President of the Republic (as in the case of M. Briand in 1913). Some authorities date the beginning of a cabinet from the day when its formation was announced in the press, others from the date the official announcement appeared in the *Journal Officiel*. Legally a ministry does not end until a new ministry has been officially announced. Actually, the ministry has ended and the crisis is opened imme-

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During the first sixty years of the Third Republic France had seventy-eight cabinets. From the Government of National Defense set up on September 4, 1870, down to the Tardieu ministry of 1930, the average life of a cabinet was barely more than nine months. Only eighteen cabinets have lasted as long as a year. This transience seems especially fleeting in comparison with the changes of British cabinets. During the sixty years which saw seventy-eight French cabinets, England had no more than seventeen.

From 1920, however, when Clemenceau retired, to the formation of the second Tardieu ministry, the confidence of the French Chamber of Deputies was given to nineteen governments. It would be incorrect to say "different" governments. Will Rogers told his London music-hall audiences in 1926 that he had watched them change the guard at St. James' Palace and then had rushed over to Paris to witness another daily spectacle—the changing of the French cabinet. Six changes had taken place in the year preceding Poincaré's Ministry of National Union (1926). Mr. Rogers might have added that the cabinet changed only in part and frequently a small part. For the fact of the matter is that a cabinet crisis in France is something very different from a crisis in England. English governments really change. One group of party leaders succeeds an entirely different group of party leaders. Across the Channel, on the other hand, there is a new deal of the same deck of cards, rather than a different game or different players. The figures show that the same deck is frequently redealt. Or, to change the metaphor, cabinet crises in France are a game of ministerial puss-in-the-

diately after the resignation of the prime minister. Lavaud and the Société d'Histoire Moderne follow the legal definition, but Muel and LeChartier base their dates on the cabinet's resignation, although they do not always give identical dates. It seems preferable, however, to consider a ministry as dating from the day on which the composition of the cabinet was first made public, officially or unofficially, and continuing to the day it resigned. The list of cabinet members as given in the *Journal Officiel* is not always reliable. Especially since the war there have been errors because of poor proofreading. LeChartier contains certain inaccuracies, such as listing as the same minister two persons of the same name who were father and son, incorrect attribution of posts, and misspelling of names.

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corner. The result is that there is a considerable mitigation of the "harmful" effects of too frequent changes of government. Chronic instability does not necessarily mean weakness or vacillation.

Even though she has had seventy-eight cabinets in sixty years France had only forty-three different prime ministers and of these twenty-seven served only once. Sixteen Presidents of the Council, therefore, headed fifty-one different administrations. For England's seventeen cabinets since 1870 there have been eleven different prime ministers. It is at once apparent, therefore, that French prime ministers come back into office more often than do the British and that the number of cabinets is by no means indicative of the number of changes in the head of the government. The same prime minister may head several successive administrations. He changes some of his collaborators when the crisis occurs, but pretty much the same government continues to hold power. That, for example, since the World War, has been the experience of Poincaré, Briand and Tardieu.

The record in frequent service is held by Briand. He has been prime minister ten times. By some, including himself, the total is figured as eleven. When Poincaré was elected President of the Republic in January, 1913, he resigned as prime minister. Briand took his place and served for a month under Fallières. On the expiration of the latter's term Poincaré was formally inducted as President. The Briand cabinet continued unchanged but was recommissioned. Did this formality make Briand head two cabinets? The leading authorities on the meaning of such matters say "no".[1] Briand, being human, says "yes". The total period of the premiership, whether dual or single, was only two months. Even as a ten-times Premier, however, Briand has set a mark which is not likely to be surpassed for some time. He has been head of a government twice as many times as any other statesman. The remaining 15 repeating prime ministers divided 41 administrations as follows: 5 each, Poincaré and

[1] Lavaud, La Société d'Histoire Moderne, and the *Annuaire de la Presse* (1927).

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Ribot; 4, de Freycinet; 3 each, Painlevé, Dupuy and the Duc de Broglie; and 2 each, Dufaure, Jules Ferry, Tirard, Brisson, Rouvier, Clemenceau, Viviani, Herriot and Tardieu.

Despite his ten administrations, however, Briand has served as prime minister for a few days less than five years. The average, six months, is considerably less than the average of nine months for all administrations under the Third Republic. With only five administrations Poincaré has been head of the government for nearly six years and five months. Two of his premierships were ended by his own choice. He resigned in 1913 because of his election as President of the Republic. He left his last cabinet in July, 1929, because of poor health. In neither case were there any intimations of an early reversal by the Chamber of Deputies. Ribot, on the other hand, prime minister as many times as Poincaré, served a total of only eighteen and a half months. In comparison with British experience, these tenures, of course, seem extremely brief. Gladstone, prime minister only four times (but a record for Great Britain), spent more than twelve years in the office.

Only a few French prime ministers have shown themselves able to retain the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies and to govern for reasonably extended periods. The longest-lived administration was that of Waldeck-Rousseau—two years, eleven months and eleven days. Poincaré's last tenure as prime minister was for almost exactly three years, but he reshaped his cabinet and began a new administration in November, 1928. Consequently, while his service was continuous, he held office twice during this three-year period. In all only seven prime ministers have gone for as long as two years without a cabinet crisis: Poincaré and Clemenceau, twice each; Thiers, Jules Ferry, Méline, Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes. In addition, nine have passed the year mark: Dufaure, Jules Ferry, Tirard, de Freycinet, Rouvier, Briand (twice), Viviani, Poincaré. These eighteen administrations lasted for thirty-two and a half years. Sixty administrations have held office during the remaining twenty-seven years. It is obvious, therefore, that the few long-lived governments are

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balanced by many short-lived governments in order to bring the average down to nine months. Five cabinets, indeed, have lasted only long enough to meet the Chamber of Deputies and to be informed that they cannot hold office.[1]

But the facts as to prime ministers and their cabinets fail to tell the whole story. What of the ministers? Is there a large turnover in their personnel, or is the turnover principally in the positions that they hold? Here the figures show that portfolios are changed much as are the trees in the game of "Pussy wants the corner."[2] The man you have just seen in the commerce department may now be watching the colonies. He may then take a vacation and in a few months turn up as minister of public instruction. Obviously such a shifting of corners pays scant attention to special competence or knowledge. The minister of marine may be a farmer; the minister of agriculture may be a printer. The minister of public works may be like Molière's doctor, *nommé médecin par coups de baton.* But this is what happens in all representative governments. The specialists are in the permanent staffs, and it is the business of the amateurs who are the political heads of the offices to supervise the specialists. "The value of the political heads of departments", Sir William Harcourt used to say, "is to tell the permanent officials what the public will not stand."[3] French administration operates on this principle. Departmental policy is not modified because a portfolio changes hands. Indeed the difficulty may be the other way. The new minister may be such a transient that he will not remain in office long enough to learn the subjects within his department, let alone to acquire that knowledge

[1] Sixteen ministries held office less than three months. They were the Grimaudel de Rochebouët, Gambetta, Armand Fallières, first, second and fourth Ribot, first Viviani, first and third Painlevé, third Poincaré, third, ninth and tenth Briand, François-Marsal, second Herriot, and Chautemps cabinets. Eighteen held office over three months but less than six months. The five which lasted only long enough to meet the Chamber of Deputies were the de Rochebouët, Ribot (fourth), François-Marsal, Herriot (second) and Chautemps cabinets.

[2] See Henry Maret, *Le Parlement* (Paris, 1920), p. 69.

[3] A. G. Gardner, *The Life of Sir Arthur William Harcourt* (New York, 1923), vol. II, p. 587.

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which is indispensable to an intelligent supervision of the civil service. Hence in France, the permanent officials, generally speaking, can have greater independence and authority than they enjoy in England. In France, however, the novice is frequently not a novice in a cabinet but only in his particular corner of it.

Take the personnnel of the seventy-eight cabinets from 1870 to December, 1930. These cabinets contained 1,267 original members—924 ministers and 343 undersecretaries of state.[1] There were 91 replacements of original appointees.[2] In these cabinets, therefore, 1,358 posts were filled, but they were occupied by no more than 488 different individuals. Of these 488 ministers (and undersecretaries), 210 appeared in only one cabinet, so that 278 French politicians divided up 1,148 posts between them. M. Briand served in 21 cabinets; Bourgeois, Eynac and Leygues each in 14; Barthou, Delcassé, de Freycinet and Loucheur each in 13. One statesman was a minister 12 times, three 11, three 10, nine 9, four 8, fifteen 7, eleven 6, seventeen 5, forty-six 4, fifty-eight 3 and one hundred and three 2.[3] In other words, it may be said that of the 488 different persons who have been ministers, 210 served once and 103 twice; the remaining 175 ministers have therefore held 942 portfolios. On an average, they have served in more than five cabinets each.

Despite a frequent reshuffling of portfolios, moreover, the French parliamentary system can on occasion achieve a high degree of permanence in particular offices. Thus, save for the two-day Herriot cabinet of 1926, Briand has been minister for foreign affairs in the last twelve cabinets, since April,

[1] Several tabulations of the number of cabinets and ministers have been published but they are in serious conflict. See Jules Veran, *Comment on devient député, sénateur, ministre* (Paris, 1924); J.-L. Bonnet, *Proposition de résolution ayant pour objet la révision de la Constitution* (Chambre des Députés, Annexe No. 1334, February 27, 1925), p. 104; Bonnet, "La Révision de la Constitution", *Parlement et l'opinion*, February 20, 1924.

[2] The figures do not include replacements in the second Tardieu cabinet.

[3] Add these figures and the total is 1,333—25 less than the 1,358 posts filled. The explanation is that ministers occasionally held more than one portfolio in the same cabinet, chiefly when replacements were made from the interior of the cabinet.

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1925.[1] Indeed there have been only thirty-five different ministers for foreign affairs. The turnover in this office has been less than in the Presidency of the Council. De Freycinet was minister of war from April, 1888 to January, 1893 (five cabinets) and again six years later. Not infrequently, moreover, generals and admirals have been called to the war and navy offices. Thus some expertness has been secured and political changes have affected army and navy policy even less slightly than if civilians had been appointed.

But, to repeat, changes of policy in any department rarely result from a simple change of government. Only when an election effects radical shifts in the balance of power in the Chamber of Deputies can a new administration use a new broom. In 1924, for example, the *Bloc National* Chamber gave way to one dominated by the *Cartel des Gauches.* Herriot succeeded Poincaré as prime minister. The principal change was in foreign policy,[2] but even here Herriot found himself restrained by the unwillingness of the permanent staff of the Quai d'Orsay to move except in the path followed by Poincaré. When the latter became prime minister two years later he got a vote of confidence from the same Chamber which had repudiated him for Herriot, and this chief of the *Cartel* was in Poincaré's Ministry of National Union, which made no change in foreign policy. Seven different cabinets from 1924 to 1926 meant little or no interruption of administrative services. There was, of course, considerable hesitancy and vacillation in tackling the monetary question. As the franc fell finance ministers fell also—more rapidly than did the prime ministers. But the real difficulty lay not in the numerous cabinet crises but in the reluctance of the Chamber of Deputies to approve the economies and increased taxes which the situation obviously required. When Poincaré became

[1] On April 17, 1930 M. Briand completed five years as minister of foreign affairs. He had been foreign minister in 1915 and in 1921-22. He took this post again on April 17, 1925 and, save for one interruption of two days—the duration of the second Herriot cabinet from July 19 to July 21, 1926—he served in eleven governments presided over respectively by Painlevé, Briand, Poincaré, Tardieu, Chautemps and Tardieu. After Tardieu's fall, he continued in the Steeg cabinet.

[2] Jacques Bardoux, *L'Expérience de 1924* (Paris, 1930).

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prime minister and minister of finance, the fiscal problem was courageously tackled. His cabinet, however, effected few changes in the policy of other departments of the government. In short, during the whole of this period, when the instability of cabinets was as extreme as ever before in the history of the Third Republic, the successive ministerial declarations could have been exchanged, and few would have known the difference.

The personnel of the ministries was much the same as well. It is, in other words, customary for French cabinets to include members of the cabinet which has just lost the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies. Only fifteen of the seventy-eight cabinets have ignored this practice. Thirty new administrations have been composed in large part (one half to three-fourths) of the previous ministers reshuffled. The heads of thirty-two cabinets have been members of the immediately preceding ministries. Prime ministers are willing to appear as the holders of less important portfolios in the combinations succeeding their own governments. Imagine Mr. Wilson's cabinet including Roosevelt, Taft and Hughes! Think of Mr. Hoover's "official family" giving places to Calvin Coolidge, John W. Davis and Alfred E. Smith! But this is what happens in France all the time. Moreover the ministerial game is played so that it is practically impossible to form a government which does not contain a material proportion of persons who have served in cabinets before. Even the Herriot cabinet of 1924, which was one of the exceptions in including no members of the preceding (Poincaré) ministry, was no exception in respect of the cabinet experience of its members. Eight of its eighteen holders of portfolios had already served in thirty-five cabinet posts.

Thus chronic instability in France never means an entirely new group of ministers. In the United States the bulk of the members of a new president's official family may not only have had no cabinet experience, but may on their appointment, make their first entrance into public life. That happens in England when a new party comes into power. In 1924, with a few exceptions, the colleagues of Mr. MacDonald, the

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British prime minister, were holding office for the first time. In 1929, his colleagues were for the most part seasoned. But no matter what the party situation in France, the average ministerial experience of cabinet members must always be considerable. Since 1900 this average has not been less than fifteen and a half months. That was the case in M. Briand's cabinet of 1910. M. Poincaré's Ministry of National Union of July, 1926, contained ministers who had had an average of four years' experience in previous cabinets. It contained five ex-premiers.

Or take the cabinet which M. Tardieu formed in November, 1929. It had twenty-eight members—ten more than in the preceding Briand government. Thirteen were taken over from the Briand government. Three had served in other cabinets. The remaining twelve were novices. The sixteen experienced members had between them occupied 107 cabinet posts under other prime ministers.[1] Cabinet government in Great Britain used to be defined as a genteel alternation of well-connected persons. In France cabinet government means the reappearance again and again of the same statesmen. For the more fortunate politicians cabinet service can be not an avocation but a vocation, with more or less frequent vacations.

Naturally, therefore, the French Parliament always contains a great deal of what in the United States would be called "cabinet timber". There is "cabinet timber" outside of Parliament also. For the French system, unlike the British, does not confine the posts to members of the legislature. Of the 1,333 offices filled in the 78 cabinets (excluding duplications), 112 went to persons outside of Parliament. The ministers of war and marine were not infrequently selected from the departments they were to head. One minister was an ex-senator and 30 were ex-deputies. The remaining posts went to active

[1] For the most part, however, it was not a case of a chief rallying to his support old troops. In many of the important posts a new set of workmen began their labors. The situation was pretty much the same as it had been with Gambetta in 1881, with Waldeck-Rousseau in 1899, with Léon Bourgeois in 1895, with Poincaré in 1912, and with Briand in 1909. Louis Barthou, "La Transmission du Pouvoir", *Les Annales politiques et littéraires*, December 1, 1929.

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parliamentarians—244 to senators and 946 to deputies. That proportion does not hold for recent cabinets. The representation of the Senate tends to shrink. In M. Tardieu's group of twenty-eight, there were only four senators. M. Poincaré's last ministry had four senators and fifteen deputies. Each prime minister can determine on the proportion which he desires, but since his main task is to keep the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, he is inclined to throw most of his posts to that body. He is not compelled, as is the British prime minister, to divide his colleagues between the two houses. French ministers, unlike the British, can appear and speak in the house to which they do not belong.

Yet, even though most of the ministers come from the Chamber, the "cabinet timber" in the Senate increases. In 1910 the Senate contained 33 ministers and ex-ministers; in 1919 the figure was 38; by 1925, it had reached 46, and in 1928 stood at 52—one-sixth of the membership. Roughly twice as many deputies belong to this class. Many of the remaining five hundred are hopeful. These deputies are said to be *ministrable*. The attribution of ministerial ambitions to deputies is no cynical fiction of journalists. M. Louis Barthou, an ex-premier, a member of the French Academy, and one of the most distinguished of living French statesmen, has defined one who is *ministrable*. He is a deputy who is "qualified to be a part of what one calls a 'combination.' But who is not, or who does not believe himself to be qualified? . . . Today one can be *ministrable* having done nothing or almost nothing. One is of a party, a group, a clientele, a coterie, or a luncheon party. I know candidates who have never made a speech or written a report. But they have powerful friends, or the sense of intrigue, or a flair for the lobbies." [1]

Consequently, when a French ministry falls there arrives what used to be called *la journée des redingotes*—the day of the walking coats.[2] Before the war the parliamentarians who

[1] Louis Barthou, *Le Politique* (Paris, 1923), p. 86. On intrigues to overthrow a ministry, see Barthou, "Propos Libres: M. André Tardieu se porte bien", *Les Annales*, February 15, 1930.

[2] "La Journée" is frequently extended to cover "une semaine" or occasionally "une quinzaine". The average length of a ministerial crisis has been five

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thought that they had a chance of figuring in a new combination put on formal dress and paraded the corridors of the Palais Bourbon. They were ready for a summons from a future President of the Council or from the President of the Republic. Indeed there are well authenticated stories of a deputy who seemed to have an uncanny gift of anticipating a cabinet crisis. He would don his *redingote* the day before a ministry fell. When he was thus seen it would be known that the cabinet's hours were numbered. Since the war there has been some relaxation of sartorial formality.[1] The sack suit is permitted everywhere—even at the Élysée. Clothes do not now distinguish the deputies and senators who hope to be ministers from the few who do not cherish such ambitions. But, as M. Barthou says, the *redingote* is still a symbol and a tradition.

The hopes of the *ministrables* who wish to be in cabinets are not quickly realized or blasted, for the process of forming a new French cabinet is tedious. Those who are to be in the new combination are not plainly indicated. It is quite possible for practical jokes to be successful. A deputy is telephoned to in the name of the secretary of the probable prime minister, and is asked whether he will accept a particular post. He says "Yes" and presents himself before the man who is attempting to form the combination. He announces his acceptance, to find that his appointment was never contemplated. When he was forming a cabinet in 1913, M. Barthou was visited by two ministerial candidates who accepted posts which he had no intention of offering. It is, M. Barthou remarks, desirable to mistrust the telephone during the negotiations for a new cabinet.[2]

days. The longest crisis covered nineteen days—November 24, 1877 to December 13, 1877 (struggle of MacMahon and Republicans). Other tedious maneuvers were from February 23 to March 9, 1876 (defeat of Buffet in legislative elections caused an immediate crisis); May 17 to 30, 1887 (exclusion of General Boulanger from the government); and June 15 to 28, 1898 (fall of Méline cabinet after election). Three ministries have been appointed the same day that the old ministry resigned: March 10, 1875 (Buffet); August 26, 1914 (Viviani); October 29, 1915 (Briand).

[1] Veran, *op. cit.*

[2] Barthou, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

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The probability that the members of the cabinet will be only birds of passage does not seem to dim the personal glory which the candidates contemplate. Even though the combination does not last beyond a first meeting of the Chamber, the prime minister is thereafter addressed as "*M. le Président*", and each colleague as "*M. le Ministre.*" The newspapers will always refer to him as M. Jacques Bonhomme, "*ancien ministre*". It is little wonder then that when a cabinet falls, far more *ministrables* than can possibly figure in a new cabinet wait anxiously for a summons. They inform their wives where they can be instantly reached when away from home. They offer their collaboration to first one and then another prominent statesman who seems earmarked as a possible President of the Council. That there is not undue cynicism in these remarks is apparent from the details of the trafficking which results when new cabinets are formed. A week or more frequently elapses before the negotiations are concluded. A statesman may refuse to attempt to form a government until someone else has tried and failed. He may form a combination which will break to pieces because of disputes over a minor undersecretaryship. Some ministers will refuse to serve in particular posts. Some will refuse to serve except in the departments they choose. Certain *ministrables* will accept if certain friends are included. They will refuse if certain enemies are not excluded. In comparison cabinet-making in England is simplicity itself. There — to an ever-increasing extent since the Reform Bill of 1832—the panel of possible prime ministers has grown smaller and smaller. It is composed of two or three party leaders, and the selection is in effect made by the country at a general election. Any one of a number of statesmen may be possible as French prime minister. Any one of a number of different combinations of ministers may receive the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies. There is a wide ambit of choice. Only four or five political personages are indicated at once as essential collaborators. Only a few have an undisputed right to go in to dinner first. The second sitting is more numerous. Some of the dozen taken to fill up the lesser places could just as

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well be chosen by lot. One may be but barely *ministrable* and by good fortune or friends in high places get a post denied those who are more *ministrable*.[1]

One should beware, therefore, of underestimating the influence of the President of the French Republic on the personnel of a new cabinet. It is natural that at the moment when a new President of the Council is being invited to form a cabinet he should be in a frame of mind which makes him willing to accept or even solicit advice from the occupant of the Élysée. True it is that a strong President of the Council can insist on having his own way, but such insistence may be too expensive a luxury. Why not placate the President of the Republic? On occasion, therefore, the latter can do more than give automatic approval to the proposals of the statesman attempting to form a cabinet.[2] In England the King has no such opportunity; the fringe of uncertainty is extremely narrow. In France it is wide.

The French fringe is wider also because the number of ministers oscillates wildly. Paris styles in cabinets vary as extremely as do Paris styles in clothes. As the field of governmental activity grows larger there is, of course, an irresistible tendency for cabinets to increase in size. New departments must be added to deal with new services. Thus the elder Pitt had six or seven colleagues. Peel had twelve, and Lord Salisbury from sixteen to twenty. Mr. Asquith's cabinet during the war numbered twenty-three. Ramsay MacDonald's 1929 Labor cabinet had twenty members. In England, however, apart from the problem of the House of Lords, cabinets can be formed with an eye to administrative efficiency, as well as to the claims of party leaders for pre-

[1] "There is no one, or almost no one, at the Luxembourg or at the Palais-Bourbon who does not believe himself fitted to enter a ministry—here, there, or elsewhere, it matters not, all the places being good to take. . . .

"When an impartial competition presides over the choices and the eliminations, those who pity themselves because of their misfortune bear no grudge. But lotteries where chance alone plays the numbers result in envies. Now, more and more, ministerial combinations resemble lotteries." Louis Barthou, "Quelques citations d'actualité", *Les Annales*, March 15, 1930.

[2] *Cf.* Henri Chardon, *L'Organisation de la République pour la paix* (Paris, 1927), p. 125.

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ferment. Ordinarily there are no groups or sections of the House of Commons whose support must be secured by ministerial representation. This consideration is dominant in France. Here is to be found the rationale of the waxing and waning, and particularly the appearance and disappearance of the *sous-secrétaires d'état.*

Down to the du Faure cabinet of 1877 there were no more than thirteen ministerial posts. Du Faure had fourteen in his combination. Gambetta (1881) had twenty-one, but the situation then was somewhat extraordinary. The war naturally increased the size of cabinets. Viviani had seventeen in his first cabinet and nineteen in his second. Briand went up to twenty-four. Painlevé had thirty. After the war the number declined and then rose again. Herriot's Cartel cabinet contained eighteen members. The last of Briand's three cabinets in 1926 had twenty-two portfolios. In 1926 Poincaré sharply reduced the number and formed a cabinet of thirteen,[1] the smallest since his own of 1924, in which he had the same number. In November, 1929, M. Tardieu almost equaled the Painlevé record of thirty. Sixteen ministers and twelve undersecretaries constituted his first ministerial team. Less than half that number had sufficed for M. Poincaré. Why the sudden increase? Manifestly it was not caused by any plans for greater administrative efficiency. No one had maintained that under M. Poincaré administration had suffered. When M. Tardieu constructed his second government, he filled thirty-four posts. His cabinet was larger by four than any previous one. It contained sixteen undersecretaries — three more than were in M. Ribot's 1917 government, which held the record in this respect, and four more than were in the first Tardieu cabinet.

The practice under the Third Republic in respect of the *sous-secrétaires d'état* has changed with cabinets.[2] Some

[1] When he reshaped his ministry in November 1928 he had fifteen ministers and four undersecretaries. The nineteen were reduced by one when M. Poincaré resigned (for he had been without portfolio). M. Briand's cabinet therefore numbered eighteen. The Briand cabinet (1921) had twenty-four and Millerand (1920) had fifteen ministers and ten undersecretaries.

[2] See André Lombrail, *Les Sous-secrétaires d'État* (Toulouse, 1911).

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prime ministers have appointed no undersecretaries, some have appointed a few and some a great many. Sometimes undersecretaries have been in the cabinet and sometimes not. Sometimes they are subordinates and sometimes equals. Certain undersecretaries have been ministers of the second class. Others have been well-nigh uncontrolled directors of public services and have been independent of the ministerial heads of the departments to which the undersecretaryships were attached. Such vagaries show rather clearly that a desire for efficient administration does not determine the number in a cabinet or the allocation of functions. If, during the financial crisis of 1926, M. Poincaré's Cabinet of National Union was able to get along with thirteen ministers and no undersecretaries at all, surely no especial administrative difficulties required M. Tardieu to have thirty-three colleagues.

In Great Britain parliamentary undersecretaries are necessary to represent departments in the House in which the minister does not sit. French ministers, on the other hand, whether deputies or senators, may appear and speak in either house of Parliament. Occasionally French prime ministers may wish a few undersecretaries for relatively unimportant departments in order to avoid increasing the number of ministerial posts. Usually, however, the number of undersecretaries waxes and wanes because of the political situation in the Chamber. M. Poincaré's team of thirteen had the confidence of the Chamber. If M. Tardieu's had been no larger, it might not have secured a majority in the Chamber. A cabinet composed of one more than half of the six-hundred-odd deputies could, in the absence of internal dissensions, be certain of staying in office. This consideration cannot be ignored by prime ministers when they attempt to form governments. An increase of ministers and undersecretaries to thirty-four gives strategic groups in the Chamber greater representation.[1]

[1] M. Barthou has suggested some dangers of having too large a cabinet. When numbers increase there can be no certainty that a rigorous choice has determined the selection. People worm their way in at the last hour, and also those who were early enough on the job successfully demand office. It is, therefore, not strange to discover a good many thwarted ambitions and intrigues. So many mediocre ones are included that those left out are unusually envious. "Réflexions prudentes sur l'imprudence d'une crise", *Les Annales*, March 1, 1930.

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This is the problem which every maker of cabinets has to face. Counting the three independent segments as one, the Chamber of Deputies is divided into thirteen groups—two more groups than were in the Chamber in 1924. The most numerous group contains only 113 of the 600-odd deputies. Every French cabinet, therefore, must be a coalition cabinet. A majority can be secured only by submitting a program or making cabinet appointments which will placate a sufficient number of the deputies to get together this majority support. M. Tardieu's second cabinet, for example, gave representation to nine of the thirteen groups in the chamber. Six ministers were taken from the *Gauche radicale;* 2 from the *Action démocratique et sociale;* 8 from the *Républicains de gauche;* 1 *Républicain socialiste;* 2 *Radicaux socialistes;* 3 *Union républicaine démocratique;* 2 *Indépéndants de gauche;* 2 *Gauche sociale et radicale;* 1 *Démocrate populaire.* One of the deputies in the cabinet belonged to no group. Five of the ministers came from the Senate. The *Radicaux socialistes* were almost solidly opposed to the Tardieu government and their two representatives in the cabinet were considered apostates. The other eight groups included 308 deputies—sufficient for a safe margin if they held together.

But the "if" is never absent in French politics. Frequently it is said that ministerial instability in France results from a "multiple party" system. The phrase is misleading. The multiplicity is a multiplicity of groups in the Chamber of Deputies. There are, to be sure, half a dozen party labels which are used in elections and half a dozen organizations which attempt to propagandize throughout the country. After they get in the Chamber, however, the deputies segment themselves into groups which may or may not have any relation with the so-called political parties. Candidates may even run under no party label at all. Thus M. Tardieu was elected as a "*Républicain de gauche*"—a designation of a group in the Chamber and not of a political party.

The members of the different groups, moreover, may change groups during a legislative session. A new group may be organized and may draw its membership from several sources.

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Save for the groups of the extreme right and the extreme left there are no ascertainable differences of doctrine or program, only imperceptible nuances which can be understood by few except the initiated French politician or journalist. The groups are important in that they are represented on the grand commissions of the Chamber in proportion to their membership. A deputy frequently chooses his group not because he approves of its program but because he will thereby have a better opportunity of getting on an important commission. The members of a group may see eye to eye with the prime minister on foreign policy but be opposed to him on domestic policy. And, as has been said, their cohesiveness can rarely be depended upon in an important vote. The rule rather than the exception is for the groups not at the extreme right or the extreme left of the Chamber to divide in three varying proportions. On every vote some members vote yes, some no, and some abstain. That is true, particularly, of the groups of the center—the so-called *charnières* or hinges of the majority. The situation can be clearly seen from the vote of confidence in the Steeg ministry.[1] If only eight of the teetering deputies

[1] *Le Temps*, December 20, 1930.

Effectifs	Groupes	Pour	Contre	Abstenus	Absents par congé
18	Démocrates populaires	—	18	—	—
85	Union républicaine démocratique	—	85	—	—
31	Action démocratique et sociale	—	31	—	—
64	Républicains de gauche	5	53	6	—
17	Gauche sociale et radicale	1	14	2	—
51	Gauche radicale	24	18	8	1
22	Indépendants de gauche	13	6	3	—
15	Républicains socialistes	12	1	2	—
14	Parti socialiste français	14	—	—	—
113	Radicaux et radicaux socialistes	112	—	1	—
107	Socialistes	106	—	1	—
9	Communistes	—	9	—	—
41	Députés indépendants	—	37	3	1
13	Aucun groupe	3	7	3	—
7	Non inscrits	1	5	1	—
607		291	284	30	2

The Right may be said to consist of the following groups: Démocrates *populaires*; *Union républicaine démocratique*; *Action démocratique et sociale*; Députés indépendants and some deputies who are "non inscrits" and who belong to "Aucun groupe".

The Center includes the Gauche radicale, the Républicains de gauche and the Gauche sociale et radicale. The Left takes in the Socialistes of various shades and the Indépendants de gauche.

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of the center groups had voted against the government, the new ministry would have been forced to resign.

If the Senate consents, the Chamber of Deputies may be, but in practice never is, dissolved. Legislative assemblies, however, are inclined to be capricious. The only effective method of reducing this caprice or of holding it in check is for the executive to have the power to dissolve the legislature and order a new election. This is an essential complement of cabinet responsibility. Certain it is that if the Chamber of Deputies had been threatened with dissolution when cabinets were following each other in quick succession in 1925 and 1926, ministries would have stayed in power. Certain it is also that if cabinets losing the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies could dissolve the Chamber, and if deputies were confronted by electoral uncertainties at unexpected times and more often than every four years, there would be some amalgamation of French groups and parties. Unmitigated by executive discretion to dissolve, the proliferation of groups means a kaleidoscopic succession of short-lived ministries.

Curiously enough, French writers have had little of importance to say about this problem. There has been much complaining, and much longing for an "improvement" of the parliamentary régime. Discussions of contemporary political situations have been frequent, but there has been no work dealing with the group system in connection with ministerial responsibility.[1]

Students of French politics have therefore been eagerly awaiting the appearance of M. André Siegfried's promised treatise on French political parties. In publishing in its issue of September 6, 1930 "*les premières bonnes feuilles de cette œuvre magistrale*", *L'Europe Nouvelle* declared that M. Siegfried, writing with "*une pénétration psychologique et historique inégalée*" would apply to French institutions the same "*rigueur intuitive*" which had marked his studies of Great Britain and the United States. The compliment was well deserved, but "*les premières bonnes feuilles*" were no

[1] For comments on this "lacune" in French political literature, see Barthélemy and Duez, *Traité élémentaire de droit constitutionnel* (Paris, 1926), p. 6.

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more than "*feuilles traduites*" from an article on "The Psychology of French Politics" which had appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* for January, 1930, and which was Chapter II of M. Siegfried's 1929 Williamstown lectures published in March, 1930, under the title *France: A Study in Nationality*.[1] When the "*œuvre magistrale*" appeared,[2] much applauded by the French press, it was no more than a translation of the Williamstown lectures with some references to more recent political events. M. Siegfried was properly honored in his own country, which was unaware of his previous honors in the United States.

This somewhat meticulous bibliographical aside should not be taken as implying any criticism of M. Siegfried's book. Quite the contrary. The point simply is that American students will find in the Williamstown lectures all that they can find in the *Tableau*. They will find a great deal—far more than any other writer has made available. The realities behind the group labels are laid bare. M. Siegfried argues that there is a more or less regular swing from the Right to the Left and then from Left back to the Right. Ministerial crises can be explained in terms of this continuous swing of the pendulum. M. Siegfried's explanation, supported by copious illustrations, will give foreign readers a far better understanding than they have had before of the rationale of what has seemed the irrationality of cabinet instability in France.

Apart from the group system, however, there are a few special conditions which more or less frequently influence particular ministerial crises. Thus cabinets may be put out of office as the result of adverse votes in the Senate. For twenty years after the adoption of the constitutional laws of 1875 the principle was maintained, at least in practice, that the Senate could not reverse a ministry. In 1896, however, the upper chamber forced the resignation of Léon Bourgeois. The Senate majority was moderate and wished to get rid of

[1] Yale University Press.

[2] *Tableau des Partis en France*, 239 pp. ("Les Écrits", chez Bernard Grasset). The part of the book dealing particularly with the groups was published as "La Politique intérieure de la France" in the *Revue de Paris*, October, 1930.

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a Radical cabinet. For seventeen years thereafter no crisis was caused by the action of the upper chamber. In 1913, however, Briand resigned as a result of a defeat on his proportional representation bill. In effect, however, M. Briand invited his dismissal. Herriot in 1925 resigned because of action by the Senate and in December, 1930, the Radical Socialists, unable to accomplish their desire in the Chamber, turned to the Senate and there were successful in causing the fall of the Tardieu government.

So long as the Radicals were not influential in the Senate they were hostile to the principle that a ministry should be responsible before the chambers. They wished the language of the constitutional laws to be interpreted as meaning responsibility before the Chamber. As the Radicals, however, have come to control the Senate they have been willing for it to be more powerful. A legislative assembly is never reluctant to show its power. The question is therefore whether this transition in respect of the Senate will have an increasing effect on the functioning of the parliamentary system. The transition has taken place both in respect of the rôle of the Senate and in respect of the party majorities which write the lines that the player of the rôle must speak.

Again, ministerial crises may be caused by pressure from the parliamentary commissions. Briand's resignation in January, 1922, was forced, not by a vote of the Chamber, but by the attitude of the commissions on the Budget and on Foreign Affairs. In December, 1925, M. Loucheur was ousted from the finance portfolio by the Chamber Budget Commission.[1] Plain instances of the influence of the commissions are rare, but it is always true that beneath every cabinet crisis lies intriguing by the presidents and reporters of different commissions. They are frequently ex-ministers. They always cherish the hope that they will be future ministers. The Chamber Commission on the Budget indeed has been called the *Commission des successeurs*. Their reports on and amendments of legislation sponsored by a cabinet may make that

[1] See Robert Mothes, "La démission de M. Loucheur, ministre des finances", *Revue du droit public*, 1926, p. 451.

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cabinet's position weaker. Ministers by ignoring the commissions, refusing to give them information which is requested, may reduce the number of their friends and increase the number of their antagonists.

Recently, furthermore, the tenure of cabinets has been affected by the extra-parliamentary action of the political parties and groups. This is a new development. In the past cabinets have occasionally seen the handwriting on the wall and resigned without waiting for adverse votes in the Chamber of Deputies. Only recently, however, has a cabinet change been forced, as is customary in Germany,[1] by decisions of the political parties whose representatives are in a cabinet that those representatives must secure the acceptance of a particular program or else withdraw. Several times in France since the *Cartel des Gauches* assumed power in 1924 the circumstances concerning a cabinet crisis have resembled those in Germany.

The most recent incident was the resignation of M. Poincaré's government in November, 1928. The members of this cabinet were all anxious to remain in office. There was nothing in any vote of the Chamber of Deputies which indicated a desire for change. The Radical Socialist Congress met at Angers and at the behest of M. Caillaux debated a resolution which made inevitable the resignations of the four Radical Socialist members of M. Poincaré's Ministry of National Union. The ministers resigned and M. Poincaré was forced to present the collective resignation of the cabinet to the President of the Republic. A somewhat similar situation followed the Radical congress which met at Nice in 1925. Then Caillaux, minister of finance in Painlevé's government, was defeated on his financial policy. Some days later M. Painlevé resigned before the chambers met. He had yielded to the extra-parliamentary pressure of the Nice congress which had, in effect, condemned M. Caillaux's financial proposals.

A situation which differed in degree rather than in principle existed at the beginning of 1926. Then the question was as to the participation of the Socialists in the government. Within the year there had been five ministers of finance. A

[1] See Edmond Vermeil, *La Constitution de Weimar.*

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sixth, M. Doumer, held his office on the unwilling sufferance of the chamber—*faute de mieux*. No ministerial crisis was officially on but everyone knew that if the Socialists were later to collaborate a new ministry would be formed. The Socialist congress which met January 10 to 14 refused participation.

"Here theoretically", remarks Professor Hauriou, "nothing happened contrary to constitutional practice. In fact, however, the rules of the parliamentary system were falsified in view of the fact that the formation of a ministry chosen from Parliament was subordinated to a decision of a party congress, an organ which by its nature is extra-parliamentary." [1]

In arguing that such activities of political parties are contrary to the constitution, Professor Hauriou cites also the Millerand case of 1924 when the parties of the Left decided to change the occupant of the Élysée. "Without violating the constitutional laws," such party action "may impose upon them changes of orientation, inflexibilities, or even create at their side new practices which sometimes complete the laws and sometimes also contradict them." One characteristic of this is in effect to dissociate, for the profit of extra-parliamentary party organs (the congresses or the committees) two terms hitherto closely joined together: power and responsibility. "It is one of the guarantees established by our constitution that those who have the power have equally the responsibility. Political responsibility, no doubt, but responsibility all the same: it is expressed in the loss of office by the minister and in the loss of his seat by the deputy."

One of the reasons for extra-parliamentary party action is, of course, personal. The Angers congress, for example, passed its resolution largely because M. Caillaux wished to retaliate on M. Herriot. M. Caillaux had memories of the Radical congress at Nice and of M. Herriot's intervention on July 17, 1926, when, although President of the Chamber, he went to the tribune and spoke against M. Caillaux's proposals that extensive ordinance-making authority be granted to the

[1] "Les Parties politiques et la Constitution", *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, Dec. 10, 1928. See also "Pratiques antiparlementaires", *Journal des Débats* (éd. hebd.), Feb. 22, 1929.

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minister of finance. To satisfy his spleen, M. Caillaux's memory did not have to last, M. Hauriou suggests, as did that of the Pope's mule—seven years. Another explanation of such party action is to be found in the kinds of coalitions which were formed in 1924 and again in 1926. The Cartel and the Ministry of National Union depended on the collaboration of different groups to a greater extent than had previous cabinets under the Third Republic.[1] There was therefore a greater chance of a party or group's making a decision which would have fateful consequences.

It is hardly necessary to say that party action outside of Parliament makes cabinet government more difficult. The responsibility of a ministry to the legislature is a sort of *ménage à deux*. The Chamber withdraws its confidence and another cabinet is set up. If the political parties attempt, outside of Parliament, to determine the fate of ministries the *ménage à deux* becomes a *ménage à trois*. Since the adoption of the Weimar constitution cabinet government in Germany has been a *Familie von drei*. Yet it is difficult to see how such party interference is either anticonstitutional or antiparliamentary. Some may think it unwise, and all may admit that it makes cabinet government more difficult, but expediency rather than principle should be the norm of judgment.[2]

Finally, underneath every French cabinet crisis is the play of local influence. It was Clemenceau who once said that whatever the ostensible cause of a change of ministry—a defeat on the budget, an interpellation on foreign affairs—the real cause was dissatisfaction with the choice of prefects, or objections by localities to sops which had been handed them by the government. These forces which are behind the scenes cannot

[1] Mr. Lloyd George's coalition broke up in October 1922 because of the action of the Conservative party in deciding to withdraw. This was an almost unprecedented method of forcing a change of government in England. The division lobby of the House of Commons and, in later years, the electorate have determined the exact nature of the "alternation of well connected persons" in cabinet posts.

[2] Professor Hauriou's article has some interesting remarks on the responsibility of universal suffrage for the developments of which he complains and on the threat to parliamentary government which is to be found in direct government.

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be exactly estimated and described. It was plainer than usual, however, that this cause contributed to the fall of the second Tardieu government. M. René Héry, senator from Deux-Sèvres, on whose interpellation the vote of lack of confidence took place, was in reality objecting to the fact that his prefect had been displaced.[1]

These are some of the reasons why cabinet government in France is so unstable. When a crisis occurs and places in the new ministerial combination are open, hope springs eternal in the breast of every deputy that he may get a corner, or that if he is already in the game, he may get a better corner. The segmentation of the Chamber into a dozen political groups, so that every cabinet must be supported by a coalition of groups, means that during every legislature a wide range of different coalitions is possible. But when ministries fall and new ones are formed, there is rarely any serious disturbance of the public business. Administration is carried on by the permanent officials who do not change. The new ministers effect no pronounced modifications of policy. There is a high degree of certainty, finally, that any combination will contain ex-prime ministers and ex-ministers. French politics does not mean off with the old and on with the new. It means that a few new ministers will serve with a seasoned group which has had extensive experience.

LINDSAY ROGERS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

[1] See *Le Temps*, December 1, 1930, p. 4.

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MUSSOLINI'S BATTLE OF WHEAT

I

THE production of wheat in Italy before the World War was steadily increasing, as the following figures prove:

Years		*Millions of tons*
1881-1900	Average annual production of wheat	3.42
1901-1910	" " " " "	4.81
1911-1914	" " " " "	5.05 [1]

The World War, however, interrupted this progress by stopping the importation of fertilizers, slowing down agricultural operations, and reducing farm stock.[2] The diminished productiveness of the land continued to be felt in the two years immediately following the war. From 1915 to 1920, therefore, the crops were inferior to the pre-war level. The figures are:

Year		*Millions of tons*
1915	Production of wheat	4.64
1916	" " "	4.80
1917	" " "	3.81
1918	" " "	4.99
1919	" " "	4.62
1920	" " "	3.84

By 1921 agriculture had recovered from war-time depression, and a good harvest yielded 5.24 million tons. In the bad season of 1922, there was a drop to 4.39 million tons. Yet these two years attained practically the average of 1911-1912.[3]

In 1923, the harvest leaped to 6.12 million tons. Since Mussolini had seized the government by the "March on Rome"

[1] *Annuario statistico italiano, 1930,* p. 574.

[2] The consumption of fertilizers in Italy was 1.33 million tons in 1913 and 0.66 million tons in 1919. G. Mortara, *Prospettive economiche, 1922,* p. 35; *idem, 1928,* pp. 44 *et seq.*; A. Serpieri, *La guerra e le classi rurali italiane,* p. 97.

[3] 5.23 million tons in 1911; 4.51 million tons in 1912.

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in October 1922, some may attribute this increase to the Duce's advent. As a matter of fact, in northern and central Italy the wheat for the harvest of 1923 had already been sown in October 1922; and in the South and in the islands, where sowing is usually later than October, the wheat area remained exactly the same as in the preceding year.[1] The rich harvest of 1923 was due to the "good year".

In 1924 the harvest fell to a bare 4.63 millions tons although the consumption of chemical fertilizers was not less than in 1913.[2] This failure was due to the bad year and not to any agricultural inefficiency on the part of Mussolini. The average for the years 1923-1924 was slightly higher than that for 1913-1914.[3]

After the bad year of 1924 came a good year. Even before the harvest had been garnered, the Ministry of National Economy triumphantly predicted, on June 29, 1925, a record yield of 6.1 millions of tons, and claimed the credit for Fascism.[4] After the harvest, the estimate was increased, on July 31, to 6.2 millions, and in the autumn the 6.2 grew to 6.55 millions.[5] In December, however, Professor Mortara[6]

[1] *Prospettive economiche, 1926,* p. 32.

[2] *Idem,* p. 55.

[3] 5.84 million tons in 1913; 4.61 million tons in 1914.

[4] *Corriere della Sera,* June 30, 1925.

[5] *Stampa,* August 1, 1925.

[6] Professor Mortara is regarded today as one of the first experts in Italian economics. Since 1920 he has published under the title of *Prospettive economiche* (economic forecasts) a yearbook indispensable to every student of Italian economic history. Unfortunately since 1925 he has been obliged to bear in mind that in Italy it is no longer safe to tell all the truth and nothing but the truth. A law of December 24, 1925, empowered the government to remove from office during 1926 any public official (including judges and university professors) who "took up an attitude incompatible with the general political tendencies of the government"; a royal decree of February 2, 1927, made the measure permanent. In 1928 Signor Umberto Ricci, Professor of Economics at the University of Rome, was deprived of his chair for publishing a mild criticism of Mussolini's economic notions. To avoid a similar fate Mortara abstains from all criticism, to the point of leaving out the chapters on wages and general labor conditions. His yearbook remains nevertheless a work of great scientific value. The attentive reader can see between the lines the mental reservations of a scholar who has not entirely renounced his independence of judgment.

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pointed out that agricultural statistics in all countries are based not so much on "verified quantities" as on "estimates", which "are more or less removed from the truth, according to the ability of the estimators".[1] In September 1926, the economist Professor Coletti, an adherent of the Fascist régime, wrote:

> Competent men, like the Chairman of the Italian Federation of Agricultural Societies, say to us: "Take care, the figure of 6.5 millions of last year must have been exaggerated!" Here, we have a kind of psychological law; a law which in years of abundant harvests inclines us to be optimistic in our statements, just as in the lean years we are inclined to pessimism.[2]

In December, 1927, Professor Mortara admitted that "some doubts" had been justly expressed as to the accuracy of the official figure of 6.55 million tons for 1925. Without excluding the possibility that this exceeded the actual harvest by 0.5 million tons, he put forward the figure of 6.3 million tons as being "not too far from the truth".[3]

In any case the fact remains that the harvest of 1925 was very good. But it is difficult to attribute to Mussolini a specific influence on this happy event, if for no other reason than that he had not yet embarked on any agricultural "battle". Professor Mortara explained the exceptional harvest of 1925 in the following manner:

> The increase in production is very different in various sections of the country; it is only 4 per cent in the North, it touches 15 per cent in the Center, and attains 44 per cent in the South and 63 per cent in the islands. This extraordinary increase in production in the southern districts and in the islands depends to a small extent on the greater area under wheat, and may to a small extent be attributed to technical agricultural progress, but primarily it indicates exceptionally favorable meteorological conditions.[4]

[1] *Prospettive economiche, 1926,* pp. 1-3.

[2] *Corriere della Sera,* Sept. 24, 1926.

[3] *Prospettive economiche, 1928,* pp. 41, 44; *idem, 1930,* pp. 43-45.

[4] *Idem, 1928,* pp. 38-39. It is well known that climate makes fertilizers of little avail in southern Italy. *Idem, 1926,* p. 53.

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It is not the earth but the sky which fructifies, said the ancients.

II

After the crop of 1925 had been harvested and speculators had bought up the wheat produced by the small landowners and tenant farmers,[1] Mussolini on July 24, 1925, reinstated the import duty on wheat of 75 gold lire ($14.50) per ton which had existed before the World War and had been "suspended" in 1914. The merchants made shameless profits; and thenceforth the consumer had to pay a new tax of about 1.45 cents on every two pounds of bread. In the autumn of 1925, the price of wheat in Italy was double what it had been in the autumn of 1923, while the general level of prices was increased by only twenty-five per cent.[2]

The reason given for reinstating the import duty was to increase production, especially in the South, and thus to make Italy self-supporting. Experts, however, maintain that the import duty encourages wheat cultivation on unsuitable areas, which would otherwise be put to a more profitable use, thus retarding genuine agricultural progress; at the same time, by raising the cost of living, it has injurious effects upon the entire national economy.[3]

As these criticisms were common knowledge in Italy, Mussolini rendered the bitter pill of the prospective duty more palatable by giving it a sugar-coating. Some twenty decrees and circulars were issued, creating propaganda commissions, multiplying traveling teachers and promoting the production of selected seed, the application of electricity to agriculture, the tillage of uncultivated areas, etc., etc.[4] The chief immediate result of these measures was an increase of $2,000,000 in yearly expenditure. The import duty, with its smoke screen

[1] *Idem, 1926,* p. 42; *idem, 1927,* p. 33.

[2] Idem, *1926,* p. 43; *1930,* p. 46.

[3] *Prospettive economiche, 1926,* pp. 51-55; *idem, 1927,* p. 3.

[4] Banca Commerciale Italiana, *Movimento economico dell' Italia, 1930, pp.* 342-3.

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of decrees and circulars, Mussolini christened "The Battle of Wheat".[1]

The area sown to wheat rose from 4,724 thousand hectares in 1925 to 4,915 in 1926, an increase of 191 thousand hectares.[2] But the weather in 1926 was unkind.[3] At the end of June 1926, the government forecast that the crop would attain 5.5 million tons, "that is to say one million tons above the average", placing the average at 4.5 million tons whereas in reality it was 5 million tons.[4]

On July 6, 1926, a royal decree placed the Central Board of Statistics under the orders of the prime minister. As Mussolini declared in his speech of December 20, 1926, statistics were to become "an instrument of government action". The advantages of this reform in statistics were soon noticeable. Professor Coletti prepared the way for the good tidings, in the *Corriere della Sera* of September 24, 1926:

> What will the wheat crop be this year? The answers which one finds in the papers do not by any means agree: 5.2 million, 5.6 million, and even 5.8 million tons have been mentioned.
>
> This uncertainty is not to be wondered at. The truth of the matter is that psychology creeps in everywhere. This year, Italians were confidently looking forward to a speedy victory in the wheat battle. Past experience—crystallized in many an adage—warns us that we humans are always prone to picture things as our desires and interests would have them be.

Ten days later, on October 3, 1926 an official communiqué announced that the wheat harvest had amounted to precisely

[1] L. Villari, *Fascist Experiment*, p. 127, informs us that "Mussolini intervened personally in the task of encouraging the nation to increase its production of wheat; a permanent wheat committee has been created to promote cultivation in every way, by means of bonuses and prizes for increased production, the introduction of machinery, fertilizers and other improvements". He ignores the import duty.

[2] *Prospettive economiche, 1927*, p. 27.

[3] *Idem, 1927*, p. 28.

[4] *Idem, 1928*, p. 52.

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59,931,877 quintals (5.99 million tons) (neither a grain more nor a grain less.

If in 1924 a crop of 4.63 million tons was regarded as a bad one, and if in 1925 a crop of 6.55 million tons (6.3 according to Mortara) was regarded as exceptionally good, a crop of 6 million tons in 1926 ought to have counted as a satisfactory one. Actually the harvest of 1926 was universally regarded in Italy as a bad one. Obviously the official figure was far above the truth. Mortara estimates the harvest of 1926 at not more than 5.5 million tons.[1]

Mussolini declared himself satisfied with the result he had achieved after the first year of the Battle. In his speech to agriculturalists, on October 11, 1926, he said:

> When the wheat battle was organized last year, I knew it was being organized under unfavorable conditions. There is no doubt that the famous law of the alternation of good and bad harvests has been borne out by facts. It was therefore to be expected that after the rich harvest of 1925, we should have

[1] *Prospettive economiche, 1928,* pp. 41-2. Many people will hesitate to believe it possible for a government of a civilized country to "cook" its statistics. In the same year, 1926, the dictatorship perpetrated another bit of statistical legerdemain about which no doubt is possible. On June 3, 1926, the Minister of Finance, Count Volpi, stated in the Chamber that in the budget of the current fiscal year there was a surplus of 668 million lire by April 30; on July 11, in an official letter to Mussolini, he announced that the surplus had risen to 1,200 millions (*Stampa,* July 12, 1926); on July 18, in a speech at Bologna, he announced that on June 30, the surplus had risen to 1,489 millions (this was repeated by McGuire, *Italy's International Economic Position,* pp. 77, 210); on December 6, 1926, he reiterated that the surplus was 1,500 millions (a round figure for 1,489 millions); on December 10, in a speech to the Senate, he gave the surplus as 2,268 millions, a new windfall of 800 millions! During the following months, *while large Italian loans were floated on the American market,* this imposing surplus "unprecedented in Italian history" (Count Volpi's speech, Dec. 14, 1926), was hailed as a most striking proof of the efficiency of the Fascist dictatorship. But a year later Mortara stated that the surplus had amounted to only 468 millions (*Prospettive economiche, 1928,* pp. 465-6); the Fascist deputies Signori Olivetti, Mazzini and Tumidei, in their parliamentary reports on the budgets of 1925-6 and 1926-7 accepted the figure of 468 millions; and the official records finally adopted the same figure (*Annuario statistico italiano, 1927,* p. 308; *idem, 1930,* p. 397). The curious fact is that even this figure is arrived at only by ignoring the loan of $100,000,000 which Italy raised through the Morgan bank in December 1925, i.e. during the fiscal year in question.

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had a year with a mediocre harvest. This was exactly why I decided to organize the battle in 1925, because I thought that unless the rural masses received a strong, far-reaching and energetic impetus, we should have a poor harvest, and this would cost national economy billions of lire. (Hearty cheers.) It was a bad year, not only in Italy, but throughout Europe. In spite of this, we succeeded in raising a harvest of 6 million tons, verified after three strict investigations, a harvest which I consider satisfactory, because without your help, the harvest could only have fluctuated between 4.2 and 4.8 million tons, a decrease of 1.2 million tons on the quantity we have actually reaped. (Hearty cheers) Without indulging in flights of rhetoric, which I dislike, I declare that the first year of the wheat battle closes with satisfactory results which enable us to pass on to the second year with renewed confidence.

The conclusion to be drawn was that if the harvest was not good, the weather was to blame, while if it was not any worse than it had been, the credit was Mussolini's.

III

After this first victory, there was nothing further to do but await the good harvest of 1927, according to "the law of the alternation of good and bad harvests."

Presumably in expectation of the promised good year, the Italian farmers laid down to wheat 4,976,000 hectares, i.e. 50,000 more than in 1926.[1] In the meantime, on April 9, 1927, the government sent out an official communiqué instructing the press not to publish forecasts of the wheat crop even from reliable sources: "Forecasts, if there are to be any, shall be made by the government in the form of official communiqués at such time as it will be in possession of all the data necessary to guarantee at least the approximate accuracy of these figures". The government thus assumed the monopoly of information on the harvests.

On June 5, 1927, Signor Ferraguti, one of the high officials who help Mussolini in his wheat battle, announced in the *Popolo d'Italia,* that if the wheat during the next weeks, "the

[1] Banca Commerciale Italiana, *Movimento economico, 1930,* p. 334.

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last critical and decisive phase of ripening", were not subjected to "the ravages of the weather", Italy would have a harvest of over 5.3 million tons. Unfortunately "the ravages of the weather" intervened. In his speech to agriculturalists on October 11, 1927, Mussolini said: "In June began a period of drought which lasted exactly three months and which has, especially in central and southern Italy, parched the countryside." In consequence the crop of 1927 was worse than that of 1926. Professor Mortara commented: "The succession of two unfavorable years proved how unfounded is the ingenuous belief in the constant and strict alternation of a bad and a good year, a belief springing from a hasty interpretation of statistics, relating to a short period of years." [1]

Given these statements, the reader would expect a harvest inferior to 5.3 million tons. As a matter of fact the crop of 1927 was officially declared to be 5.33 million tons. Mussolini, however, was not satisfied even with the official statistics. In his speech of October 11, 1927, he declared that after "all necessary checking had been done, and after discarding over-pessimistic and over-optimistic results", the harvest had amounted not to 5.33 but to 5.5 million tons, "of wheat of the highest quality". The official records, nevertheless, remained fixed at the lower figure of 5.33 million tons.[2]

Anyone who suspected that the new victory was not entirely authentic, would have shed all sinful skepticism on November 7, 1927, when Professor Thompson of Toronto, the Canadian representative at the International Institute of Agriculture, uttered the following words, in the presence of Mussolini: "The work of Signor Mussolini has carried Italy to an exceptional degree of development, not only from the political but also from the agricultural point of view. The wheat battle has shown the world what can be done for the economic progress of the nations." [3]

A mocking destiny, however, seems to have accompanied

[1] *Prospettive economiche, 1928,* p. 42.

[2] *Bolletino mensile di statistica,* Nov. 1927, p. 713; *Annuario statistico italiano, 1930,* p. 574.

[3] *Corriere della Sera,* November 8, 1927.

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the agricultural triumphs of the Duce. The farmers, discouraged by the bad harvests of two years and by the fall in wheat prices, had begun to reduce the consumption of fertilizers in the first half of 1927,[1] and continued to do so in the second half of the year despite a drop of from twenty to forty per cent in the price of fertilizers.[2] In a circular of September 13, 1927, the Minister for Public Economy wrote:

> Despite the reduction in prices, the Ministry notices that the orders for fertilizers in the current year are proceeding very slowly, so much so that at the end of August they showed an exceedingly small percentage in comparison with the orders for 1926. Any farmer who restricted his use of technical aids to production would be acting against his real permanent interests and working for his own direct loss and the loss of the Nation: both to be deprecated and prevented with Fascist determination.[3]

The farmers continued to be deaf. In 1927, according to the statement made by the Minister in the Chamber on March 31, 1928, the consumption of fertilizers was fifty per cent less than in 1926. So, in January 1928 the Ministry published another circular:

> A further examination of the rate of consumption of chemical fertilizers discloses three main facts: (a) the continuance of the already noted decline in the consumption of fertilizers generally; the prospects for the winter and spring consumption of superphosphates are still far from promising; on the contrary, the prospects for the consumption of nitrates are promising; (b) the general decline in consumption has been proved

[1] *Relazione del Consiglio d'Amministrazione della Società Montecatini* in *Popolo d'Italia,* March 31, 1927. American observers in Italy also noticed this fact. In the *Commerce Reports* issued by the Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in Washington, June 2, 1930, one reads: "Following the revaluation of the lira, prices of agricultural products dropped in terms of the lira. Farmers were short of money and dissatisfied with returns from the crops of 1926. In 1927, therefore, only 1,218,000 tons of superphosphates were applied to the soil (as against 1,540,000 tons in 1926): the lowest consumption since 1922. During 1928, consumption recovered to 1,312,000 tons, and in 1929 made a further advance to 1,505,000 tons".

[2] *Popolo d'Italia,* July 23, 1927.

[3] *Stampa,* September 14, 1927.

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to be relatively more serious in central and northern Italy; (c) further, allowing for the farmer's diminished returns owing to the bad season last year, it often happens that farmers who have not used fertilizers are among those best provided with economic resources.[1]

To the restricted use of fertilizers decided upon by a considerable number of farmers were added "the ravages of the weather".[2] Furthermore the area under cultivation slightly decreased.[3]

In spite of these three facts, an official communiqué prophesied before the end of April that "the harvest would exceed all those obtained in the first three years of the wheat battle, if cold winds did not arise at the moment of reaping."[4] The secretary of the permanent council for the wheat battle specified that the harvest would amount to 7 million tons.[5] As 7 million tons did not appear to be a harvest worthy of the Duce's powers, other Fascist experts forecast 8 million tons, and began to discuss how to avoid a disastrous fall in wheat prices as the consequence of such a magnificent harvest.[6]

A long silence followed these prophecies and discussions. Finally on September 1, 1928, an official communiqué announced: "The reports on the production of wheat are still good; yet there is reason to think that the estimated figure of 6.4 million tons [no longer 7 or 8 millions] will be slightly diminished by the shortage, which is more serious than was at first believed."[7] Three days later, the Minister for National Economy officially announced that the harvest had amounted to

[1] *Corriere della Sera,* January 19, 1928; *cf.* Banca Commerciale Italiana: *Movimento economico dell' Italia, 1930,* pp. 322-3.

[2] Article by Professor Masé Dari, in *Resto del Carlino,* April 16, 1928; Mortara, *Prospettive economiche, 1929,* p. 33: "The year 1928 has been only moderately favorable to the wheat crop."

[3] 4,976,000 hectares in 1927, and 4,963,000 in 1928: Banca Commerciale Italiana, *op. cit.,* p. 334.

[4] *Corriere della Sera,* April 18, 1928. The communiqué admitted that "in some districts the persistent rains caused some damage".

[5] Interview with the *Tevere,* April 8, 1928.

[6] *Resto del Carlino,* April 16, 1928.

[7] *Corriere della Sera,* September 2, 1928.

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"6 million tons or slightly less". For this gratifying result he gave credit to Mussolini, "author of our wonderful revival". The ultimate official figure was 6.22 million tons.[1]

Mussolini declared: "The year's results are to be regarded as highly satisfactory, especially because the other European countries, which like us have had to contend with bad weather, have had a harvest considerably lower than the normal." [2]

How it was possible, with a bad season and a decline in the consumption of fertilizers, to exceed the production of the most excellent years, is one of the mysteries of Fascist statistics.

Now that such a bad year had given such a good harvest, the problem actually arose how to avoid a fall in prices. The remedy was at hand. On September 13, 1928, the import duty was increased from 75 to 110 gold lire per ton. "The benefit accruing to producers from the present measure amounts to about 500 million lire", explained the Fascist *Corriere della Sera,* September 14, 1928. It would have been more correct to explain that the middlemen had pocketed the largest share of these 500,000,000 lire.

IV

Despite the increased tariff, the area under wheat in 1929 fell from 4,963,000 to 4,776,000 hectares;[3] but an increased use of fertilizers[4] combined with good weather ultimately gave an excellent harvest. According to the official statistics, it amounted to 7.09 million tons. But in October 1929, the American Commercial Attaché in Rome sent a report to the Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in Washington, in which one reads: "Considerable scepticism has been expressed over the officially announced 7 million tons for the year's wheat harvest." [5]

The wheat harvest was excellent in the whole of Europe in 1929. In France, it was reported to exceed that of 1928 by

[1] *Annuario statistico italiano, 1930,* p. 574.

[2] *Corriere della Sera,* September 4, 1928.

[3] Banca Commerciale Italiana, *Movimento economico, 1930,* p. 338.

[4] *Annuario statistico italiano, 1930,* p. 179.

[5] *Commerce Reports,* October 14, 1929, p. 88.

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1.5 million tons, and no one gave the credit for this surplus either to the President of the Republic or to the Prime Minister. Professor Mortara writes:

> The harvest of 1929 is the largest one Italy has ever known. The meteorological conditions in northern Italy were not exceptionally favorable to wheat growing. In northern Italy, and especially in the valley of the Po, the high yield of 1929 is the result of technical amelioration, tenaciously protracted through adverse circumstances. In central Italy, the more modest progress seems to be the upshot of gradual increase, and consequently may be considered as permanent. In southern and insular Italy, it is to be feared that the brusque leap in production is, for the greater part, the effect of a propitious season. As to the cultivated area, we note that from 1923 to 1929 it diminished by 61,000 hectares in the North, and by 65,000 hectares in central Italy, while it increased by 160,000 in the South and by 155,000 in the islands. The import duty on wheat has favored the extension of its cultivation in regions where the lowest productivity is linked with the highest cost of production; but it seems that it had there the least effect on the amelioration of productive technique.[1]

The Italian Commercial Bank (Banca Commerciale Italiana) reached identical conclusions:

> To this comforting result [the increased harvest] the favorable weather contributed especially in southern Italy. By comparing the increase of 1.35 million tons in 1929 with the quinquennial average, the North participates in the measure of twenty-one per cent, central Italy in the measure of seven per cent, and the rest of the peninsula by seventy-two per cent.[2]

This fine harvest was accompanied by a new increase of the import duty from 110 to 140 gold lire per ton, on May 24, 1929, that is to say, on the eve of the harvest. At last the increased duty went not to middlemen, as in the preceding years, but to the producers.

[1] *Prospettive economiche, 1930,* p. 26.

[2] *Movimento economico dell' Italia, 1930,* pp. 377. Another authority, Signor Mazzucchelli, writing in the *Rivista Bancaria,* Jan. 15, 1930, p. 39, confirms these figures.

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The meteorological misfortunes of 1930 were manifold. This is Mussolini's own description of them:

> After an unduly mild winter, spring set in with heavy and persistent rains, during the last three weeks of May, and caused widespread laying of the crops which had grown prematurely tall owing to the absence of winter cold. It was not always possible to fight the rust and other diseases on the water-logged soil. Just before harvest time a heat-wave caused the premature ripening of the grain.[1]

Notwithstanding these adversities, Mussolini had previously announced, on June 4, a yield "not inferior to 6 million tons".[2] An official communiqué of August 25, 1930, announced that the harvest had been "slightly inferior to 6.1 million tons, despite the bad weather," and, but for Mussolini's relentless battle, it would not have exceeded 4 million tons, the figure for 1917. The year 1917, it may be remarked, yielded the worst harvest of the war period! Finally on September 11, 1930, Mussolini declared the yield to have been 5.8 million tons.

Franco Sacchetti, an Italian story-teller of the fourteenth century, tells how Bernabó Visconti, the capricious tyrant of Milan, insisted that a certain abbot, in lieu of a fine, should tell him the distance between the earth and the sky, and how much water the sea contained. The abbot did not know what to answer, but his miller appeared before the tyrant in his stead and stated that according to his measurements the distance between the sky and the earth was 36,854,072½ miles and 22 feet. "How can you prove this?" asked Bernabó. "Have it measured, Sir, and if it is not so, command me to be hanged by the neck!" It was more difficult to say how much water the sea contained, as it was "a thing which always moves and into which fresh water always flows." Still, he was able to affirm that the sea contained 25,982,000,000 fathoms, 7 barrels, 12 decanters and 2 glassfuls of water.

[1] *Corriere della Sera,* Sept. 12, 1930. See also semi-official communiqué in the press of July 5, 1930, and *Rivista Bancaria,* August 15, 1930, p. 694.

[2] *Corriere della Sera,* June 5, 1930.

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"How do you know that?"—"I found out as best I could; if you don't believe me, have it measured and if you do not find it to be so, have me quartered". Bernabó judged the answer quite intelligent and decided that the miller should become abbot and the abbot a miller.

Together with the news of the 6 million tons yielded by the harvest of 1930, Mussolini on June 4 gave out another announcement, designed to prove the efficiency of the Fascist régime: the import duty on wheat would be increased again, for a fourth time, from 140 to 165 gold lire (about $33) per ton. The Minister of Agriculture, in his speech of June 5, commented on this joyful news in the following words: "The Duce pledged himself to support the agriculturalists in their wheat battle against the hostility of an unmanageable and barren land and against the caprices of the Mediterranean climate. This pledge has been kept, as usual." The press was ordered to glorify this fourth increase in the duty as "beneficial to the producer and to the consumer" and as "deserving the applause not only of the agriculturalists but of the entire nation".[1]

V

Here the story must pause for the present. A first deduction to be drawn from it is that the official statistics of wheat production in Italy have since 1925 been systematically tampered with for the glorification of the dictatorship. They indicate not so much the actual state of things as what the régime would like the people to believe. My surmise is that the official figures every year have overestimated the actual crops by an average of 0.5 million tons.

Apart from these doubts, certain other conclusions can, however, be reached.

(1) The increase in production manifest in Italy before the World War and checked by the war, became evident again in 1921 and 1922 and has continued ever since. Consequently a harvest which twenty years ago would have counted as a good one, is now regarded as a bad one. It would be unfair to say

[1] *Corriere della Sera*, June 6, 1930.

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that the campaign of education and propaganda which accompanied the Battle of Wheat from 1925 onward has been entirely in vain; but it would be equally unfair to claim that without it the progress already manifest would have been arrested. Undoubtedly the protective duty on wheat, reinstated in 1925 and increased in the following year, encouraged wheat cultivation in southern Italy and the islands.

(2) Imports from 1921 onward have been as follows[1]:

Before the Battle of Wheat:	1921	2.72	million tons
	1922	3.13	" "
	1923	1.89	" "
	1924	2.40	" "
	1925	1.83	" "
After the Battle of Wheat:	1926	2.36	" "
	1927	2.39	" "
	1928	2.38	" "
	1929	1.18	" "[1]

These figures show that the Battle of the Wheat did not succeeding in making Italy self-supporting, but it had the not negligible result of lowering the average annual imports from 2.40 million tons in 1921-25 to 2.08 million tons in 1926-29, while the population rose from 40.1 millions on January 1, 1926, to 41.5 millions on January 1, 1930. The rise in wheat production met the rise in population. This, however, is not a new fact in Italian economic history. From 1900 to 1914 the population increased from 30.5 to 34.6 millions, whereas imports remained stationary: 1.04 million tons in 1901 and 1.01 million tons in 1914. Home production, rising from 3.4 to 5 million tons, met not only the needs of the increasing population but also its enhanced purchasing power. Similarly from 1921 to 1926 the population rose from 38.7 to 40.1 millions and home production followed suit.

(3) As a result of the wheat tariff the Italian consumer pays about 75 dollars for a ton of wheat which but for the

[1] In the above table imports are calculated from August 1 of the year mentioned to July 31 of the following year. Up to 1928 the figures are taken from Mortara, *Prospettive economiche, 1930,* p. 43. For 1929 see *Rivista Bancaria,* Aug. 15, 1930, p. 694, and official communiqué of Aug. 5, 1930, published in the press of the following day.

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duty would cost him only 45 dollars. The government levies on imported wheat about 60 million dollars per annum, and the home producers enjoy an annual gain of 110 million dollars over what they would receive in the open market. The large landowners get the lion's share of this increment.

A family of industrial workers or of agricultural laborers, consisting of a father, a mother and three children under twelve years of age, consumes 2,000 lbs. of wheat a year. It consequently pays on its bread an additional price of about twenty-nine dollars a year. As the average annual wage of an industrial worker in Italy, when in employment, is approximately $250 a year, and that of the agricultural laborer about $150, it follows that the industrial worker pays, on the daily bread of his family, a tax amounting to more than ten per cent of his annual wage, and the agricultural laborer eighteen per cent. When these wages are diminished by unemployment, especially frequent during the winter, the weight of the duty becomes crushing. Mussolini's "Battle of Wheat" is in effect a battle against the consumer of wheat.

GAETANO SALVEMINI

LONDON, ENGLAND

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RUSSIA—THE INDUSTRIAL LABORATORY

RUSSIA has aroused interest as a melodrama but it has not been sufficiently appreciated as a laboratory. For in the U. S. S. R. there are at present all of the paraphernalia of capitalism stripped of what was supposed to be its chief dynamic — the profit motive. Russian industrial activities have furnished us with a controlled experiment on a gigantic scale, whose workings, particularly at the present stage, furnish a wealth of material to business men and students specializing in various branches of capitalistic economy. Russians have concocted an economic beverage like Sanka or Kaffee Hag with the profit caffeine extracted. In this way we can have—so it is hoped—all the delights of coffee and still feel virtuous—all the benefits of industrial production without the odium of profiteering.

In Russia today there are state corporations called trusts with all the attributes of our corporations except stock and stockholders and what Marxians have called "dividend mongering". So like are they to capitalistic corporations that the directors and officers of these trusts have developed a corporation consciousness. Despite the fact that the profits of their corporation eventually go to the state, there have been cases of directors and officers of such trusts who have been charged with being more interested in the success of their particular enterprise than in the welfare of the state as a whole or in the welfare of the workers employed therein. Russia has its syndicates not unlike German cartels or our own coöperative marketing associations. They have banks and bankers, discussions about inflation or deflation, about whether too much or too little credit has been introduced into industry, whether inventories are too large or too small and whether prices are too high or too low. They have their problems of finance and problems of distribution. Indeed the complaints of excessive costs of distribution sound strangely familiar to the ears of American visitors. They have no stock exchange but they

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have an active commodity exchange which looks surprisingly like any of our wheat pits or produce exchanges. An active exchange business takes place between representatives of their different trusts and syndicates. They have many Chambers of Commerce which give banquets with many speeches just as our own Chambers of Commerce do. They even have that phenomenon supposed by Marx and Marxians to be confined to bourgeois capitalism—namely economic crises.

This is what makes present-day Russia so intriguing. We recognize the usual capitalistic forms. But it is easy to be misled by this surface similarity. To suggest that Russia has "gone capitalistic" because she has adopted these forms is to play with words. There is in Russia today no private control of the means of production, and private profit is in such homeopathic doses as to be negligible. It is barred except purely in the interests of expediency in certain limited areas and for certain limited periods. "Socialistic emulation" between different factors or groups has been substituted for individualistic emulation between different persons. The forms are capitalist, but the spirit is communist and in strict conformity with the Marxian dogma of a society of and for the proletariat.

It as as if we stepped into another economic planet whose inhabitants at first glance seemed to be just like those on earth but on closer examination proved to have some other life-giving fluid than blood in their veins. No doubt an excursion to such a planet would yield intensely interesting data to a visiting physiologist. So Russia, the Marxian Mars, offers interesting material to the visiting economist.

In the mining field, in enterprises with which the writer has been connected, it is often found expedient to erect "test plants" in which experiments are conducted on a scale much larger than in a laboratory and indeed large enough to indicate the economics involved. In these plants, one chemical ingredient or another is often deliberately omitted in order to see how the process works without this particular element. A comparable method of conducting experiments in the economic field is not easy to work out. For of course to have any

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significance it would involve conducting experiments over a wide area and asking individuals to change life-long habits. In Russia today we have offered a ready-made testing plant in the economic field on a nation-wide basis, and it would be folly not to take advantage of such facilities for study.

Take for example the matter of crises. It has been claimed by Marxians that crises are wholly a phenomenon of capitalism caused by the element of private profit—the logical inference being that with private profit eliminated crises would disappear. Yet they have crises in Soviet Russia where private profit is negligible. Perhaps this may suggest that crises are inevitable in any large-scale economy which involves adjustments between agriculture and industry. Perhaps it may lead to other conclusions. But that here is an opportunity to learn more about the causes of crises there can be no doubt.

However, it is particularly in the management field that the Russian experiment offers interesting data. Some of the stock economic assumptions in that field may have to be overhauled as a result of what we are learning from the situations that have been manifested in this non-profit society. It has been one of the much repeated *clichés* that the main obstacle "in getting from labor a hearty and maximum effort,"[1] is its discontent with the "profiteering" element in our economic system. The conclusion was inferred that once that element was eliminated labor would become efficient. As a consequence, there has been a tendency to belittle the significance of modern personnel and management movements and to rate them as of minor and not major importance in relation to the labor problem. The suggestion that labor dissatisfaction could be mitigated by the introduction of first-rate management methods—that is by analyzing and applying the principles of teamwork and morale as one does in organizing a football team—was in many quarters waved aside as at best superficial and naïve, and at worst disingenuous.

The problem, it has been claimed, is more fundamental. Capitalistic exploitation should be removed and all would be well. The ironing out of the great inequalities of wealth and

[1] Ramsay MacDonald, *Socialism, Critical and Constructive.*

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income would mean the vanishing of any disposition on the part of the workingman to malinger or "make work". The workingman would do his full share. As a corollary the tendency of management to keep wages down, to resist legislation regulating hours, to ignore safety requirements and to cut piece rates were commonly assumed to be due to the pressure of stockholders upon the management, or at least to the subconscious desire of the manager to please the investors in his enterprise.

Therefore it is useful for students of industrial processes to turn to Russia where they are using the decentralized corporate forms created by capitalism but have eliminated the supposedly objectionable element in capitalism, namely private profit.

If we accept the stock assumptions just described we should of course expect the labor problem in Russia to present quite a different aspect from the problem as it appears in capitalistic countries. For example, we should expect to find relatively little labor malingering and no managerial indifference to labor welfare.

Now, curiously enough, a visitor to Russia finds very little difference between the labor problems that arise in Russia and those that appear elsewhere. We find much the same difficulties that we find in early stages in capitalistic countries. This is true both as to the attitude of management and the attitude of labor.

In the first place it is interesting to find Russian union leaders complaining, in very much the same spirit as our own unions, of the tendency of the managers of state trusts to reduce wages. This indicates that the friction caused by economic adjustments is no different in a non-profit régime from what it is in a profit régime.

We find that the attitude of state-appointed industrial managers in a non-profit economic system is not very different from that of a shareholder-elected management in a state where private profit prevails.

For example we find statements in the official press of April 1929 that: "While the unions admit the necessity of an increase of individual output on the basis of the stabilised wages,

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. . . certain trusts have decided to carry out an automatic reduction of wages."

The cutting of piece rates has always been a storm center of complaint against *laissez-faire* capitalism. It is therefore interesting to find that this very process was at work in Russia to some extent during the years 1928 and 1929 under the direction of Soviet directors of state industry. It is stated by the trade-union press early in June, 1929, "that the Supreme Economic Council . . . has found itself compelled to raise the standards of individual output and reduce piece rates".

Mr. Tomsky, who at that time was the head of the Trade Union Council, complained of the fact that certain directors of state industry "choose the line of least resistance and economize as far as possible at the expense of the workers".

Then there are complaints of Soviet directors' lack of regard for labor regulations. Certain directors of state industry, it is claimed, "still regard labor protection as an unproductive extra expense."

New undertakings, it has been claimed, have been set up without sufficient attention to the requirements of safety. The situation is often startlingly similar to situations which arise under our own industrial régime when it is attempted to apply scientific management. For example at the joint conference of the Trade Union Council and the Supreme Economic Council in 1928 we hear that:

> The trade union representatives alleged that rationalization was frequently used as a pretext for getting rid of undesirable workers, who were immediately replaced by others. This helped to increase unemployment.

On the other hand there is one field in which Russia is setting an example to the rest of the world. That is in her provision for workers' dwellings and community houses. In her insistence that the managers of the state industries shall not neglect the employees of these industries by failure to provide such facilities, Russia is giving a demonstration of modernization in its highest sense.

And now to discuss the attitude of Russian labor toward

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management. Both Russian managers and their foreign technical advisers resident in Russia complain of the slackness of labor, malingering, making work. This impression of a passing visitor is confirmed by Russia's official statements. There have been elaborate campaigns exhorting labor to be efficient in the great cause for which they are working. In her endeavor to stimulate efficiency she is using methods not dissimilar to those used in our drives for philanthropic causes. Just as we have our various "Weeks" for various causes Russia has her "Industrial Days". The Five Year Plan is of course a serious industrial project but it also serves as a slogan to speed up production. Visitors to Russian factories cannot fail to observe placards iterating and reiterating such slogans as:

> Efficiency is the weapon in the hands of the Soviets in their fight against capitalism.
>
> Every percentage of decrease of cost of production will give us power.

In other words the workmen are asked to be efficient in order to consolidate their own power. Still the efficiencies that might be expected as a result of this plea are not secured. Indeed labor discipline has become one of Russia's major problems.

Here are some paraphrases of what appears in their official press. (Soviet Russia, it may be said to her credit, has adopted the policy, in the interests of efficiency, of not concealing her weaknesses.)

> Wages have risen more rapidly and output more slowly than had been calculated. . . . The industrial authorities, the Commissariat of Labour and the trade unions, are agreed that the chief reason for this is to be found in the slack state of discipline which pervades the industrial undertakings run by the State.
>
> The carrying out of the economic programme is impeded by unjustifiable absences on the part of the workers, suspension of work in undertakings, a relative increase in waste of materials, failure to carry out the orders of the administrative and technical staff.

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> As the result the Government of the Soviet Union published on 6 March, 1929 an Order which is intended to raise discipline in the factories.

There is reference to—

> the number of attempts made by the workers to damage machinery in order to stop production and receive wages without working for them, the insults and injuries to which the technical staff is subject.

This all sounds much like the ca'canny and sabotage of capitalistic economic life.

We have heard discussion, among American and Russian engineers active in Russian industries, of the tendency to "make work" "to string out the job." According to the orthodox explanation such soldiering was supposed to be confined to the fear of capitalistic unemployment. There is the same fear of socialistic unemployment. In discussions with engineering consultants responsible for production results the writer listened to complaints that the men were resistant to orders and had been encouraged to argue about instructions given them. This, according to our informants, had a demoralizing effect on the technicians.

The industrial leaders in charge of Russian state corporations have complained bitterly of too much interference on the part of union leaders and labor committees.

The stock assumption has been that such opposition to unions was confined to profiteering employers in capitalistic countries fearful of increased expense for payroll or work conditions. The conventional conception of unionism has been that it is a vehicle to protect the laborer from predatory profiteering employers and to prevent such employers from taking advantage of the unequal bargaining power of laborers. The corollary was that opposition to unionism has been wholly due to the greed of capitalists. Many economic students have not suspected that the elimination of the element of private profit would still leave on our hands the problem of reconciling the demands of unions for the protection of their members against discharge — a perfectly human desire — with the

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demands of management for efficiency. They have not suspected that one factor in the opposition to unions was administrative impatience with disorganizing influences, an impatience that is characteristic of administrative authority everywhere. Yet this fact experience in Russia conclusively proves.

According to a member of the Supreme Economic Council,

> the attitude of the Commissariat of Labour has a demoralizing effect on hardworking and disciplined workers. He declares that the organs of the Commissariat re-instate workers dismissed for the most serious infringements of labour-discipline, rowdy conduct or assaulting the technical and administrative staff. . . .
>
> At the same time certain unions admit that they have shown complacency towards disorderly persons.

In Russia all the fruits of labor go to the proletariat. In Russia as elsewhere it is very properly felt that labor should be given, in addition to the physical products of toil, the intangible educational advantages of "self-determination" within the factory. But in Russia as elsewhere they have found that in industrial activities self-determination must be harmonized with efficiency.

Instead of dual control—that is, sharing control with workmen—no doubt there will be substituted, as there has been in this country, the principle of consultation.

No visitor to Russia or reader of Russian documents can fail to be impressed with the fact that making unionism compatible with industrial effectiveness is one of the major problems that has arisen there.

A *New York Times* despatch of September 8th, 1929, states:

> An order was published today by the Bolshevist party's Central Committee. It provides that Soviet factory managers must be obeyed by all workers, whatever rank these may happen to hold in the local Bolshevist party or in their trade union section. It is decreed that a real single command must henceforth exist in all factories; and the trade unions, shop stewards' committees, etc. are told to cease attempting to usurp managerial functions.

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So we find that the psychology of the workers and managers does not alter with any régime. Substantially the same principles must be applied to secure continuous systematic work in a socialistic régime as in a régime of private profit. Indeed in the elementary stage of an industrial program such as we have in Russia it is not so possible to permit democratic methods as it is at a later stage. To induce individuals to perform hard work continuously together for any length of time means that certain principles of leadership must be adopted. Such principles differ of course somewhat with different types of leaders. They vary somewhat with the different varieties of economic systems, but it is surprising how little they do vary. This would seem to be a fair deduction from recent Russian experience.

There are other conclusions one may properly reach. One of these is that the psychology of the manager is not very different in a non-profit from that in a profit régime. Russia, like other nations, is finding that in order to secure the production upon which the economic well-being of a nation depends it does not suffice to have a large number of happy, contented, industrious workingmen. It is also necessary to have a sufficient number of contented, experienced members of the managerial and technical group. It is one of the ironies of economic life that the extent to which the success and prosperity of a nation depend upon this conscientious, patient, unpretentious group is largely underestimated. The contribution of this group is usually undervalued in favor of more obviously dramatic matters such as physical resources, credit, and plentiful labor. It is in securing the services of this group that Russia faces one of her most urgent problems. Credit is essential to Russia, but so is industrial leadership. It is not so much a matter of the heads of industries, that is the generals, as of the seconds in command, that is the colonels, captains and lieutenants.

Because of her political philosophy and strategy Russia is desirous if possible not to depend on foreign industrial leadership. Foreigners are to be employed mostly for consulting services and then only, as far as possible, temporarily. Her

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managers and technicians during the pre-revolutionary era were largely foreigners and so the number of "native" Russian technicians is small. To overcome this weakness, Russia is endeavoring to train tens of thousands of technicians. This audacious project aiming to modernize suddenly a rather primitive people is what makes Russia so fascinating.

The result is that it is particularly important to Russia to make the position of the technical executives a happy one. The Soviet leaders have come to appreciate that any economic system to be efficient must fit not only the psychology of the worker but also the psychology of the production executives. They have at present, I believe, a keen realization that as a manager is a necessary instrument for production, his ability to function effectively is essential. One placard seen in the shops located in the oil fields read:

> The Captains of industry, the engineers and technicians, have to be leaders of the socialistic contest.

Thus experience in Russia—the Marxian laboratory—confirms the conclusion that the problem of management to secure an adequate industrial production is as much an administrative as an economic problem. Both management and labor behave very much the same under non-private profit as under a private profit system. Russian experience proves that the abolition of the system of private profit will not cure all the problems of the relations between employer and employees. It brings us to the rather surprising and paradoxical conclusion that there can be a "labor problem" where there is no conflict between capital and labor.

SAM A. LEWISOHN

NEW YORK CITY

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ENGLAND'S CONTROVERSY OVER THE SECRET BALLOT

WITH the demand for Parliamentary Reform in the 19th century came an insistent cry for the secret ballot. The subject had not been unknown to an earlier [1] era, but within the century from the decade of the 'thirties until the 'seventies, probably no topic more frequently [2] engaged the attention of political leaders.

Shortly after the victory over Napoleon, Benthamites began to take an active interest in the question. Bentham himself published the *Radical Reform Bill* in 1819 in which he called for secret, universal, equal and annual suffrage. The *Westminster Review,* leading organ of the Philosophical Radicals, followed, in the 'twenties, with writings in favor of the ballot,[3] and the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Examiner* were newspapers which maintained what was then known as a radical tone in dealing with this current problem.[4] The latter, indeed, together with the *Westminster Review,* displayed sufficient ability as champions of the movement to have made a decided impression on the country. Mainly attributable to their efforts, according to the hostile *Fraser's Magazine,* were "the loud calls, which, by newspaper, pamphlet, declamation at public meetings, and petition to the House of Commons . . . urged . . . the introduction of this mode of reform." [5]

It was in the *Westminster Review* of July, 1930, that James

[1] See Porritt, Edwin, *The Unreformed House of Commons,* 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1903), vol. I, pp. 207, 537-8; Butler, J. R. M., *The Passing of the Great Reform Bill* (London, 1914), p. 7; Harris, William, *The History of the Radical Party in Parliament* (London, 1885), pp. 30-32; Hansard, vol. 100 (3rd series), 1225; vol. 157, 188 *et seq.*; vol. 207, 755 *et seq.*

[2] Hodder, Edwin, *Life and Work of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury,* 3 vols. (London, 1888), vol. III, p. 291.

[3] *Cf. Westminster Review* for 1825.

[4] Mrs. Grote, *The Personal Life of George Grote* (London, 1873), p. 59.

[5] *Fraser's,* vol. II (January, 1931), p. 733.

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Mill published anonymously his famous article "On the Ballot". Perhaps no other single piece of writing did so much to stir up discussion on the topic. Mill regarded this to be the real question: "Whether the people who vote, should really have the choice of the member of Parliament; Or should only go through the formalities, the mummery of voting, including in it the prostitution of an oath, little regarded by a religious people;—while the whole power of choosing, should be really possessed by other parties". Whereas the major part of the public men of England, Mill wrote, assume that the suffrage is now free and treat the proposition of the ballot as contemptible or odious, the real situation frequently is as follows:

> The voter for a member of Parliament has a trust placed in his hands, on the discharge of which the highest interests of his country depend. . . . To render this high obligation more binding still, the sanction of an oath is added. The voter swears, that he will not betray, but will faithfully execute, his trust. What happens? The unfortunate voter is in the power of some opulent man; the opulent man informs him how he must vote. Conscience, virtue, moral obligation, religion, all cry to him, that he ought to consult his own judgment, and faithfully follow its dictates. The consequences of pleasing, or offending, the opulent man, stare him in the face; the oath is violated, the moral obligation is disregarded, a faithless, a prostitute, a pernicious vote is given.

In consequence of the situation, the people of England, he declared, do not elect the members of Parliament but allow a few men to choose at least a majority of members. What gives the small number of men the power of choosing is the openness of voting. The openness of voting, therefore, corrupts the government of England, and corrupts the morals of the people of England. The ballot, however, will annihilate bribery and corruption as well as the excessive expense of elections.

Before the end of 1830 the *Morning Chronicle* was roundly asserting that "without the ballot the exercise of the franchise would be illusory" and that "to an honest man, without the

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protection of the ballot, the franchise would be the heaviest of all curses".[1] Parliament also had listened to speeches upon the subject[2] and witnessed during this year what the *Annual Register* called the first attempt to introduce a principle new to the representation of the country.[3] The proposition had come from Mr. O'Connell—"the most restless and reckless of all demagogues". Only twenty-one had voted for it but among them were Lord Althorp, Sir Francis Burdett and Joseph Hume. Lord John Russell and Brougham, however, came out against secret voting. But data[4] on the prevalence of bribery advertised a cause which already had many supporters and by 1831 the pamphleteer[5] found the question of vote by ballot agitated everywhere. A magazine[6] proclaimed it to be a theme of such daily discussion at every public gathering, and in almost every newspaper, that all the arguments for and against it could be treated as nearly familiar to its readers. References in the *Examiner* as well as petitions to the House prove the activity of its proponents in organization and public meetings.

Enthusiasm led, indeed, to the appearance on Sunday, January 2nd, 1831, of the first issue of the *Ballot*. The title declared in one word its political creed. Its announcement informed the public that no plan of Reform could effectively relieve the people or give stability to a popular government, unless it included vote by ballot. It soon warned[7] Earl Grey as head of the ministry that if he should temporize, he was a lost man, that he must fix his reliance upon the people, and not upon a corrupt House of Commons, not upon a host of placemen and sinecurists. But let the Earl's scheme be one of justice, including short Parliaments, the extension of the

[1] Quoted from *Fraser's Magazine*, vol. III (1831).

[2] Hansard (new series), vol. 23, 784-785, 356 *et seq.*

[3] *Annual Register*, vol. 72 (1830), p. 94.

[4] *Cf. Annual Register*, vol. 72 (1830), pp. 94, 95; *Fraser's*, vol. II (January, 1831).

[5] *Cf.* Ord, William Henry, *A Dialogue on Election by Ballot* (London, 1831).

[6] *Quarterly Review*, vol. 44 (1831).

[7] Issue of January 23.

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franchise to all taxpayers, and vote by ballot, and the Grey administration not only would succeed in freeing the country from its innumerable burdens but would be the strongest, the most virtuous, and the most popular ministry that ever shielded the English throne.

A week later this newspaper was pleading that the ballot was the best protection for independent voting to *all* parties and that its adoption must lead to the utter annihilation of those scandalous and abominable scenes which were disgracing and corrupting society at every contested election. These facts were felt and known by the people, it continued; hence, at every reform meeting, *without exception,* the proposal of secret voting had been received with loudest acclamations.

That the movement which the *Ballot* represented was gaining ground was attested by the *Times* [1] and the *Globe.*[2]

On the other hand, arguments against the innovation are to be found readily enough. *Fraser's,* borrowing Burke's description of radicalism, declared the whole agitation to be merely the chirping of the grasshoppers.[3] In its opinion the ballot would be useless to the independent voter, to him who pledged and kept his pledge, and would benefit alone the liar and deceiver. It suggested, therefore, that any bill brought into Parliament for the establishment of vote by ballot should be entitled "as truth and common sense would dictate", *An Act for the Encouragement and Increase of Falsehood, Perjury, and Deceit, at Elections for Members of Parliament.* In fact, a fear that violated promises or oaths would affect disastrously national characteristics was the source of much opposition to secret voting. As if, said one writer,[4] in reaction to this kind of argument, there were no fallacy in the contention:

> Trifling with oaths is a part of an English gentleman's edu-

[1] Quoted from the *Examiner,* December 5, 1830.

[2] Quoted in *Fraser's,* vol. III (1831). *Vide* also *Examiner,* December 19, 1830.

[3] *Fraser's,* vol. III (February, 1831). Burke's description may be found in his *Works,* vol. III (1st American edition, Boston, 1807), p. 102.

[4] Fonblanque, Albany, *England Under Seven Administrations,* 3 vols. (London, 1837), vol. II, pp. 13-15. The quotation was written in 1830.

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> cation, and the Testament is kissed with almost as much thought of constancy as the chamber-maid. Youths at the Universities swear without caring to inquire to what observances they have bound themselves; and there is to be observed, wherever the opportunity offers, a preparation of habit for treating an oath as a mere ceremony. In the Custom-house, too, we may see of what force is an oath opposed to interest.

However, to a pamphleteer [1] who formulated a reply to Mill, the fulfillment of promises rather than violated oaths constituted the real menace to ballot: A threat from the landlord would cause men to vote and to get others to vote as he desired, lest all be ousted; bribery could not be touched because both giver and receiver were interested; the corrupt voter would see that unless he kept faith with the bribing candidate, he would lose rewards, *i.e.*, the market would be spoiled; rewards might be promised in case the election of the candidate should be accomplished.

Perhaps more effective than abstract reasoning on the question was the dread of secrecy and change: "He who votes by ballot votes as an individual, he who votes before the world, votes as a component part of a public body." [2] He who wants universal suffrage and ballot should speak plainly and tell us at once that "it is not *Reform,* but *Revolution,* at which he is aiming". [3] Still more concrete arguments were not lacking: [4] The ballot is efficacious for the destruction of the aristocracy and the monarchy.

> From the ballot, there is just one step more to Universal Suffrage and Annual Parliaments—to that happy climax which is to place the wealth of the country, in all its vast and complicated relations, under the legal protection of that physical power whose forbearance we are just now so anxious to propitiate. Reform means Revolution. *A war against prop-*

[1] *Objections to the Ballot.* By a friend to Parliamentary Reform (London, 1831).

[2] *Fraser's,* vol. III (March, 1831).

[3] *Ibid.* (February, 1831).

[4] *Quarterly Review,* vol. 44 (1831).

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erty is the real principle and the only serious pursuit of radicalism.[1]

However much the country was stirred on the question of ballot, those who had the fate of the Reform Bill of 1832 in their hands finally decided against its inclusion in the measure. Members of the cabinet were divided on the issue. Some of them had long since announced their conversion to a change in the mode of voting.[2] They were obliged, however, to forego their purpose of making it a part of the bill when the borough franchise qualification was lowered to £10 in place of the £20 with ballot which had been suggested.[3] The king, in fact, had warned his minister that nothing should ever induce him to yield to it or to sanction a practice which would, in his opinion, be a protection to concealment, would abolish the influence of fear and shame, and would be inconsistent with the manly spirit and the free avowal of opinion which distinguished the people of England.[4]

Reformers claimed that the Reform Act could not have a fair trial without the ballot;[5] they felt like throwing down the scheme "with pain, indignation, and disgust"[6] but upon consideration they thought it better to accept what was given because the ballot was sure to be carried, at all events, in the first session of a reformed Parliament.[7] That the Act itself was nothing more than a "first-step" bill, even in the opinion of boroughmongers, as the *Ballot* declared,[8] was evinced by the serious conservative opposition to such a moderate measure.

But the Reformed Parliament disappointed! In spite of

[1] Italics in the original.

[2] Hansard, vol. 15, 667 *et seq.*

[3] *Vide,* for more details, Butler, *The Passing of the Great Reform Bill,* pp. 179-181, and Seymour, Charles, *Electoral Reform in England and Wales* (New Haven, 1915), pp. 206-7.

[4] Fitzgerald, Percy, *The Life and Times of William IV,* 2 vols. (London, 1884), vol. I, p. 337.

[5] Fonblanque, *op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 289.

[6] *Ballot,* March 6, 1831.

[7] *Cf. Quarterly Review,* vol. 44 (1831).

[8] *Ballot,* July 17, 1831.

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data which proved the seriousness of bribery and in spite of the parliamentary activity of Radicals, a ballot act was not passed. One was proposed by Grote, who in offering himself as candidate for London had advocated secret voting. Radical friends including Mill and Hume decided that he should be the person to undertake the ballot question in Parliament. The leadership now displayed on this subject by the man who was destined to win fame as the historian of Greece led Joseph Parkes to describe him as "a Polar star to all of us — a magnetic needle necessary to steer our course straight",[1] and in introducing the topic he gave a speech which his wife has evaluated as one of the best of the century.[2]

Parliament learned from him that nearly one half of the constituency of the kingdom were unable to call their votes their own, any member of them being liable to suffer pecuniary loss equal to a heavy fine if he voted independently. It learned moreover that numbers of electors saved themselves by refusing to register and others made a compromise by absenting themselves from the poll. It heard him declare that secrecy of voting and freedom of voting were necessary and inseparable companions: that the ballot might not render bribery altogether impracticable but would render it much more difficult, much more complicated, and much more dangerous to the parties concerned, and that for one vote perverted by bribery there were fifty perverted by intimidation. It listened to his answer given to those who thought the vote a public trust to be performed publicly—an answer which emphasized the idea that open voting was not necessary for the performance of a trust, inasmuch as voters ought to be responsible neither to non-voters who were excluded from the franchise *presumably* because of their incapacity of forming any judgment on political subjects, nor to the wealthy who made illegitimate use of their power and station.[3]

But Lord Althorp, former advocate of the ballot, now thought that there was not sufficient necessity for another

[1] Mrs. Grote, *Life of Grote*, p. 112.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[3] Ballot, it was held, would not destroy the legitimate influence of property.

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great constitutional change and Sir Robert Peel, in addition to questioning whether secrecy could be obtained, objected to a system which would make the House more democratic, especially in a time when they had not yet experienced the effects of the Great Reform Bill.

Grote, in spite of failure in 1833, persisted in his endeavors throughout the decade.[1] He was alike interested in bringing motions for the ballot before the House and in devising methods for taking votes so as to ensure secrecy. He and his followers aroused a zealous agitation from 1835 to 1839, advertising their cause by the presentation of petitions, public meetings and organizations. Petitions, for instance, were presented in such great number before the commencement of debate in 1838 that the effect was quite theatrical:[2] the whole opposition side of the House seemed to rise and if there was not "fire in each eye" there were "papers in each hand" and some honorable gentlemen seemed positively encumbered with the load. Petitions would have been still more numerous, said Mr. Ward,[3] had voters dared to speak out, but in many instances to sign a petition would have been little less than rebellion against the sovereignty of landlords.[4]

Meetings were held in great number and in various sections of the country, as the *Examiner* proves. Sometimes they took place in honor of ballot advocates,[5] sometimes apparently in an attempt to exhibit to the public Mr. Grote's box, sometimes merely in the more prosaic task of giving inspiration through speeches and resolutions. Organizations such as the Ballot Union,[6] the Brighton Constitutional and Liberal Association,[7]

[1] *Cf.* Hansard, vol. 28 (1835), 369-395; vol. 34 (1836), 781-807 (speech based largely on bribery and intimidation committee report of 1835), vol. 37 (1837), 8-33; vol. 40 (1838), 1131-1155; vol. 48 (1839), 442-450.

[2] *Examiner,* February 18, 1838.

[3] *Cf. infra* for Mr. Ward's activity.

[4] *Vide,* also, for petitions at this time, *Spectator,* vol. II (January–June, 1838), p. 155.

[5] *Cf.*, for instance, one given to Mr. Berkeley, *Examiner,* Jan. 13, 1839.

Mrs. Grote, *Life of Grote,* p. 109.

[7] *Cf.* data in *Examiner,* Feb. 11, 1838.

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and the Birmingham Political Union [1] were not uninfluential in this connection.

Perhaps the importance of the agitation can be judged by the large number of pamphlets published in 1837, 1838 and 1839 on the subject of ballot. Many of these are more interesting to follow than the Parliamentary speeches which presented similar arguments. Lewin,[2] for instance, gave reply to those who asked: "if voters vote in secret why should not members deliberate and vote in secret also?" He contended that if it were better for the public interests that members should deliberate and vote in secret, then it were well to let them do so: But open voting tended to corrupt the *voter* whereas it tended essentially to preserve the purity of the *member*. Since public opinion and the growth of intelligence were not apparently causing any limitation of intimidation and since ballot petitions were signed with few exceptions by those persons who were in dependent conditions of life, he considered the ballot the great panacea for election evils. In attempting to quell the fear frequently expressed that secret voting would tend to make Englishmen addicted to lying, he quoted the philosopher:

> It is evident that no voter . . . could vote *contrary to his promise* under the system of secret voting, unless he had made a promise to vote *contrary to his opinion*. . . . The real question therefore, is whether an elector, having promised to vote contrary to his opinion, is at liberty on reflection to break that promise, by actually giving his vote according to his opinion . . . the elector in these cases is *not* obliged to perform what the promise requires, because he was under a prior obligation to the contrary, *viz.*, to vote according to his own conscience. . . . The guilt, therefore, of such promises lies in the making, not in the breaking of them; and if, in the interval betwixt the promise and the performance, a man so far recovers his reflection as to repent of his engagements, he ought certainly to break through them.[3]

[1] *Cf.* data in *Examiner*, August 12, 1838.

[2] Lewin, Thomas, *On the Duties of Voters and On the Vote by Ballot*, (London, 1837).

[3] The same argument is to be found in Grote's parliamentary speech of 1833.

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"It is a great sin to swear unto a sin,
But greater still to keep a sinful oath.
Who can be bound, by any solemn vow,
To do a murderous deed, to rob a man,
To force a spotless virgin's chastity,
To reave the orphan of his patrimony,
To wring the widow from her 'customed right;
And have no other reason for his wrong
But that he was bound by a solemn oath?"

John Taylor [1] in *Letters on the Ballot* [2] and S. C. Denison in *Is the Ballot a Mistake* [3] listed the arguments both for and against the ballot, leaving the task of decision to the reader.

Of the pamphlets written during these years, *Ballot* by the Rev. Sydney Smith [4] caused the most discussion. Smith agreed that aristocrats had dismissed tenants for voting contrary to orders and customers had left shopkeepers; he thought that practices were bad but that facts and consequences had been exaggerated. For himself—"for a difference of 2½ per cent [he] would desert the most aristocratic butcher that ever existed, and deal with one who

"Shook the arsenal and fulmin'd Greece".

The plough did not appear to him to be a political machine, though the loom and the steam engine were furiously political:

> Nineteen tenants out of twenty care nothing about their votes, and pull off their opinions as easily to their landlords as they do their hats. They have no more predilection for whom they vote than organ pipes have for what tunes they are to play. A man who ploughs badly, or who plays badly, says he is dismissed for his vote.
>
> Shopkeepers, too, are very apt to cry out before they are hurt; a man who sees after election one of his customers buying a pair of gloves on the opposite side of the way, roars out that his honesty will make him a bankrupt, and the county papers are filled with letters from Brutus, Publicola, Hampden, and Pym.

[1] Editor of the *Glasgow Liberator*.

[2] Published in Glasgow, 1838.

[3] Published in London, 1838.

[4] Smith, Rev. Sydney, *Ballot* (London, 1839).

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To him, an abominable tyranny is exercised by the ballot in that it compels those persons to conceal their votes, who hate all concealment, and who glory in the cause they support: "Mr. Grote, a scholar and a gentleman, and knowing all the histories of public courage, preaches cowardice and treachery to England". If there is ballot there can be no scrutiny, the controlling power of Parliament is lost, and the members are entirely in the hands of returning officers. A representative will not be able to tell who are his instructors (*i.e.*, the persons who elect him). People who do not wish to be suspected of voting on the wrong side will stay away. Ballot and universal suffrage are apt to be coupled, and universal suffrage will mean that the poor will gain everything and ruin everything. "How beautiful is the progress of man!—printing has abolished ignorance—gas put an end to darkness—steam has conquered time and distance—it remained for Grote and his box to remove the encumbrance of truth from human transactions".

And he himself, alas, had been longing for a breathing spell and quiet after the Reform Bill of 1832!

Smith's pamphlet was well enough done so that it seemed to be an effective blow to ballot. Rumor had it that even Mr. Grote had been staggered by it,[1] and the *Examiner*[2] answered its attack editorially. Its ideas were the occasion for W. D. Christie's refutation in *An Argument in Favor of the Ballot* which the author held to be "the first attempt at a complete, connected, systematic discussion of the ballot question". He considered that public opinion would turn against those who obeyed the command to remain at home and that a briber desired a positive vote. Voters were pledged in duty to vote for the candidate whom they *thought* the best and even the humble were no more apt to be led astray by ignorance than the higher class by sinister interest and by prejudice. Public opinion on this premise was of no great importance. Moreover, Parliament would be better off without the unprofitable duty of scrutiny.

[1] Christie, W. D., *An Argument in Favor of the Ballot* (London, 1839), p. vii.

[2] *Examiner*, June 16, 1839.

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Magazines, as well as pamphlets, acquainted the reading public with the discussion. Facts on intimidation influenced even hostile publications. The *Edinburgh Review* had been much opposed to ballot in 1833,[1] but in spite of continued opposition confessed in 1837 that it had "almost come to think that it must have a trial; because the evil of the present system is so crying, that it becomes almost impossible to imagine anything more desperate". The *British and Foreign Review* of 1835 acknowledged that the increasing oppression of landlords in the country and aristocracies in the towns would make it extremely difficult to resist secret voting. The *Westminster Review* felt[2] that the election of 1835 tended to prove that popular rights might eventually be crushed by the deadly incubus of bribery and intimidation and that unless something were done, the Reform Bill would become worse than an nonentity—a positive curse. Durham told how this election had increased ballot supporters a hundredfold.[3] Even Russell warned Tories against the practice of intimidation[4] and some members of the Liberal ministry were reported to be in favor of the ballot.[5]

On the other hand a number of magazines were still bothered by practical obstacles or what were considered to be such: In the *Quarterly Review's* eyes, secrecy was impossible of attainment—

> Does Mr. Grote hope to make habitual in all the intercourse of domestic life, the reserve which even on single and vital occasions it requires all the nerve of a hero to maintain?
>
> "I love thee, infinitely—but harkee, Kate,
> I must not have you henceforth question me,
> I know you, wise; but yet no farther wise
> Than Harry Percy's wife; constant you are,
> But yet a woman; and for secrecy,

[1] In an article accredited to Brougham.

[2] *Westminster Review*, vol. 25 (1836), pp. 486-489.

[3] Reid, Stuart J., *Life of Durham*, vol. II, p. 146.

[4] *Examiner*, Feb. 18, 1838.

[5] *Ibid.*

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No lady closer; for I will believe
Thou wilt not utter what thou dost not know:—
And so far I will trust you, gentle Kate." [1]

And both the *Quarterly Review* and *Fraser's* still opposed the ballot for fear that it would cause the destruction of the monarchy and the substitution of some form or fashion of Republic. Open suffrage, in the view of the latter magazine, was likely to prevent all violent and precipitous changes and revolutionary disturbances: "You know very well there is but little chance of democratic revolutions, while all measures, doctrines, and propositions, are openly discussed in public and private life".[2]

In general, however, the ballot was growing so rapidly in favor that its opponent, Russell, as leader of the House, found himself in an embarrassing position.[3] In 1838 he withstood its adoption only by such effort that Brougham, himself opposed to it,[4] declared that its passage could be expected within five years; rumor said that Lord John was ready to resign.[5] Macaulay in 1839 both in his election speech at Edinburgh and in the House declared for it, much to the chagrin of Greville.[6] Macaulay and the *Examiner*[7] seemed to have argued on the pregnant premise that the enlargement of the constituency by the Great Reform Bill had made the necessity of ballot more strongly felt, inasmuch as foul influences would be more violently exercised as the numbers of electors became more unmanageable by the old means. Melbourne is supposed to have been a secret convert to it for some

[1] A writer to the *Times* (September 2, 1852) had the same idea which he expressed in prose, and Brougham in 1830 had used a similar argument.

[2] *Fraser's*, September, 1837, "The Poll or the Ballot".

[3] Parker, *Life of Graham*, vol. I, pp. 266, 267; Walpole, *Life of Russell*, vol. I, pp. 286, 325, 326.

[4] Lord John Russell in 1838 spoke of Brougham as "a reluctant convert to the ballot" (Hansard, vol. 40, 1188). But see Hansard, vol. 41, 49-50, 52; vol. 48, 815.

[5] The *Greville Memoirs* (London, 1885), February 18, 1838.

[6] *Ibid.*, June 1, 1839.

[7] *Examiner*, June 23, 1839.

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time.[1] 1839, therefore, saw it made an open question, though it failed to make much numerical progress by its changed status.

In the decade of the 'forties the fortunes of the ballot declined. Grote retired from Parliament in 1841 "indisposed to remain as one of so very small a number as now constituted the Radical cluster".[2] The *Examiner* acknowledged[3] that Radicals had lost popular support to the "Ultra Radical" Chartists. The latter opposed the ballot unless it were accompanied by other points in the charter, especially manhood suffrage, feeling that secret voting without the extension of the franchise would stop the little indirect influence which workingmen had at elections. Moreover, Palmerston, like Lord John Russell,[4] was averse to testing secret voting.[5] To the Whig leaders still, ballot did not "suit the brave and honest character of the English people".[6]

Yet bribery continued to be bothersome and was said in some quarters to be practised more shamelessly than ever.[7] Apropos of the situation Mr. Henry Ward took on the mantle of Mr. Grote and brought the question before the House in June, 1842.[8] The ballot movement, however, had little chance of progressing during a period when public attention was focused on the agitation of the Chartists and the Anti-Corn Law Association. But the success of the latter apparently led to the great activity for the ballot in the decade of the 'fifties. Its victory showed how all popular questions were to be won. Mr. Cobden himself wrote in 1852 to a dinner given by the Radicals:

[1] Reid, *Life of Durham*, vol. II, p. 112. But see Hansard, vol. 41, 47-49; vol. 48, 822.

[2] *Life of Grote*, p. 140.

[3] *Examiner*, March 31, 1839, Oct. 7, 1838, June 25, 1842.

[4] *Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell*, vol. I, p. 49.

[5] It is also possible that ballot was not so strongly pressed while Peel's 1839 bill modifying the formation of election committees was in course of trial.

[6] *Cf. Examiner*, June 25, 1842.

[7] *Cf. ibid.*, June 13, 1841, August 7, 1841 (commenting on statements of the *Times*).

[8] *Cf. Spectator*, vol. 15 (June 25, 1842), and Hansard, vol. 64, 348-367. Mr. Ward was interested in many aspects of representation problems.

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> For my own part, when Free Trade and Protection are no longer political battle-cries, I shall look forward with intense interest to the day when a really liberal and popular party shall organize itself, with the pledge never to abandon the field until Vote by Ballot shall become the law of elections, as it is already the custom in almost every society, club, and association in the kingdom.[1]

Thought upon the subject on the part of friends of free and protected voting resulted in the formation of a Ballot Society on February 2, 1853. Cobden and Bright, though not office holders, were, from the first, members of the society. Cobden retained his interest[2] and later in the decade wrote a signed letter to the *Times* pleading for a trial of ballot at one election, and promising, in case it was not liked, to say no more upon the subject.[3] Bright, who for a number of years had advised use of the ballot, looked upon it not as a principle but as a *mode* of doing something.[4] To him it was an integral part of reform, without which "any extension of the franchise [would] be felt by multitudes to be an evil rather than a privilege to be prized".[5]

Henry Berkeley,[6] however, became the head of the Ballot Society. He had led the ballot party in Parliament since 1847, and in 1848 moved a resolution to the effect that the votes of Parliamentary electors be taken by ballot. He presented the request to the House annually[7] for a number of years, until it became in the opinion of the *Saturday Review* a

[1] *Ballot*, I, no. 1.

[2] *Cf. Times*, August 27, 1859, August 30, 1859 (editorial).

[3] *Ibid.*, September 3, 1859.

[4] *Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell*, vol. II, pp. 112, 113. (Letter from John Bright, December 12, 1852).

[5] *Times*, Feb. 17, 1859, quoting Bright's letter to Ballot Society.

[6] For comment on his life, see *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. XI (1865).

[7] The results of Berkeley's motions were in 1848, 86 ayes to 81 noes; 1849, 85 to 136; 1850, 121 to 176; 1851, 87 to 50; 1852, 144 to 246; 1853, 172 to 232; 1854, 157 to 194; 1855, 166 to 218; 1856, 111 to 151; 1857, 189 to 257; 1858, 197 to 294; 1859, 99 to 103; 1860, 147 to 254; 1861, 154 to 279; 1862, 83 to 50, (second reading) 126 to 211; 1863, 102 to 122; 1864, 123 to 212; 1865, 74 to 118; 1866, 110 to 197.

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burlesque [1] and in the eyes of the *Times* an event as constant as spring and asparagus.[2] To both papers the whole discussion of the topic was futile. The *Times* put it: [3] "Just as there is an Epping hunt once a year, and as our forefathers used to bait a bear on Shrove Tuesday and a bull on some other day, there is an annual debate on the Ballot, when the miserable, mangy old fox is pompously carted into the House of Commons by his well-known exhibitors, and then and there turned out and hunted to death".

The *Saturday Review* agreed: [4] "The evening [of the ballot debate] is passed in a controversy involved in mazes almost as endless, and leading to as little practical result, as the controversy of the fallen angels in Milton about predestination and free will".

Nevertheless the subject was well advertised by the annual discussion and also by a controversy which Berkeley carried on with the *Times*. There is much evidence toward proving that, during the very period of the formation of the Ballot Society, ballot itself had become a political issue. On August 5, 1852, Graham had written to Lord Dunfermline: [5] "Ballot is the great stumbling block in the way of an agreement with the Radicals. On that point they are inexorable, and public opinion is gravitating towards it.[6] The bribery and intimidation which have disgraced many recent returns will give increased force to this popular demand". The same opinion had been expressed to Lord John Russell [7] a little earlier in the year, and John Bright upon occasion declared, "The Reform Party is the Ballot Party".[8]

[1] *Saturday Review*, April 13, 1861.

[2] *Times*, May 21, 1856, editorial.

[3] *Ibid.*, November 18, 1856, editorial.

[4] *Saturday Review*, June 12, 1858.

[5] Parker, *Life of Graham*, vol. II, p. 171.

[6] *Edinburgh Review* (April, 1852) agreed with this statement.

[7] Parker, *Graham*, vol. II, p. 166 (July 17, 1852). *Vide*, also, letter from Russell, July 23, 1852 (vol. II, pp. 168, 169).

[8] *Cf. Ballot*, I, no. 40, pp. 4-5.

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The Ballot Society was patterned after the Anti-Corn Law Association and, supported by many of the best and oldest members of this group, soon claimed for itself "an organization which has a more widely extended and energetic action than . . . any other political association whatever".[1] An executive committee which met regularly, kept up[2] an agitation for election of ballot pledgers to Parliament, interviewed M. P.'s, and sent forth public speakers. It was assisted by many local societies, among which the Northern Reform Union,[3] the North London Political Union,[4] the Westminster Reform Union,[5] and the Lewis Ballot Society[6] seem to have been very active.

The society arranged public meetings[7] at which its own vice-chairman, E. C. Whitehurst, frequently delivered the main speech. It procured signatures to petitions for ballot[8] and in 1860 was able to show 65 petitions, with 7,269 signatures, during part of a session when during the same period there were presented for Lord John Russell's Reform Bill only 13 petitions with 6,595 signatures.[9] It kept up extensive correspondence with various regions, for the purpose of acquiring information respecting the evils which made secret voting needed; it offered prizes for essays on the ballot, and it distributed many thousand tracts every year, among which "Ten Minutes' Talk on the Ballot"[10] was hoped to be as effective as the "Corn Law Catechism" had once been. Some of Berkeley's speeches were reprinted and protagonists and antagonists became involved in another war of pamphlets. Henry Grant's

[1] *Ibid.*, I, no. 21, p. 2.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, no. 1, pp. 2-3.

[3] *Ibid.*, I, no.. 4, p. 4, and I, no. 9, p. 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, I, no. 11, p. 3; I, no. 12, p. 2; I, no. 38, p. 3.

[5] *Ibid.*, I, no. 14, p. 2.

[6] *Ibid.*, I, no. 18, p. 3; I, no. 32, p. 3.

[7] *Vide*, for instance, *Ballot*, I, no. 4, p. 2; I, no. 11, p. 2.

[8] *Ibid.*, I, no. 15, p. 2.

[9] *Ibid.*, I, no. 20, p. 2.

[10] Written by J. C. Symons. An earlier edition had been popular in the 'thirties.

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pamphlet[1] spoke of the shifting of voters from party to party as an event to be expected under the ballot:

> A secret suffrage, under cover of which the elector may vote capriciously, unmeaningly, this way today and that way tomorrow, would act badly on the formation of character, badly on the elector, badly on the working of the constitution of this country. The plant you would shelter will wither beneath the baneful shade you have devised for its protection.

Furthermore he attempted to confound his readers by a dilemma:

> Under the ballot either electors will conceal their political opinions, or they will not conceal them. If they conceal them, the free interchange of thought ceases, and they become unfit for the exercise of the franchise. If electors conceal not their political opinions the ballot cannot shelter them. But either they will conceal their political opinions or they will not conceal them. The ballot, therefore is either injurious or inoperative.

Another pamphlet[2] expressed the idea that in Ireland the ballot, instead of preventing intimidation, would increase the power of the priests tenfold. On the other hand advocates of secret voting started in 1859 their own weekly, *Ballot,* which was practically the official organ of the Ballot Society.

The society attempted also to get the coöperation of religious bodies on a measure which involved morals as well as politics,[3] and held a conference of ministers of religion, of all denominations, "to promote the adoption of measures to prevent elections being made the means of debasing and degrading the people".[4]

The ballot executive committee continued regularly to meet even when public attention was absorbed by the Crimean War and most political associations were asleep. But the move-

[1] *The Ballot Weighed in the Balance* (London, 1853).

[2] *A Few Practical Suggestions on Electoral Reform and the Ballot,* By one of the middle class (London, 1854). For additional arguments used during the decade see *The Right of the People to Universal Suffrage and Annual Parliaments,* by the Duke of Richmond (London, 1859).

[3] *Ballot,* I, no. 24, pp. 2-3.

[4] *Ibid.,* I, no. 21, pp. 1-3; I, no. 25, p. 4.

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ment which it represented assumed greater importance during the ensuing time of peace as the large number of editorials in the *Times* attest. The very bitterness of the *Times'* attacks connotes much. Yet the *Saturday Review,* which confessed to agreement with the latter, began to contrast the position of voter and newspaper writer.[1] It granted that the newspaper writer might safely operate on his hundred thousand readers without giving any pledge whatever of his sincerity, and added:

> If it be said that it is for the public interest that political questions should be freely discussed by journalists protected from the pressure of social persecution, and individually irresponsible to public opinion, we can only say that those are just the arguments which are advanced by the advocates of the ballot. If it is alleged that the public writer is more fearless, more patriotic, more disinterested, and more honest, when he does not sign his name, this is just what Mr. Berkeley says that the voter will become when he seals up his balloting ticket in an envelope.[2]

Members of the Ballot Society were pleased with the news of 1856 that ballot was no longer "un-English", but had, with the assent of the Queen, on the advice of the Liberal Ministry, become the law of the colony of Victoria.[3] This fact, together with the adoption of ballot in the other Australian colonies, greatly strengthened the Society's position.[4] Distinguished Victorian colonists, returning to England, addressed meetings with effect, and if the writer of a letter to the *Times*[5] felt that the child was not yet quite old enough to

[1] *Saturday Review,* July 4, 1857.

[2] The *Times* in reply to Berkeley had already declared (Dec. 13, 1856) that the press was not anonymous in the sense of the ballot: "In Ballot neither any one person, nor any number of persons acting together is responsible for the result. . . . But this journal is responsible for all that appears in it without a signature".

[3] For data see Ernest Scott, "The History of the Victorian Ballot" in the *Victorian Historical Magazine,* November, 1920.

[4] *Ballot,* I, no. 1, pp. 2, 3.

[5] *Times,* April 12, 1859.

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teach politics to the parent, nevertheless Mr. Berkeley could twit England's leading journal with the fact that it was very careful not to touch on the working of the ballot in Australia and "the perfect unanimity of all classes which exist in Australia as to the beneficial results of its adoption".[1] Mr. Whitehurst was of the opinion that when Lord John Russell sanctioned secret voting in the four Australian colonies, he dealt the death-blow to the system of open voting in England.[2] The *Saturday Review*,[3] however, saw nothing beyond experiments in America and Australia. Indeed, the reader who follows throughout the century the mass of material written upon the ballot as practiced elsewhere in the world might justly conclude with this weekly that it was natural to infer that in the United States the ballot system had been the cause of the invention of revolvers as well as of bowie-knives, scalping scenes in Congress, and ginsling. But, by parity of reasoning, the open voting of England must be held to have produced the steam engine, vaccination, Enfield rifles, and the orations of Mr. Berkeley and Mr. Bright.

The election of 1857 with its usual accompaniments of bribery and intimidation brought the movement additional strength in members and resources. Milner Gibson joined the executive committee of the Ballot Society, and therefore held a place in that body as well as a post in the Palmerston-Russell cabinet.[4]

But, important as was the growth of a favorable public opinion,[5] no more serious result among political leaders was effected than a rumored vacillation on the part of Lord John Russell.[6] As to the other great Whig leader,

[1] *Times*, August 29, 1859.

Ballot, I, no. 4, pp. 3, 4.

[3] *Saturday Review*, June 12, 1858.

[4] *Ballot*, I, no. 1, pp. 2-3. Gibson was president of the Board of Trade from 1859 to 1866.

[5] See *Saturday Review*, April 16, 1859; Parker, *Life of Graham*, vol. II, p. 372; *Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell*, vol. II, p. 222.

Ballot, I, no. 40, pp. 4-5. *Cf.* Russell's speech, given in *Times*, April 16, 1859.

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> Lord Palmerston, with his four hundred men,
> Marched to the House, and then marched back again.[1]

And a government which in appointing a committee in 1860 to inquire into the Corrupt Practices Act of 1854, excluded Berkeley,[2] was not apt to cater to popular demand in its reform bill of the same year by including secret voting in its program.[3]

Moreover, John Stuart Mill was now concluding—much to the chagrin of John Bright and to the delight of the *Edinburgh Review*[4]—that the ballot was power without responsibility, that secrecy sapped the citizen's courage, promoted evasion, and tempted to downright lying.

It is true that for a short time in the early 'sixties members of the Ballot Society were active both in and out of Parliament. Berkeley persevered with annual motions; checking on the views of candidates continued, with the suggestion that anti-ballot Tories rather than anti-ballot Whigs be sustained in cases where a ballot vote was destined to be lost;[5] public meetings whose object it was to agitate for secret voting, were frequently called and especially were attempts made to enthuse the Northern regions;[6] and relationships, at least through personalities, were retained with other Reform organizations.[7]

Nevertheless, newspapers show on the whole a declining movement. The *Edinburgh Review* spoke[8] of the ballot as a question of decreasing importance and ebbing popularity, not, it asserted, because any reaction had occurred in the public

[1] *Saturday Review,* May 9, 1857. See, also, *Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell,* vol. II, p. 130.

[2] *Ballot,* I, no. 14, p. 2; I, no. 15, p. 2.

[3] *Ibid.,* I, no. 16, p. 2; I, no. 17, p. 2; I, no. 18, pp. 2-3; I, no. 32, p. 4; and Parker, *Life of Graham,* vol. II, p. 360.

[4] *Edinburgh Review,* July, 1860. See *Westminster Review,* October, 1870, for discussion on the effect of Mill's objection to the ballot.

[5] *Elector,* I, no. 51, p. 4.

Ibid., II, no. 64, p. 5 (Ripon); *ibid.* (Leeds); II, no. 63, p. 7 (Carlisle); II, no. 64, p. 6 (Manchester); II, no. 65, p. 7; II, no. 66, p. 3; II, no. 66, p. 5; II, no. 105, p. 3.

[7] *Ibid.,* II, no. 87, p. 5 for instance deals with the Political League.

[8] *Edinburgh Review,* July, 1860.

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mind adverse to measures of real liberality, but because argument had weakened rather than strengthened the convictions formerly entertained by many sound Liberals on this subject. The *Saturday Review* in 1861 declared [1] that the ballot business was neither more nor less than a decaying idolatry, although a creed to which Radicalism still pretended devotion; by 1862 it was stating that "it would be an exaggerated estimate to suppose that a dozen intelligent men in or out of Parliament believe in the ballot as a political specific, or regard it in any other light than as a convenient item for electioneering clap-trap".[2] Even the *Westminster Review* acknowledged in 1862 that questions of reform were causing but little public discussion, though it decried bribery and treating, interference and intimidation, and questioned why some champion of the ballot did not demand how it happened that if the vote were not a right, those who held it were allowed to exercise it or not, exactly as they pleased. The *Elector* was greatly disturbed in the same year [3] by the 85-52 vote on Mr. Berkeley's annual motion because of the lack of interest which the numbers represented, and shortly afterwards ceased publication. The *Saturday Review* suggested that the Ballot Society, "evidently a losing concern", should shut up shop.[4] The *Times* toward the middle of the decade mentioned difficulties which beset this organization.[5] Lord Palmerston in the Parliamentary debate of 1864 over Berkeley's motion called upon his colleague to confess that the feeling in favor of this particular motion was no longer so strong as it had been.[6] Palmerston's administration, indeed, was held by the Radicals to be responsible for the general apathy. The *Elector* had been definite upon this matter: "We regard Lord Palmerston as the great enemy of, and the obstacle to Reform, and

[1] *Saturday Review,* December 28, 1861.

[2] *Ibid.,* July 5, 1862.

[3] *Elector,* May 31, 1862. This paper had superseded the *Ballot.*

[4] *Saturday Review,* July 5, 1862.

[5] *Times,* August 23, 1864; March 3, 1865.

[6] *Annual Register,* 1864, p. 139.

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we are sure that nothing will be yielded to the people so long as Lord Palmerston is the Whig Premier".[1] Earl Russell also was disposed to rest and be thankful.[2] The American Civil War hardly helped, for a time, the cause of the Radicals. Berkeley found it necessary to reply to the *Times'* judgment "that the present unhappy condition of America is attributable to universal suffrage and the ballot" and the *Elector,* taking up the argument, adjudged "that the anarchy and spoliation originated with the Southern aristocracy".[3] The *Times* in an editorial of June, 1863, gloated[4] over the fact that in the existing state of public opinion and "the almost excessive horror of Republican institutions" it hardly had need to notice that Mr. Berkeley lost his motion. And if Christian Socialists and their friends in 1864 attempted a moral suasion program against bribery and intimidation—a gallant enterprise in the eyes of the *Saturday Review*[5] like that of Mrs. Partington and her mop—one of their leaders, Thomas Hughes, nevertheless hardly admired secret ballot but had come to look upon it as a matter of detail and machinery which might insure the good working of an extended suffrage.[6] The *Annual Register* found[7] no new arguments adduced on either side during the presentation of Berkeley's ballot motion of 1865 and thought none possible "on so trite and fully-discussed a subject". Manifestly the controversy based on political conditions as they existed since 1832 had failed to give victory to Radicalism; whether more practical considerations, in part suggested by Thomas Hughes, would cause England's statesmen to reconsider their positions, when once the Second Reform Act should be passed, is a topic worthy of consideration.

[1] *Elector,* II, no. 73, p. 4. *Cf.,* also, I, no. 52, p. 5.

[2] *Saturday Review,* October 24, 1863.

[3] *Elector,* II, no. 96, p. 5.

[4] *Times,* June 17, 1863.

[5] *Saturday Review,* September 3, 1864.

[6] *Times,* June 1, 1865.

[7] *Annual Register,* 1865, p. 115.

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The Reform agitation of 1866 and 1867 presented manhood suffrage and ballot as theme of the Reformers' marching song and the expressed goal of the Reform League under whose leadership many meetings were held. But Gladstone in 1866 did not care to complicate his problems by adding bribery clauses to his measure and Conservative groups in 1867 were hardly likely to desire an intimate study of intimidation.[1]

Nevertheless the Act of 1867 almost immediately brought ballot to the fore. The election of 1868 gave control to the Liberals and, although Gladstone [2] had been against the ballot for thirty-five years, Bright, now a cabinet member, thought it a necessary sequel to the new franchise act.[3] Milner Gibson, who had influence with certain elements within the party, won recognition as one of its outstanding champions,[4] and Mr. Bruce, Secretary of State for the Home Department, became, by 1869, a convert to it.[5]

Bruce was much influenced, as were many others,[6] by the experiences of the election of 1868 itself. Intimidation of a quiet sort, with the workingmen themselves sometimes making threats, and the open violence of a bullying mob alike caused a feeling of alarm. The *Spectator* was greatly impressed by Mr Bruce's attitude:

> When we find a statesman of this type . . . telling his constituents that, in spite of his dislike to secret voting, and his steady refusal hitherto to support it, he has, under light of the facts brought before him at the last election, decided that secret voting involves less evil than open voting . . . , we cannot but admit that the chances in favor of the ballot have assumed an entirely new aspect.[7]

[1] *Cf.* view of *Saturday Review,* July 1, 1871.

[2] *Cf. Times,* editorial, December 22, 1868.

[3] Trevelyan, *Life of Bright,* p. 379; *Saturday Review,* January 23, 1869; *Spectator,* September 5, 1868.

[4] The *Saturday Review,* January 23, 1869, was wrong in supposing that he had shown no special interest previously.

[5] *Annual Register,* 1869, p. 16.

[6] *Cf.* feeling expressed in the *Spectator,* September 5, 1868.

[7] *Spectator,* vol. 42, p. 97.

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And early in 1869 a select committee of the House of Commons was appointed, following a recommendation of the speech from the Throne, to inquire whether it might be possible to provide any further guarantees for the tranquility, purity, and freedom of both municipal and parliamentary elections. The committee, of which the Marquis of Hartington was chairman and Bright a member, sat on twenty-seven days, examined nearly eighty witnesses and won reappointment for the ensuing session to consider their report with a view to early legislation. Out of this consideration came the recommendation of secret voting. Evidence which the committee obtained had shown clearly the evils of the old system. A study of ballot as practiced abroad led to the conclusion that it was working well and although arguments opposing it, which were known to the country, still carried force, advantages from a change in the system of voting were regarded as potent to do more than counterbalance disadvantages.[1] Hostile periodicals gathered from the data that the new method would make elections more orderly [2] and at the same time present "a bright vision of relief from pressure and from the apprehension of suffering pressure or giving offence".[3]

And during the period when members of the official class were recognizing the need of dealing with the problems of bribery and intimidation, popular organizations of the type which had played a part in the passage of the Act of 1867 came to work for the ballot. The Reform League, for instance, following the advice of Bright, decided to exclude from its support all candidates who did not advocate secret voting.[4] Its Council was active to the extent of printing George Jacob Holyoake's pamphlet, *A New Defence of the Ballot in Consequence of Mr. Mill's Objection to It,* with a view to its circulation in the branches of the League and other political societies. Holyoake believed that a militant compaign should be carried on; that ballot proponents ought to apologize for

[1] *Cf.* quotation in *Times,* March 17, 1870.

[2] *Saturday Review,* August 14, 1869.

[3] *Edinburgh Review,* October, 1871.

[4] *Saturday Review,* August 24, 1867; October 19, 1867.

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being *without* it. There was, to him, good and bad secrecy; the ballot was secret suffrage in the legitimate sense of privacy and security. It was no affair of his neighbor *how* he voted, or *for whom* he voted, or *why* he voted—since he exercised no power or freedom which the neighbor did not equally possess. If the vote was a "trust", then let the individual be *trusted* with it. The voter ought not to be controlled during the one minute of independence in seven years which the state allowed—the moment when he gave his vote.

The Ballot Society, for its part, supported the governmental inquiry on corruption [1] and the Labor Representation League made secret voting an essential part of its reform program. Manchester partisans of the ballot in reality effected an advertising campaign by importing machinery and rules from one of the Australian colonies and holding a preliminary election among themselves for the purpose of deciding upon a Liberal nominee in the event of a vacancy.[2]

There can be little doubt, indeed, that popular demands after 1867 were of more importance than some of the Conservative magazines were willing to confess. Even the *Saturday Review* toward the end of 1869 acknowledged [3] that the wish to try the ballot was widely and rapidly increasing, and that many intelligent people were regarding it as a conservative measure. And the *Times* gave space enough to descriptions of public meetings [4] and the activities of organizations to prove that the working class was thoroughly alive to the issue: the Edinburgh Cobden Club,[5] the National Reform Union,[6] the Greenwich Advanced Liberal Association,[7] the Birmingham Liberal Association [8] and many other associations stimulated

[1] *Times*, March 4, 1869.

[2] *Ibid.*, January 23, 25, 26, 29, 1869; *Saturday Review*, January 23, 1869.

[3] *Saturday Review*, October 30, 1869.

[4] *Cf. Times*, Dec. 24, 1868, Jan. 16, 1869, June 1, 1871, etc.

[5] *Ibid.*, April 6, 1870.

[6] *Ibid.*, May 19, 1870; *Saturday Review*, February 5, 1870.

[7] *Ibid.*, June 5, 1871.

[8] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1871.

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discussion. Officials of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners,[1] of the Society of Painters and Decorators, and of the Associated Engineers,[2] and other well-known labor leaders of the time made recommendations with regard to the contents of a Parliamentary bill and seemed to be especially anxious for the prohibition of paid canvassers in elections and an extension of the hours for polling. In 1871 the working class held a London meeting in support of the "Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Bill" at which artisans were chosen to be the speakers. Mr. Odger, who was one of their well-known leaders, claimed the ballot as a necessity for the workingmen and defined it as no more "un-English" than gaols and police.[3] The *Bee-Hive,* famous labor weekly, went further in declaring that necessary as was secret voting for industrial towns, it was even more necessary for agricultural boroughs and country regions,[4] where still remained, intact, the old Tory instinct:[5]

> I pledge myself, though much bereft
> Of ways and means of ruling ill,
> To make the most of what are left
> And stick to all that's rotten still.

The agitation was not without effect upon a heedful party which found accumulated discontents over its various recent measures disturbing and which needed to appease its more extreme members for the tolerance of religious teaching contained in the Education Act of 1870.[6] The obvious method of dealing with the dissatisfaction, according to the *Saturday Review,* was "to adopt the catchword by which, for one or two generations, the more advanced section of the Liberals had been conventionally recognized." Mr. Gladstone there-

[1] *Ibid.,* May 27, 1870.

[2] *Ibid.,* March 3, 1871.

[3] *Ibid.,* July 11, 1871.

[4] *Bee-Hive,* February 18, 1871, June 3, 1871.

[5] *Ibid.,* July 15, 1871.

[6] *Saturday Review,* July 22, 1871.

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fore found it convenient, that periodical complained,[1] to conform to the doctrines held by this active section of his party even if no new argument in favor of the ballot could be discovered. He probably was not unmindful of the general belief that secret voting would exclude Conservative and Moderate Liberals from numerous seats.[2] And, feeling that party hopes depended to some degree on this kind of measure, he dared to introduce a subject which neither his followers nor his opponents could afford to reject lest the constituents "might choose to think themselves betrayed, and might lash themselves, or be lashed by agitators, into great fury".[3]

On the other hand opposition to secret voting continued to exist because of the very dread of democratic tendencies, even though the Second Reform Bill had passed. Long since had the *Elector* pointed out [4] that complete religious liberty, especially on the question of church rates, could hardly be obtained without ballot. The *Ballot Catechism* had told its catechumens that ballot would lead to the passing of some fine laws and the repeal of other laws, like the game laws, in which the Lords were much interested. Therefore, the *Torquay Directory* could warn [5] of the perils to be feared which, arising from restless innovators, "might tend to effect a social and political revolution".[6] Open speech itself, with freedom of writing, might not be much longer tolerated. So far was the question one of democracy that the *Saturday Review* attacked Disraeli, when the great Conservative leader declared ballot less necessary than a law for better regulation of mines, as follows: "the author of household suffrage was bound to know that the promoters of democratic Reform Bills had always demanded secret voting; and he might easily have foreseen that the next

[1] *Ibid.*, May 14, 1870; *cf. Westminster Review*, October, 1870 and Earl Grey's speech, June 10, 1872, Hansard, vol. 211, 1427 *et seq.*

[2] *Saturday Review*, May 14, 1870, August 14, 1869, January 23, 1869.

[3] *Blackwood's*, August, 1872.

[4] *Elector*, II, no. 70, p. 5.

[5] The Ballot. Three Letters. Letter II (March 9, 1870), p. 9.

[6] *Ibid.*, Letter III (March 26, 1870), pp. 15, 16.

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Parliament would adopt the favorite measure of the party which could not fail to become dominant ".[1] The controversy, in its eyes,[2] had been conducted, for an entire generation, by disputants who perfectly understood that they were respectively contending for the promotion or for the discouragement of democratic influence.

Liberal leaders, however, incited less by dread of democracy than by practical considerations, acted on the recommendation of the Hartington Committee. The Government's ballot bill of 1870 was dropped, owing to pressure of public business, but one introduced by a private member went through the second reading. During the debate Gladstone, though expressing still "a lingering reluctance", frankly stated that the arguments in support of the attitude which he had previously taken, had now lost much of their force because the position of the question had been so largely altered by the extension of the constituency.[3] In spite of the withdrawal of the Government bill, the year saw ballot really tried out. According to the terms of the Education Bill of 1870 ballot was to be used in the London School Board election and in practice worked so well that comments were made in the Parliamentary debates. In truth, Mr. Forster's biographer has asserted[4] that the ballot act might be said to have been born in the Education Office, "for the original idea of the ballot as it is now in use in our parliamentary and municipal elections, is to be found in the by-laws framed in 1870 for the election of the London School Board".

By 1871 Gladstone was much more enthusiastic for a bill,[5] and Mr. Forster, who, unlike his chieftain, had long since given up opposition to ballot,[6] now attempted to guide a

[1] *Saturday Review*, July 22, 1871.

[2] *Ibid.*, May 14, 1870.

[3] Hansard, vol. 203 (1870), 1028-1034. Disraeli disagreed with this point of view.

[4] Reid, T. Wemyss, *Life of Forster*, 2 vols. (London, 1888), vol. II, p. 3.

[5] For sarcastic comments see *Blackwood's*, August, 1871; March, 1872.

[6] *Cf.* Hansard, vol. 204 (1871), 529 in contrast to Reid's statement in the *Life of Forster*, vol. I, p. 530.

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measure through Parliament.[1] He opened the question "with his usual clearness and with perfect tact and temper".[2] Conservatives combated by talking against time with the result that certain of their members "outdid by far all previous efforts of oratory recorded in parliamentary history".[3] Gladstone was able, however, to show his control over a party which had been seriously disunited through the fortunes and divisions of a session, by leading them to a policy of calculated silence.[4] Even so, debates were prolonged far into the session and the Lords played the part expected of them by rejecting[5] the bill on the score that opportunity was lacking for ample consideration. The *Times* was pleased to note that the House of Commons viewed the defeat with equanimity.[6]

The *Annual Register* even stated that the measure was lost "with very little regret as far as could be discovered, on the part of the country, which, in spite of various 'indignation meetings', seemed . . . little stirred by Liberal denunciations of the House of Lords".[7] But, of course, the rejection was hardly regarded as being based on the merits of the question and was not necessarily final. The *Saturday Review*, early in 1869, had expressed[8] an opinion that the Lords would not obstinately resist the popular decision, if it appeared, after an interval, that the country was in favor of the experiment. And Gladstone now promoted quiescence by refraining from violent expressions of regret at the outcome.[9]

Nevertheless enough popular insistence was displayed to

[1] This measure, unlike the Government bill which Hartington introduced in 1870, included municipal voting along with parliamentary voting and excluded scrutiny. For a brief, clear description of secrecy obtained by the Victorian as against the New South Wales system, see *Times*, July 15, 1871.

[2] *Saturday Review*, February 25, 1871.

[3] *Annual Register*, 1871, p. 85.

[4] *Ibid.* and *Times*, July 7, 1871. For details of the session see Cox, H., *The Session of 1871*, and Disraeli's résumé, Hansard, vol. 208, 1096-1114.

[5] Second reading was postponed six months.

[6] *Times*, August 11, 1871, editorial.

[7] *Annual Register*, 1871, p. 86.

[8] *Saturday Review*, January 23, 1869.

[9] *Times*, August 29, 1870.

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make questionable the view of the *Annual Register*. London artisans in a July meeting declared in emphatic terms that the House of Lords "had better not" reject the measure.[1] The Birmingham Liberal Association held a meeting on August 22, 1871, to consider the conduct of the Upper House. A workingman moved a resolution that the constitution of the Second Chamber be so modified as to bring it into harmony with the public opinion of the country.[2] On the same date a meeting was called at Leeds by the Mayor, in answer to a requisition, at which there were condemnations for the House of Lords, groans for the Princes of the blood, and epithets for bishops—"the worst of the lot". A month later the Birmingham Liberal Association was issuing to representatives of the Liberal party in all parts of the United Kingdom an invitation to the Birmingham Conference on the reform of the House of Lords.[3] The *Bee-Hive* published letters which showed labor's attitude against the Lords' action, and editorially remarked that unless the temper of the English people had become more tolerant of hypocrisy and selfishness than it was reputed to be, a heavy price in popularity would be paid by their lordships for this most unwise exertion of their power as a dominant class in the country.[4] Frequently, indeed, was the argument advanced that the ballot bill as a measure which affected the House of Commons and their constituents, should have concerned the Upper House but little in any case.

Such display of feeling was apt to make the Lords consider carefully their position in 1872 lest they themselves instigate a great and dangerous agitation.[5]

Early in the 1872 session the Government introduced a new bill.[6] Much time was taken up with discussion of details.

[1] *Times*, July 11, 1871. [2] *Ibid.*, August 23, 1871.

[3] Circulars given in *Times*, September 23, 1871. See also, on this question, *Saturday Review*, December 9, 1871.

[4] *Bee-Hive*, August 19, 1871.

[5] *Annual Register*, 1872, p. 65.

[6] Portions of the 1871 measure were dealt with separately as the Corrupt Practices Bill: Forster's bill was to deal with the abolition of public nomination and the establishment of ballot. Later both were committed to the same committee.

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The *Annual Register* quoted only two speakers as giving noteworthy arguments in the Commons: Ridiculing the "trustee" idea which Lord Palmerston had used so potently in the past, Mr. Dowse declared that non-electors clearly ought not to dictate for whom the franchise holder should vote, as otherwise they would be the electors.[1] As to Ireland, it were better, in his opinion, that she should return eighty Home-Rulers than that electors should be discontented by inability to express their opinions. On the other hand Mr. Walter, presaging that equal election districts would soon be at hand, opposed a scheme promotive of democratic tendencies.

Of more interest was the course of events in the House of Lords. Arguments were far superseded in importance by actions. It was not strange to hear that ballot was thrust on the nation in order to meet the demands of the advanced section of the Liberal party, or to learn that Lord Shaftesbury was prepared to witness the dissolution of the Established Church, if the bill should pass, and that he trembled even for monarchy, or, indeed, that a noble lord believed in the necessity for appeal to the people. But it was strange to see the House pass a second reading and in committee make secret voting optional. Such proceedings called for warnings alike from the *Times,* the *Saturday Review* and the *Spectator,* though all were opposed to ballot.

To the former newspaper it seemed[2] to be a very perilous experiment for the Lords to strain their constitutional rights and try a fall with the Liberal majority in the Lower House. To the latter paper it was neither fair nor politic for them to pass an amendment which meant publicity for all but those who needed no secrecy.[3] And to the *Saturday Review* it was a sure sign that the Liberals, after all, had no monopoly on blundering.[4] In the end the Lords were obliged to give way on all their major provisions with two exceptions, one of which

[1] Grote had used a similar argument.

[2] *Times,* July 8, 1872.

[3] *Spectator,* vol. 45, pp. 778, 747.

[4] *Saturday Review,* June 22, 1872.

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added scrutiny, the other of which limited the life of the measure until 1880.

Ballot, for which an agitation had lasted forty years, now became part of the English constitution.[1] It might claim the distinction of being adopted, said the *Times*,[2] after the most prolonged discussion that was ever given to any measure. That discussion had survived the life of Berkeley and the interest of Grote [3] though not the hostility of Earl Russell.

Indeed, a number of biographers and the more conservative periodicals of the day have stated that the bill at its very passage was more or less disliked. Reid in the *Life of Forster* wrote [4] that many of Forster's colleagues in 1872 had no love for the measure; Maxwell in the *Life and Times of William Henry Smith*,[5] that probably there never was a bill secretly more distrusted by the House of Commons than this one. *Macmillan's* doubted [6] whether there existed among the constituencies that general and ardent desire for secret voting which the enthusiastic supporters of the ballot desired the world to believe. A writer to the *Times* claimed [7] that here again England was taking a leap in the dark. And the *Spectator* bitterly remarked [8] that the House was passing a bill for secret voting which members, if they themselves voted secretly, would reject two to one.

If these statements and opinions be true, the reader may evaluate the importance of popular demands and party requirements in causing the passage of the Act.

As to the effectiveness and influence of the measure a short discussion must suffice. A reader depending for information upon contemporary periodical literature would scarcely dare

[1] 35 and 36 Vict., c. 33.

[2] *Times*, February 16, 1872, editorial.

[3] For Grote's attitude see Mrs. Grote, *Life of Grote*, pp. 312, 313.

[4] Vol. II, p. 5.

[5] Vol. I, p. 203.

[6] *Macmillan's Magazine*, October, 1872.

[7] *Times*, April 17, 1872.

[8] *Spectator*, April 27, 1872.

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venture any opinion more definite than did Dr. Johnson when asked by Boswell concerning the expediency of wearing night-caps—"I do not know, Sir; perhaps no man shall ever know". The *Times* soon expressed [1] disapprobation of the new order and the *Westminster Review* almost a decade later judged [2] that ballot was not worth preserving. Ostrogorski has pointed out [3] that the election of 1874 in spite of ballot was no purer than 1868 and that of 1880 surpassed both in illicit expenditure incurred by the candidates.[4] On the other hand the editor of *John Bull* wrote [5] to the editor of the *Times*: "As a political opponent of the ballot I may be allowed to add my testimony to the admirable manner in which it worked at Preston, to the marked absence of drunkenness until late in the day, and my firm conviction of the purity of the election". The *Saturday Review* related [6] an incident in 1873 which tended to prove ballot effective against intimidation and a pamphlet [7] written after 1874 asserted that ballot was really secret. Joseph Arch, leader of the agricultural laborers' movement, in a campaign speech of 1880 agreed [8] with the statement of the pamphlet. The *Spectator* referring to a by-election of 1872 granted [9] that no one thought it of use to resort to bribery or intimidation but complained that the election was too quietly conducted. A dull election, it had previously argued,[10] would tend to keep people at home. The very orderliness which ballot *did* bring, was pictured as taking away interest: Were people inclined

[1] *Times*, September 17, 1872.

[2] *Westminster Review*, vol. 115 (1881), p. 452.

[3] Ostrogorski, M., *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, 2 vols. (New York, 1902), vol. I, p. 469.

[4] Seymour, Charles, *Electoral Reform in England and Wales*, pp. 433-40, gives data on the continuance of bribery.

[5] *Times*, September 20, 1872.

[6] *Saturday Review*, September 20, 1873.

[7] *Is the Ballot Secret?*

[8] *Joseph Arch, The Story of His Life, Told by Himself* (London, 1898), p. 326.

[9] *Spectator*, August 17, 1872.

[10] May 18, 1872.

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to vote when there was no music and no flags—nobody to belt and nobody to cheer—and no hourly publication of the state of the poll?[1]

If the Liberals had hoped for added strength from the measure, they were disappointed.[2] Indeed, the result of the first general election under the ballot, in 1874, came as a welcome surprise to the Conservatives—as an unlooked-for discouragement to their opponents. A minority of ninety in the old Parliament was converted to a majority of fifty in the new House of Commons.[3] Perhaps more patent causes than the ballot are easily to be found for the Liberal defeat. Nevertheless the biographer[4] of a Conservative leader of the day rejoiced over the situation: "By the Ballot Act the working classes had been freed alike from the oppressing dictation of employers and the demoralising application of wealth, and here was the use they had made of their freedom on the very first opportunity". It is perhaps more reasonable to argue that ballot helped to make it advisable for all parties to effect preliminary arrangements, by means of a more or less closely knit organization, for managing elections in doubtful constituencies.[5] But certainly, the party of Home Rule found from the 1874 election that ballot had given aid in its rapid growth.[6] As to whether ballot in itself increased the disinclination of strong men for parliamentary life, or tended to bring in unknown men and turn out men of long standing, or put the prime minister "on the stump"—as Shaftesbury's biographer implies[7]—much doubt may be expressed.

Finally, if, on the one hand, it be asserted that electoral evils still persisted after 1872 to such an extent that the Corrupt

[1] *Quarterly Review*, vol. 133 (1872), p. 283; *Economist*, Sept. 28, 1872.

[2] See Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, vol. II, p. 370.

[3] Maxwell, *Life of William Henry Smith*, vol. I, p. 250.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] See Ostrogorski, vol. I, pp. 159, 172.

[6] Ernest Barker, *Ireland in the Last Fifty Years* (London, 1916), p. 20; Lord Eversley, *Gladstone and Ireland* (London, 1912), p. 63.

[7] Hodder, *Life of Shaftesbury*, vol. III, p. 349; also *Spectator*, July 6, 1872, May 18, 1872, August 17, 1872.

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Practices Act of 1883[1] was a piece of legislation which necessity itself forced upon politicians, it can be maintained, on the other, that the inquiry of 1876[2] showed a generally improved conditions, intimidation became a less vexing problem, and the act was continued after 1880. Sir Charles Dilke in the Parliament of 1881 declared[3] that the law had met with considerable success, an opinion which he believed would not be contradicted by any member of the House. And in 1882 he announced[4] that Conservatives and Liberals, as a whole, were prepared to continue its existence.

An episode, which in an odd way had colored alike popular discussions and Parliamentary annals, had reached its end. If it may be said that Grote had fathomed the metaphysics of the ballot and Berkeley mastered its anecdotes, it may also be asserted that democracy's political leaders had found its enactment requisite for their own political lives and the nation's needs.

JOSEPH H. PARK

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

[1] *Cf.* Seymour, *Electoral Reform,* pp. 442-452.

[2] *Accounts and Papers,* 1876 (vol. XII), 162. Minutes of Evidence give a wealth of data.

[3] Hansard, vol. 257, 272-3.

[4] *Ibid.,* vol. 269, 362-3.

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EMILE DURKHEIM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONALISM [1]

IN spite of his untimely death in 1917, there is still a lively interest in the doctrines of the eminent French sociologist, Émile Durkheim, heir of the Positivist philosophy of Comte and Spencer. Brilliant members of the Durkheim school, like Marcel Mauss, Célestin Bouglé, Georges Davy, and Paul Fauconnet, have followed the path of specialization for which he blazed the trail.[2] By consecrating themselves to the posthumous publication of his courses in education and sociology they have kept his memory green in intellectual circles. In the United States, Charles Gehlke and Harry Elmer Barnes have estimated his contributions to sociological theory, and his plans for political reconstruction.[3]

Although the *raison d'être* of his scientific research in sociology was the welding of France into a well organized and well integrated nation, and although there is a great deal in his thought which is pertinent to an understanding of the national ferment of contemporary times, no one has approached Durkheim's work from the standpoint of his nationalism. This

[1] The works of Durkheim which bear most intimately upon this subject are as follows: *La Division du travail social,* 2e. édition avec une nouvelle Préface intitulée, "Quelques remarques sur les groupements professionelles", 1901; *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique,* 1895; *Le Suicide,* 1897; *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* translated by Joseph Ward, 1915; the monographs in *L'Année sociologique,* published under the direction of Durkheim, 1898-1913; the war pamphlets, *Germany Above All,* translated by J. S., 1915, *Who Wanted War?* translated by A. M. Wilson-Garineau, 1915, and *Les Lettres à tous les français,* 1916; the posthumous publications *Éducation et sociologie,* 1922; *Sociologie et philosophie,* 1924; *L'Éducation morale,* 1925; *Le Socialisme, sa définition, ses débuts, la doctrine saint-simonienne,* 1928. The *Revue philosophique* and the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* contain many additional monographs.

[2] Paul Fauconnet has an article on "The Durkheim School in France", in the *Sociological Review,* Vol. XIX, pp. 15-20.

[3] Gehlke, *Émile Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory*; Barnes, "Durkheim's Contribution to the Reconstruction of Political Theory", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. XXXV, p. 236.

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is the object of the present study. For out of the gospel of social determinism which exalted the group or "society", and minimized the importance of the individual, there evolved a conception of the nation which foreshadowed some of the principal doctrines of the militant Action Française, of the Italian Fascists, of the Russian Bolshevists, and of "one-hundred-per-cent" Americans.

The Principles of Durkheim's Sociology

Like Saint-Simon, Comte and Spencer, Durkheim sought to formulate a positive science of "social facts".[1] But they had begun with general problems of a speculative character, such as the nature of society, or the definition of the supreme laws of evolution and progress—a task which he thought, during the early stages of a new science, as fruitless as the alchemist's search for the philosopher's stone. Not content with binding sociology to the petticoats of philosophy, those who followed the Comte-Spencer tradition were too prone to subordinate it to psychology and biology, either by overestimating the significance of the individual, or by contending that society was an organism subject to the laws of the physical world.

Approaching the whole problem from the standpoint of a realist, Durkheim issued a declaration of the independence of sociology from philosophy, biology and psychology, and called for specialization as the prerequisite for any formulation of general laws.[2] Instead of falling a prey to the fashionable taste for generalities, each sociologist must devote himself to the production of detailed monographs on the basis of a careful observation and use of the comparative method. Durkheim always insisted that "social facts" must be considered as "things", that since they are infinitely diverse and complex, they must be explained by the complex, and not by their individual manifestations.[3] As "realities" these social facts

[1] For what follows see "Sociology and the Social Sciences", by É. Durkheim and P. Fauconnet in *Sociological Papers*, London, Vol. I, p. 258; also "La Sociologie en France au XIXe. siècle", *Revue bleue*, 1900, pp. 609 and 647.

[2] *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, pp. 1 *et seq.*, 8, 124, 172 *et seq.*

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 35, 175; *Le Suicide*, p. vii.

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were governed by laws of their own as immutable as those which governed the physical world. They could be measured or compared as accurately as the intensity of electric currents.

Beginning with the premise that to know man one must know his social milieu, Durkheim placed his whole emphasis upon the collective life as a reality distinct from and superior to that of its individual members.[1] Just as the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen produced water, a substance entirely dissimilar from either of its component parts, so the fusion of individuals in the formation of a group produced a "being" of a new type.[2] These "beings" Durkheim called "societies". He was not speaking of one great universal entity, but of any well defined aggregate or group. Not only did he include the clan, the tribe, the city-state and the nation, but the religious sect, the school, the literary and the occupational groups.[3]

Durkheim regarded these "societies" as "the most powerful combination of physical and moral forces of which nature offers us an example."[4] He endowed each of them with a personality of its own, a conscience or soul, and each had its own law, constitution and morality, its own manner of thinking and feeling.[5] As the source and guardian of civilization, of all the knowledge and experience of a multitude of minds during many long generations, the society had a certain fixity and continuity which was lacking in the brief and shadowy life of the individual.[6] It was a great "moral power", which acted coercively upon him.[7] In a public gathering or crowd

[1] *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique,* p. 127; *Sociologie et philosophie,* p. 79; *L'Éducation morale,* p. 103.

[2] *Ibid.;* also *Sociologie et philosophie,* p. 36.

[3] *La Division du travail social,* p. 242; *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique,* pp. 103 *et seq.; The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* pp. 10, 44-45; *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 170, 263-264.

[4] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* p. 446.

[5] *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique,* p. 94; *Sociologie et philosophie,* p. 136; "Sur le Totémisme", *L'Année sociologique,* Vol. V, p. 116.

[6] *Sociologie et philosophie,* p. 107; *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* pp. 212, 434.

[7] *Sociologie et philosophie,* pp. 56, 78; *L'Éducation morale,* p. 274.

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where all hearts vibrated in unison, men perfectly inoffensive under ordinary circumstances might be carried away to commit acts of atrocity which they would later regard with horror. This same coercive power was manifest in all great "social currents" of enthusiasm, pity or anger, which the individual could not resist without incurring the wrath of the group.[1]

Durkheim listed certain "social facts" which tended to become more fixed than the transitory emotions of a crowd or the intense feelings of a patriot who answers the call of his country. There were precepts, maxims and laws, which composed the "collective conscience" of the group.[2] The commandments, "Thou shalt not kill", and "Thou shalt not steal", were the product of a "collective opinion" which imposed itself upon the individual because the voice of all had an accent which the voice of one could never have.[3] Language, with the system of concepts it translated, was the manner in which the society as a whole represented the facts of experience.[4] Durkheim mentioned some "collective habits" which became crystallized in the form of institutions such as the courts, the government, the fiscal and credit systems, and the church, all of which the individual accepts but does not create.[5] There were others just as real—the figures of natality, marriage, divorce, and suicide, which showed by their constancy and regularity, in a given society, that they were proper to it, and beyond the influence of individuals.[6] Indeed, Durkheim could furnish us with manifold examples, either material or psychic, of the externality and coercive nature of social facts. The warning prick of man's conscience was in reality the voice of society speaking within him.[7] A determined type of archi-

[1] *Le Suicide*, p. 418; *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, pp. 9-11.

[2] *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, pp. 7, 12-13; *La Division du travail social*, p. 71.

[3] *L'Éducation morale*, p. 104.

[4] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, p. 434.

[5] *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, pp. 6, 11.

[6] *Le Suicide*, pp. 10, 336; *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 13.

[7] *L'Éducation morale*, p. 101.

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tecture had a social reality of its own.[1] The child formed his taste by entering into contact with monuments of the national taste.[2] Even the exact direction of roads and routes of transportation was determined by social impulse.[3]

Durkheim believed that the society was within as well as outside the individual. Man's double personality consisted of an individual being and a social being, which was the better part of himself.[4] If the beliefs, traditions and aspirations of the group were extinguished from the individual mind, if these "social representations" were destroyed, Durkheim assures us, the society would die.[5] Despite his recognition of the individual being, one is inclined to feel that Durkheim has reduced man's brain to a mere reservoir for group sentiments and ideals.

Durkheim's sociological interpretation of religion is strikingly original, and of considerable interest for our purposes. Since anything so universal in its appeal could not be a vast hallucination, but must have its roots embedded in some concrete reality of experience, he undertook an exhaustive study of the totemic beliefs of the primitive Australian tribes, in order that he might lay bare that reality, and separate it from the symbolism which invested it.[6] He concluded that religion was born in the midst of an effervescent social environment. At intervals in the gray monotony of the routine of daily life, the Australian native participated with the fellow members of his clan in the frenzied excitement and passionate whirl of song and dance. In the emotional atmosphere of this gathering the individual was transformed.[7] He was carried away by a mysterious power which, although it

[1] *Le Suicide*, p. 354.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, p. 16.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 347.

[6] This was the purpose of *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*; see also, "Définition des phénomènes religieux", *Année sociologique*, Vol. II.

[7] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, pp. 262-263.

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did not originate in him, was nevertheless a part of him, and which aroused in his being a feeling of reverence. Since he could consider an abstract entity only if it were connected with some concrete reality, the native created the totem as a symbol of the power he had experienced, just as other religious groups have set up a personal deity, or as the nation has become incarnate in the flag.[1] This totemic symbol remained long after the gathering had dispersed, and in time it became, not only the god, but also the flag of the clan.

Since the only thing which surpassed the individual was the society of individuals, Durkheim concluded that the religious force which exalted the Australian native was nothing other than the "collective and anonymous force of the clan."[2] The totem was at once the symbol of the god and of the society because the god and the society were one and the same thing.[3] The primitive Australians were in reality worshipping the group of which they were a part. In the same way the reality back of the personal deity Yahweh was the Hebrew people. This principle once accepted, Durkheim believed there was no longer any religious mystery to becloud the human intelligence. For the immortality of the soul expressed the immortality of the society.[4] All sacred things, that is, collective traditions, sentiments and emotions, were those which had been elaborated by the group, and the profane were those of individual origin.[5] If nearly all the great social institutions were born in religion it was because "the idea of society is the soul of religion."[6] The very obvious nationalistic implications of these conclusions will be pointed out later.

[1] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* pp. 220, 232.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 221.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 206; *Sociologie et philosophie,* p. 75.

[4] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* p. 268.

[5] *Ibid.,* 262; "Définition des phénomènes religieux", *Année sociologique,* Vol. II, pp. 25-26.

[6] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* p. 419.

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Durkheim's Plan for Political Reconstruction

The times were out of joint, but Durkheim felt that through his research into the social conditions of the past he had found the method to set them right. Due to the rapid progress of the principle of organic solidarity,[1] profound changes had taken place in the structure of European societies, and man had not yet adjusted himself to his new environment. The relaxation of the bonds attaching the individual to the collective usages of the group had produced a state of moral isolation, the evils of which were manifest in the alarming increase in the suicide rate in the industrial foyers of European societies.[2] The serious nature of industrial and commercial crises, the existing antagonism between capital and labor, indicated an economic anarchy equivalent to Hobbes' description of the state of nature.[3]

To overcome the evils of an aggravated egotism, which was paving the road to moral misery and suicide, Durkheim felt that men needed the inspiration of a new ideal, which would arouse the spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion.[4] Only by a revival of the spirit of association and by an extensive regulation of individual activities could the prevailing anarchy be cured. Durkheim was a strong advocate of the tonic properties of moral discipline.[5]

[1] According to Durkheim there were two fundamental principles underlying the complex process of historic evolution: those of mechanic and organic solidarity. The first prevailed in clan and tribe where the collective personality alone existed. The severity of repressive penal law and the diffusion of religious sentiment throughout all phases of the group's activities, were characteristic of this period. The principle of organic solidarity was based on the division of social work, which increased in direct proporton to the numerical growth and density of the population. The prevalence of civil contractual law, an ever-increasing individual liberty, the emancipation of political, economic and social functions from religious monopoly, were characteristic of this period. Durkheim believed that this professional organization was gradually succeeding the territorial in the life of the nation. See *La Division du travail social,* chapters ii, iii.

[2] *Le Suicide,* p. 84.

[3] *La Division du travail social,* pp. 344, 359.

[4] *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 116, 269.

[5] "Critique de Saint-Simon et du saint-simonisme", *Revue de métaphysique et de morale,* Vol. XXXIII, p. 441.

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A survey of the social units which had functioned in the past convinced him that the remedy lay in the rebirth of the professional group, the only unit which was sufficiently durable to function with success under an extremely complex division of social work.[1] The persistence of these groups throughout the historic past, from the Roman gilds to the new flourishing of industrial and commercial syndicates in France, was in itself an evidence of their economic and moral possibilities.[2] He deplored, however, both the narrow localism of the corporations of the Middle Ages, which led to their suppression by the omnipotent national state, and the undefined status of the existing syndicates in France, where lack of coöperation threatened to increase the economic anarchy then prevailing.

To keep pace with the expansion of industry from municipal to national and international markets, Durkheim advocated the reorganization of the occupational group as a public institution coextensive with the bounds of the state, and subject within certain limitations to its control.[3] He did not draw up any elaborate plan for the division of powers between the state and the occupational group. He believed, however, that the function of the former was to control the general principles of industrial legislation, and to oppose to the particularism of each profession the interest of the whole unit. To the professional group he transferred the highly specialized tasks which the state was incapable of exercising. Each group was to control the intricate details of its own organization, to provide machinery for the regulation of conflicts between the different branches of its own profession, and except where the interests of other groups were concerned, was to act as an autonomous unit. Durkheim's scheme encouraged the formation of subsidiary organizations for particular localities or groups, whose rôle in relation to their professional unit was

[1] Durkheim was sure that the family, the educational system, religion, and regional units like the commune, the department and the province were incapable of effecting this moral regeneration. See "La Famille conjugale", *Revue philosophique,* Vol. XCI, pp. 12-13; *Le Suicide,* pp. 427-432; *La Division du travail social,* pp. xi, xxxii, xxxiii.

[2] *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 272-3.

[3] *La Division du travail social,* pp. xxvii-xxx; *Le Suicide,* pp. 436-441.

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similar to that of the professional unit toward the state. He believed that this hierarchy of groups would provide the only stable foundation for the introduction of functional representation in the legislature to replace the existing territorial arrangement.[1]

Durkheim did not expect that the restoration of the professional group to its rightful place in French society would serve as a panacea for all ills.[2] He did feel, however, that these groups, founded upon the natural interests of men within the same occupation, would fill the "empty void" between the individual and the nation. He expected that each group would become a "collective personality", with its own manners, traditions, rules and obligations. Through its facilities for recreation, education and mutual aid, it would provide a social and moral, as well as an economic milieu. Durkheim lived through an era of extensive social reform in western Europe, when the atmosphere was saturated with the schemes which the Collectivists, Solidarists, Social Catholics, Marxian Socialists, State Socialists and Syndicalists advanced as a solution for the woes of the world. His own project was, to a certain extent, a synthesis of some of the more moderate elements of the above systems. Far from advocating an out-and-out proletarian program, he was the avowed enemy of all violent upheaval which involved a sudden and serious breach with the past. By the subjection of both individual and economic interests to the "sane discipline" of a hierarchy of professional groups culminating in the state, he expected to produce "a new renaissance of the social life."[3]

Durkheim and the Philosophy of Nationalism

It remains to be seen how the principles of Durkheim's sociology are manifest in his philosophy of nationalism—how the realist who repeated with an almost monotonous frequency

[1] *La Division du travail social*, p. xxxi; *Le Suicide*, p. 450.

[2] *L'Éducation morale*, p. 294; *La Division du travail social*, pp. xi, xxxi, xxxiv; *Le Suicide*, pp. 435-450; "Critique de Saint-Simon et du saint-simonisme", *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 444, 445.

[3] *Le Suicide*, pp. 285, 354.

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that "social facts" must be considered as "things", and who exalted the group as a personality infinitely superior to the individual, came to regard the nation as the supreme reality of his time.

When he spoke of "societies" he included not only the family, the clan, the tribe, the city-state and the nation, but also the religious sect, the school, the occupational group and so on.[1] They were all "societies", but they were not all of equal importance. He recognized the "political society" and *la patrie* as the most powerful social units in existence.[2] By the "political society" Durkheim seems to have meant the state with particular relation to its governmental framework. He visualized *la patrie* as the spiritual incarnation of the French people.[3] Both were different points of view on the same reality—the nation. As the following statement clearly indicates, he believed the principle of nationality to be the only satisfactory foundation of the state:

> A nationality is a group of human beings, who for ethnical or perhaps merely for historical reasons desire to live under the same laws, and to form a single state; and it is now a recognized principle among civilized peoples that when this common desire has been persistently affirmed it commands respect, and is indeed the only solid basis of a state.[4]

For all practical purposes Durkheim used the terms "people", "nation", "state", *la patrie*, and "society", synonymously, to denote a "collective being" with a personality distinct from and superior to that of its individual members.[5] His nation was then, like his other societies, more than the sum total of the individuals who composed it, and more than the territory they occupied. As a "psychic being" it was a great moral as well as a great material power.[6] Recalling the

[1] *Cf.* supra, p. 89.

[2] *L'Éducation morale*, pp. 83-84, 91.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[4] *Germany Above All*, p. 40.

[5] *L'Éducation morale*, pp. 84-88.

[6] *Sociologie et philosophie*, pp. 78, 84-85, 107; *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, pp. 207-209, 422; *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 127.

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"social facts" which he stressed most in the composition of a society, we find that those collective habits which had crystallized in the form of political, moral, legal or religious institutions, and collective sentiments in the form of the precepts, maxims, laws and language of the group seemed to predominate.[1] The constituent elements of his national society were therefore cultural, and his nation was largely the product of customs, traditions and beliefs derived from a common historic past.

It followed naturally from this, that each "collective being" had its own temperament, its soul and its own characteristics, which could not be found again in exactly the same form in the whole universe. In each nation the law, the economic organization, the literature, the language, the monuments and the moral philosophy were in consonance with the character of the people.[2] This character was not subject to change from day to day. Indeed, climate, temperature and geological conditions varied more easily from year to year than did the temper of nations.[3] Durkheim had very definite ideas about the preservation of the national identity throughout the whole course of its existence, despite the forces of change and evolution. He found in France an excellent example of unity in the development of a national society.[4]

Durkheim believed that the Frenchman, consciously or unconsciously, was a "true Cartesian".[5] The French genius was characterized by a need for clarity, simplicity, and a thirst for rationalism. Even the language was not made to translate obscure ideas. French poets, novelists and artists depicted man in general, instead of presenting characters as complex as Faust or Hamlet.[6] Cosmopolitanism was a trait of the

[1] *Cf. supra*, p. 90.

[2] *L'Éducation morale*, pp. 79, 318; *Éducation et sociologie*, p. 80; *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 94; *La Division du travail social*, p. 392; *Sociologie et philosophie*, p. 56.

[3] *Le Suicide*, pp. 343, 446.

[4] *L'Éducation morale*, p. 71.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 291.

[6] *Ibid.*

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French mind, and the greatest national glory of France lay in the human ideas she had expanded over the world.[1] In 1915 he proudly displayed an additional characteristic. Despite the "native nervousness" which foreign nations attributed to France, she had a sort of "instinctive wisdom", which permitted her to retain her equilibrium in all the crises she had been through.[2]

Before the war he admired the German propensity for "singing in common, walking in common, playing in common", and he set them up as an example to the individualistic Frenchman.[3] War psychology was no doubt responsible for his finding an "abnormal and noxious" element in the German mentality. Accepting Treitschke's philosophy as the criterion for his analysis of their character,[4] he asserted that the "extravagant pride and ambition" of Germany, her "bellicose disposition" and "systematic savagery", were the outcome of a system of ideas which bade the state rise above all human forces to dominate the world. It seems to be as difficult for the scientific sociologist to preserve an objective attitude in the study of human relations as it is for the nationalist to retain a sense of humor in discussing national characteristics.

It is evident that Durkheim intended not only to maintain but to strengthen the French nation by drawing the individuals who composed it from their moral isolation and welding them into a coherent animated society. In his sociological research he had found that suicide varied in inverse proportion to the degree of integration of religious, domestic and political groups.[5] Catholic societies displayed a much greater immunity than Protestant because they were more closely integrated.[6] From his study of the historic past he had observed that during periods of disintegration when the attraction of society

[1] *L'Éducation morale*, pp. 32, 322.

[2] *Lettres à tous les français*, pp. 15-16.

[3] *L'Éducation morale*, p. 268.

[4] *Germany Above All*, pp. 3, 42.

[5] *Le Suicide*, p. 222.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 149 *et seq.*, 173.

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was weak, and egotism had a free career, great unhappiness prevailed. On the other hand, in great national crises or national wars, when the image of *la patrie* assumed a place in individual consciences that it did not occupy in time of peace, and patriots became a real part of the group they loved, the toll of suicides visibly diminished.[1] Durkheim therefore wished to make France a strongly integrated national unit. He did not seek to restore the excessive integration of primitive society, where all individuality was submerged in one collective personality. Nor did he expect to attain his end by increasing the centralization in France, for it was the pursuance of that policy which had reduced the individual to a state of moral isolation. He wished to fill the empty void by producing contacts between the nation and the individual: "The nation can be maintained only if between the state and the particular individuals there is interpolated a series of secondary groups which are near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly and draw them into the general current of social life."[2] To attain greater national solidarity by a process of decentralization seems paradoxical. But it will be remembered that Durkheim's professional groups were national corporations, their membership included all those within a given industry throughout the nation, and their function was to draw the individual into the general current of national life.

Durkheim was a strong exponent of the value of public gatherings, ceremonies and emblems in promoting the integration of the nation. "It is only by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or performing the same gesture that they [people] feel themselves in unison."[3] The flag was an essential "rallying point" for *la patrie,* just as the totem was for the clan.[4] These symbols, by expressing social or national unity in material form, made it more obvious to all, and without them the sentiments they evoked could have only

[1] *Ibid.,* pp. 222, 429; *L'Éducation morale,* p. 78.

[2] *La Division du travail social,* p. xxxiii.

[3] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* p. 230.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 221, 231 *et seq.*

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a precarious existence. In the same way, it was the established policy of all parties, political, economic and confessional, to have periodic reunions that they might "revive their common faith by manifesting it in common."[1] Durkheim obviously believed that all meetings, rites and ceremonies which concentrated the thoughts of the group upon their common beliefs and aspirations, produced a "moral-remaking" that raised the vitality of the nation.[2] During the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1880, Durkheim spent the whole day in the streets for sheer joy of basking in the popular enthusiasm which this fête evoked.[3] His implicit faith in the coöperative work of the group made of him a committee-man *par excellence*.[4] From the outbreak of the war in 1914 he devoted himself with passionate ardor to all forms of intellectual propaganda for sustaining the morale of the nation. It is said that he was diligent in his attendance at meetings where questions of war and victory were under discussion, and that he never failed to inspire his listeners with courage and fortitude. In the "Letters to All Frenchmen" he urged every individual, by a process of moral revictualling, to encourage his fellow citizens by word and example, to draw fresh courage from the personality of the group, and in this time of peril to sacrifice himself for France without counting the cost.[5]

Although Durkheim denied that education alone could remedy the evils of contemporary society, he assigned it an important rôle in the regeneration of the individual French-

[1] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, pp. 209-210.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 427.

[3] See Georges Davy, "Émile Durkheim", *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, Vol. XXVI, p. 188.

[4] Georges Davy says that Durkheim belonged to the following committees:—Conseil de l'Université; Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques; Comité consultatif de l'enseignement supérieur; Commission des étrangers au ministère de l'intérieur; Comité français d'information et d'action auprès des juifs des pays neutres; Fraternité franco-américaine; Pupilles de l'école publique; Comité de publication des études et documents sur la guerre; Comité de publication des lettres à tous les français; Ligue républicaine d'Alsace-Lorraine; Société des amis de Jaurès; Pour le rapprochement universitaire.

[5] *Les Lettres à tous les français*, pp. 7, 12-13, 130.

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man.[1] He thought that education created in man that "social being" which was not hereditary, and yet comprised all that gave value and dignity to human life. It was therefore "the methodical socialization of the younger generation," and the means by which each society renewed perpetually its own existence.[2]

Durkheim remarked that French education had been and ought to be something essentially national.[3] The school was a "miniature political society", a "social microcosm", which prepared the younger generation for civic life.[4] The French schools translated the French spirit, and the public school system, where the vast majority of the children were to be found, was and ought to be the guardian of the "national type".[5] He did not deny the necessity for special education on the basis of caste, class and profession.[6] This was extremely important. But above and beyond it were certain ideas and practices which ought to be inculcated in all individuals throughout the nation. To accomplish this, he thought that education should be subjected to some measure of state control.[7]

When he came to consider what were these ideas and sentiments, he was forced to conclude that a culture largely human was all that the individuals of a large contemporary society like France could have in common.[8] He said that he would sponsor no return to a narrowly nationalistic system, but that all French children should be taught the value of discipline, so essential in democracies. They must love justice and respect both reason and science, without which democracy would never have existed. Their education was to be a rational education, entirely exclusive of ideas borrowed from revealed religion.

[1] *Éducation et sociologie,* p. 70.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 49.

[3] *La Vie universitaire à Paris,* p. 24.

[4] *Éducation et sociologie,* pp. 39-42, 96; *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 263-4.

[5] *L'Éducation morale,* p. 4.

[6] *Éducation et sociologie,* pp. 44-47.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 60.

[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 71-73; *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 10, 16, 21, 49, 56, 105.

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But above all they must be taught attachment to the group.[1] Durkheim believed that France could live only if there were sufficient homogeneity among her members. Education was one means of developing the spirit of association. Its fundamental task, therefore, was to teach the children to love and to know *la patrie,* to study its history as "the genius of a people developing in time", and to be ready to put its interests before their own, even if the attachment should involve the sacrifice of their lives.[2]

Durkheim believed that the training for this collective life should begin in the classroom. The class must become a little society *sui generis,* with its own temperament, manners and customs.[3] By appeals to class honor, by arousing the sense of class responsibility, the teacher could stimulate the spirit of the group. By compiling a history to record class achievements, by keeping an honor book, and other souvenirs of past generations of students, Durkheim expected to evoke in the child a feeling for continuity. In his estimation continuity was second only to solidarity in importance. To prevent any relapse to the old pernicious state of moral isolation he favored the continuation of these groups outside the school through the formation of societies of graduate students. One might add that for Durkheim education was the nationalization, as well as the socialization of the individual. As in Athens, Sparta and Rome, its objective was to produce good Athenians, Spartans and Romans, he hoped that in France it would produce good Frenchmen.[4]

Durkheim believed that domestic ends should be subordinate to national ends, for the simple reason that *la patrie* was a social group of higher order than the family.[5] Similarly, the human objective was in its turn far superior to the national.[6]

[1] *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 75, 82; *Éducation et sociologie,* p. 60.

[2] *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 90, 116, 318-19.

[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 170, 277, 282-284.

[4] *Éducation et sociologie,* pp. 39-42.

[5] *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 84-85.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 86.

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But there did not exist any real society of humanity, with its own organization, its own conscience—in a word, its own individuality. The national state was the most highly organized human group that existed. Although he realized that international ties were already weakening the national, and although he expected the dissolution of the present states to be followed by the erection of others more vast than those of today, he scarcely expected that there would ever be constituted one which comprised all humanity.[1] Instead of subordinating and sacrificing a group which actually existed to an ideal which might never be more than "a being of the reason", Durkheim proposed to realize human ideals within the national group.[2] Instead of striving for material expansion at the expense of its neighbors, each state should focus its attention upon the improvement of social conditions within its own frontiers. If this were done all rivalry between nations would disappear, and there would no longer be any antagonism between the human and the national ideals, for they would be one and the same thing. Each national state would become "a special point of view on humanity".[3] Positivist though he was, Durkheim, because of his insistence on realities, could not bring himself to place the dream-state of humanity above a national state in actual operation.

Durkheim was a Jew, but despite the anti-Semitic campaign that was waged in France at the close of the nineteenth century, he was a soulful French patriot. He believed that man could be complete only if he belonged heart and soul to the various societies in which he was engaged—to the family, the corporation, the political association, *la patrie* and humanity—but above all to the political association and *la patrie*.[4] It is significant that Durkheim made no plea for provincial patriotism. Not that he expected territorial districts to disappear, but he thought regional ties artificial, and the pro-

[1] *Ibid., La Division du travail social,* pp. 138, 401.

[2] *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 86-7; "La Sociologie en France", *Revue bleue,* May, 1900, p. 612.

[3] *L'Éducation morale,* pp. 87-88.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 83-84, 91.

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vincial spirit gone forever.[1] I have found no real evidence of devotion to Alsace, other than his membership in the Republican League of Alsace-Lorraine, and his defense of France, in one of his war pamphlets, for being "faithful to the religion of remembrance."[2]

Durkheim's theory of patriotism was entirely in consonance with his views on humanity, and on the position of the individual in society. He thought a "spiritualized patriotism" would furnish the necessary ideal to draw the individual out of himself to work for the glorification of the national unit.[3] Since every citizen derived the best part of himself from *la patrie,* it was his fundamental duty to assure its existence, and to be willing to sacrifice himself for it. Durkheim did not wish the individual to carry in his breast the image of a jealous egotistical state, but rather to visualize *la patrie* as a partial incarnation of the idea of humanity.[4] No true patriot could endure to witness the sufferings of his companions without suffering too. It was therefore his duty to do everything in his power to ameliorate the internal conditions of his society. This was a pacific and humanitarian rather than a military ideal of patriotism. When the war came, however, Durkheim found it comparatively easy to prove that France was in the right and all her enemies, particularly Germany, in the wrong.[5] His pacifist ideal forgotten, he became as active as the most aggressive patriot in exhorting Frenchmen to sacrifice all to *la patrie* in the confident expectation of victory.[6]

Durkheim's sociological interpretation of religion might afford some food for thought to those who proclaim a religion of nationalism. While he expressed some doubts as to the efficacy of one universal religion in drawing the individual from his moral isolation, it seems that in his own mind the human ideal loomed larger than the strictly national. His

[1] *La Division du travail social,* pp. xxxii-xxxiii.

[2] *Who Wanted War?,* p. 52.

[3] *L'Éducation morale,* p. 117.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 91, 94.

[5] *Who Wanted War?,* p. 55.

[6] *Les Lettres à tous les français,* pp. 13, 15.

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writings, however, easily lend themselves to a different interpretation for any one who cares to appreciate it. Among the Australian natives he found that the totem was at once the symbol of God and the flag of the clan; that, in other words, the group and the divinity were one.[1] If the clan worshipped itself, and if the reality back of all religion was the society, could there not be a religion of nationalism with the flag as the visible representation of the national god? If the individual bows before the collectivity as before God, does he not bow before the nation as the highest collective unit in actual existence? Other statements corroborate this point of view. Durkheim saw no essential difference between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates in the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt, and a reunion of citizens commemorating some great event in the national life.[2] There were beliefs which he felt were to a considerable extent indistinguishable from actual religious beliefs: "*La patrie,* the French Revolution, Jeanne d'Arc, are for us sacred things, which we do not permit any one to defame."[3] Moreover, he recognized the propensity of any society to set itself up as a god and to create gods. This was never more evident than in the French Revolution, when Fatherland, Liberty and Reason were deified by public opinion in a religion which had its own dogmas, symbols, altars and feasts.[4] This idea of the nation-god is an obvious conclusion to draw from Durkheim's writings, but I repeat that it constituted the highest ideal of Durkheim, himself, only in so far as *la patrie* spiritualized was a partial incarnation of humanity.

Not all sociologists who submerge the individual in the personality of the group, and who subject him to social laws as invariable as those which govern the physical world, are necessarily nationalists. Nor do all realists inevitably rush to the conclusion that the nation is the highest existing reality. It must be acknowledged, however, that Durkheim's phi-

[1] *Cf. supra,* p. 92.

[2] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* p. 427.

[3] "Définition des phénomènes religieux", *Année sociologique,* Vol. II, p. 20.

[4] *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* p. 214.

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losophy of nationalism was the logical sequel to his search for realities and his gospel of social determinism.

Durkheim's thought seems to mark the transition from the humanitarian ideals of the Positivists of the mid-nineteenth century to the jingoistic nationalism of the twentieth. Instead of pinning his faith to the utopian scheme of a universal state, he sought to attain human ideals within the nation itself. While retaining humanity as a god, he recognized the divinity of the nation. Instead of branding all patriotism as national egotism, he sought to reconcile the cosmopolitan ideal in a spiritualized patriotism. The essence of Durkheim's nationalism was his conception of the nation as the most exalted "collective being" in actual existence. Equally important was his own objective—the closer integration of France by means of national professional groups, meetings and symbols, and a national system of education. By subjecting individual and economic interests to a sane discipline he hoped that France would become a well-regulated national society. He emphasized over and over again the existence of a national personality, which despite the similarity of European cultures, did not correspond exactly to any other, and which retained some part of its identity throughout all time. In a very real way then, Durkheim foreshadowed what Charles Maurras has been pleased to call "integral nationalism". It is not a far step from a conception of the nation as the supreme reality, and humanity as the highest ideal, to one in which the nation fulfils the requirements of both. Where Durkheim clung to the vestiges of humanitarian pacifism and abhorred violent upheaval, his successors openly discarded the Positivist religion and replaced it by the religion of nationalism. The atmosphere of the post-war world is redolent with the ideas of those who think that if they seek first the glorification of the nation by every available means, all other things will be added unto them.

M. MARION MITCHELL

LINDENWOOD COLLEGE
ST. CHARLES, MO.

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In Memoriam
Henry Rogers Seager

The Directors of the Academy of Political Science have adopted the following Minute as an expression and a record of their profound grief at the loss of a colleague long regarded with warm affection and high esteem:

At the time of his death, on August 23, 1930, HENRY ROGERS SEAGER had been a Director of the Academy of Political Science for almost twenty years. During these two decades his support of the Academy had been so active, his judgment so sound, and his range of informed interest so broad, that it would be difficult to exaggerate the value of his counsel and coöperation in aiding the Academy to focus upon problems of public interest the best contributions of both scientific scholarship and practical experience. His advice was often sought and always helpful in the drafting of programs for Academy meetings, and in these meetings he was frequently called upon to speak or to preside. He had agreed, shortly before his last illness, to serve as chairman of the program committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary Meeting.

His conception of political economy not as a narrowly academic exposition of theoretic doctrine, but rather as a humane endeavor dedicated to the scientific solution of actual and challenging problems, was the *leitmotif* of his professional career. After exceptionally thorough postgraduate training in American and European universities, he received his first teaching appointment in 1894 as an instructor of political economy in the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania. He was called to Columbia University in 1902 to serve as adjunct professor and subsequently as professor of political economy, and from Columbia he received the honorary degree of Litt.D. in 1929. His large classes at the university, his painstaking work with individual graduate students, and his widely used textbooks influenced the thought of thousands of students, many of whom now hold professorial chairs or important posts in business or in government.

It was characteristic of his attitude that he should choose to devote his major interest to practical problems of labor, of corporate organization and of industrial combination. His book on *Trust and Corporation Problems,* published the year

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before his death, represented the ripened harvest of a quarter-century of research. Some of his lectures were published in book form under the title *Social Insurance, a Program of Social Reform.* Of his other studies on labor economics there is only a fragmentary published record in the numerous articles and reviews which he contributed to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, the *American Economic Review,* the *Survey,* and other journals.

The services which DR. SEAGER rendered outside the university were closely in line with his interest in economic problems. He was appointed by the Governor of New York in 1909 as a member and vice-chairman of the Wainwright Commission on Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation, and the imprint of his mind was clearly to be seen in the notable reports of that commission. He served the Federal Government during the World War as secretary of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board and subsequently as executive secretary of the President's Second Industrial Conference. He was frequently consulted, thereafter, on legislative and executive problems. The American Economic Association elected him as president in 1922. The *Survey* owed much to his contributions, financial and intellectual. He was a founder of the American Association for Labor Legislation and thrice its president.

In the summer of 1930 PROFESSOR SEAGER led a party of twenty-eight American economists to Russia, for the purpose of making an objective investigation of Russian economic developments under the five-year plan. It was in the course of this important inquiry and in the full vigor of his sixtieth year that he was struck down by a fatal illness. He died in the city of Kiev, Russia.

His distinguished contributions to economic science and to public welfare survive his death and will continue his influence. His gracious personality and countless acts of kindliness, for which he never sought recognition, will live in many memories.

BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED: That the Directors of the Academy of Political Science, recognizing the great services rendered by HENRY ROGERS SEAGER to the Academy, to the advancement of economic science and to his fellow men, express their deep sense of loss and extend to his son, Mr. Schuyler Fiske Seager, their most sincere sympathy.

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REVIEWS

The American Leviathan. By CHARLES A. BEARD and WILLIAM BEARD. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930.—824 pp. $5.00.

After having collaborated with Mrs. Beard in a most enlightening narrative and interpretation of the *Rise of American Civilization* (Macmillan, 1927), Professor Beard now brings out, with the coöperation of his son, a B.S. of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, this ample volume baptized with the name which Hobbes chose nearly three centuries ago to typify the State—"a half-mythical giant uniting in one person a whole multitude". The historian will remember the rude pictorial symbol on the fly-leaf of the 1651 edition of Hobbes' *Leviathan,* namely, the outline of a human figure, like the familiar man of the zodiac, with his head, body and limbs filled with innumerable tiny homunculi. The human particles that fill the containing contour of the American leviathan are not only some twenty times as many as those who composed the English nation of Hobbes' day, but they are crowding and jostling one another with mounting increments of energy which threaten to disrupt their symmetrical and hallowed confines. To drop the metaphor, the wise and efficient government of 122,000,000 Americans in an age permeated and revolutionized by an amazing technology presents a far different problem than the exercise of certain enumerated powers of defense, currency control, construction of postroads, disposal of public lands, taxation, and the guaranty of a republican form of government to the several states, over a fairly homogeneous population engaged in fairly standardized and simple operations of farming, business partnerships, shop-keeping, trading and manufacture for community demands.

The problem of the federal government in dealing with the new and complicated functions of society "created under the pressures of the machine age" is the subject of the book. Those problems are stated (with a vastly interesting mass of concrete illustrations) rather than solved by the authors. The challenge of such fundamental questions as transportation in an age of motor power, the

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conservation of our natural resources, the promotion of business enterprise at home and abroad, the plight of the farmer, public health, safety, and morals, national defense, and the relations of the federal government to the states, to our foreign dependencies, and to the world at large is set forth with an arresting and somewhat disconcerting incisiveness; but little is said by way of criticism or commendation of the various administrative and legislative remedies proposed to meet the challenge. We can gain from the volume a clearer grasp, for example, of the exigencies out of which the present program of the Insurgent "bloc" has come than we can of the adequacy of that program to cure the manifest evils. Would or would not the government operation of Muscle Shoals be advisable? Should or should not a federal board furnish public money to agricultural corporations for the purpose of pegging wheat? Ought or ought not the President to be given the power to alter tariff rates on the advice of a board of his own selection? Might or might not the railroad situation be relieved if competing forms of transportation by motor truck and bus were brought under equally stringent federal regulation? The authors do not tell us what they think on these and many other questions of burning interest in the relation of the federal government to the problem created by the age of technological innovations and mass production. In short, the treatment is objective and expository rather than critical and constructive. This is not said to register a complaint. To understand the magnitude and complexity of a problem is the necessary condition of any wise attempt at its solution.

Readers who are acquainted with the successive editions of Professor Beard's college text *American Government and Politics* will recognize a virtual new edition of that standard work in the first ten chapters of the present volume, which deal with the nature of the Constitution, political parties, and the structure and operation of the three great departments of our government. But even here the authors have not been content with a mere restatement of the formal aspects of our political machinery: they have recast and reinterpreted the material with a constant eye to the inevitable changes in political morphology introduced by new economic process and technological achievement. It is no rigid Newtonian mechanism of government that they describe, but rather a growing complexity of function evolving with necessity to make legislation, administration and judicial review correspond ever more closely to the new patterns of society that result from the tremendous interaction of inherited political dogmas and compelling economic demands.

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In the second half of the volume this challenge is set before us in a series of brilliant chapters dealing with taxation, transportation, and a dozen other problems of the national government which have become so thoroughly "affected" with a technological interest. The amount of detailed information and apt illustration in these chapters, drawn from the work of every department, bureau, office and commission in our government, is simply amazing. Considered merely as an encyclopedia of technology the work would be notable. But it is far more than that. Interested as the Beards are in the "informed competence" of the expert, they preserve a robust faith in the ultimate judgment of the people. In spite of the numerous follies of democracy, the Fathers were not mistaken in founding government upon the broad basis of an educable public. A technological paternalism would be as intolerable, and in the end as inefficient an autocracy, as the political autocracy of a group of nobles or the military autocracy of a general staff. "The war was won", the Beards remind us, "by the countries in which military affairs were constantly interfered with by the 'democratic politicians' so generally scorned by the [German] experts." Hence the supreme task of the American democracy in the new age of technology is not to commit its government to the narrow class of experts who form the spearhead of the penetrating forces of technology in every field, but rather, sensing and appreciating these forces, to shape the operations of its government to the end that the masses of the people who produce the wealth and bear the burdens of civilization may become able progressively to estimate and appropriate the gains of science for the public weal. The American leviathan is not an inexorable and soulless Frankenstein creation of stone and steel, but a living, migrating, developing organism of coöperating bodies and brains, in which politics, economics, business, administration, justice, nay, even religion, art and letters all have their part to play.

DAVID S. MUZZEY

The Present Juridical Status of the British Dominions in International Law. By P. J. NOEL BAKER. New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1929.—xii, 421 pp. $7.50.

Professor Baker concludes that "the Dominions have become separate persons of international law" (p. 353) "capable today of practically every international relationship of which sovereign states are capable" (p. 358), but that "the British Empire is still not only a political unit in the world of states, but for certain purposes

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also a single unified person of international law" (p. 368). A completely logical reconciliation of these propositions might, and in fact has, led to a controversial literature recalling theological dissertations on the nature of the Trinity. Professor Baker, however, saves himself from such a dialectic by his initial insistence that constitutional law, especially in the British Empire, depends more on fact than on logic, and that the facts of Dominion nationhood and Imperial union under the Crown are fully recognized both within and without the British Empire (p. 8).

The book, which is a translation of lectures originally delivered in French at the Academy of International Law at The Hague, marshals the abundant materials on the subject in a convincing fashion. The League of Nations Covenant and the Report of the Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations of the British Imperial Conference of 1926 are taken as the "written basis of the international and constitutional position of the Dominions" (p. 3). The book is mainly a commentary on these documents. Each is, however, conceived as the formal recognition of a long historical process, and the steps in the process by which the Dominions achieved first constitutional and then international self-determination are set forth. In addition, the author presents the official and unofficial materials dealing with the making of these two basic documents and with their subsequent interpretation.

The controversial and juristic literature is combed with equal exhaustiveness, the lectures by Sir Cecil Hurst delivered at the Harris Institute at the University of Chicago in 1928 being accorded a weight doubtless deserved from their author's important part in framing the basic documents. The writings of Arthur Berriedale Keith, which minimize Dominion nationhood, are also considered in detail, but with devastating effect. The conclusions in Professor H. Duncan Hall's *British Commonwealth of Nations* are much more favorably treated.

The author states that he has sought to shirk no difficulty of any kind which previous controversy may have raised, (p. vii) and the reviewer agrees. In the concluding chapter such thorny questions as the right of secession, the automatic belligerency of the whole Empire if any part declares war, the right of "passive belligerency" of a part in such an emergency, the definition of "group questions" and the nature of "*inter se* relations" within the Empire are discussed, and in most cases, definitely and convincingly answered.

While the author writes more on the facts of the situation than on the logic, he does suggest an answer to the paradox mentioned at

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the beginning of this review by his answer to the last of these two problems. "Group questions" he believes, are not defined by law, but are decided by consultation as cases arise. Each part of the Empire is legally entitled to consider every question an individual question, and its government is competent to advise the Crown to act. At the same time, every part of the Empire is equally entitled to consider any question a "group question" and to urge that no action be taken without its consent. It is clear that this raises the possibility of conflicting advice from two or more of its governments, each of which the Crown is constitutionally bound to follow and consequently that the united Empire can survive only as long as a spirit of conciliation and an opportunity for deliberation exists. In other words, the unity of the Empire rests not on a unified authority to settle political differences but on a common will to reach agreement, supported by sentiment and tradition. The author believes the continuance of the Empire depends fully as much on the League of Nations as it does on the Imperial Conference and other British Empire institutions. Unless the League can make the world safe for political entities which require long deliberation to reach conclusions, the British Commonwealth of Nations cannot persist. "The chief danger to the unity of the Commonwealth", he writes, "seems to lie in the possibility of a sudden international crisis where the British government might be compelled to take decisions with a rapidity that would make effective consultation with the dominion governments extremely difficult. But this danger is evidently reduced by the existence of the new rules and institutions of the League and of the Kellogg Pact" (p. 340).

This conclusion suggests that the British Empire is, itself, a league of nations rather than a state, but this conclusion is avoided by recognition that "*inter se* relations" are "constitutional", not "international" in character. The author is ready to admit that if any Dominion insisted on the use of international procedure to solve its difficulties with another Dominion it could do so legally, though its insistence would destroy the unity of the Empire. In other words, "*inter se* relations" ought to be considered "group questions" to be settled by British Imperial machinery.

The problems dealt with in the book are of importance not only because they explain the nature of a political institution which governs a quarter of the human race, but also because they elucidate many questions of political theory and international law. Obviously the author abandons faith in the notion that political sovereignty necessarily involves unified political authority and also the theory

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that sovereignty is indivisible (p. 191). The importance which consultation and coöperation may have as the political methodology in a world free from the immediate necessity of self-defence are properly emphasized.

The book, which includes in appendices the texts of the most important documents, will doubtless continue to be the standard treatise on the subject for a long time.

QUINCY WRIGHT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Cases and Other Materials on International Law. Edited by MANLEY O. HUDSON. St. Paul, West Publishing Company, 1929.—xxv, 1537 pp. $6.50.

The appearance in the United States in the same year of two voluminous collections of cases on international law and in England of a digest of decisions, the latter to be continued as an annual publication, affords further evidence of the rôle which the case method plays in the study and teaching of international law in the two countries. It may be remarked in passing that an examination of McNair and Lauterpacht's Digest reveals the astonishing extent to which international law is being interpreted and applied today by national courts not only in Anglo-Saxon countries but in those of continental Europe.

Professor Hudson's work is not exclusively a case book, but a collection both of decisions and of illustrative materials consisting of the texts of pertinent excerpts from multilateral and, in some instances, bilateral conventions, state papers, statutes, decrees, the Covenant of the League of Nations, etc. No excerpts, however, from the opinions of text writers are included except as they are found in judicial decisions.

His collection includes altogether the texts, wholly or in part, of 317 decisions. Besides these are footnote references and sometimes quoted excerpts from a large number of other decisions. Naturally the great majority of the decisions reproduced are those of American and British courts, including the British Dominions of Australia, Canada and South Africa and including in some instances the decisions of American State Courts and in one instance a decision of the Supreme Court of the Panama Canal Zone. His collection contains also more than the usual number of decisions of Continental European courts. Thus there are seven German decisions, six French, two Swiss, one Belgian and one Austrian. There is also

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one decision by the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for the Free City of Danzig.

One criticism of American case books heretofore has been that they were almost wholly collections of English and American decisions. Professor Hudson intimates in his preface that a larger number of Continental decisions would have been added but for the difficulty of making accurate translations and of presenting the necessary explanatory material. In the selection of his cases, he states that wherever possible he has chosen those decided by tribunals which are bound to apply the general law of nations as distinguished from those parts of it which may have been "received" into the law of a single nation. One feature which distinguishes the present collection from the earlier ones is the large number of decisions of international tribunals: the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the more important arbitral tribunals and mixed commissions such as the recent Anglo-American, Mexican-American and German-American commissions.

The cases and materials are arranged in fifteen chapters, some of which are inordinately long. Chapter v, for example, relating to questions of jurisdiction, contains 263 pages. For class-room convenience, it might very well have been divided.

The author departs from the customary practice of beginning with decisions on the nature and authority of international law and its relation to municipal law but starts in with the subjects of international law, that is, members of the society of states. Bearing upon the former subject there is a footnote reference to *Triquet v. Bath* and one to the *Paquête Habana* but none to the *Prometheus, Queen v. Keyn, la Jeune Eugénie, Wolff v. Oxholm, Mortensen v. Peters* or the *Antelope*. The opinions in the *Scotia,* the *West Rand Gold Mining* and *Zamora* cases are found in other parts of the book under other subjects.

In the chapter on Nationality (35 cases), the decisions in the *Thind* and *Ozawa* cases are lacking although there is a footnote citation to both. It may be that they deal with matters of municipal rather than international law, but so do the Naturalization Act of 1906 from which they are cited and the *Schwimmer* and other decisions relative to naturalization which are included in the collection. Strictly speaking, most of the decisions in this chapter, like those in chapter xi on the treatment of aliens, involve questions of municipal rather than international law, but the line of separation is not always easy to draw and since they involve international conduct and international relations, they are properly included. One

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does not find in the long chapter on Jurisdiction (or elsewhere) the cases of the *Anna*, the *Parlement Belge, U. S. v. Rice, DeLima v. Bidwell, Regina v. Carr*, the *Sally and the Newton* and others usually found in the case books.

So the cases relating to diplomatic immunities do not include *Taylor v. Best,* or *Novello v. Toogood,* although there is a reference to the latter. The cases of *Carl Vogt* and *Windsor* are not included or referred to in the chapter dealing with questions of extradition.

The preparation of a collection of this kind is a task of selection, and opinions will naturally differ as to whether certain cases should be included or excluded. Some of those mentioned above as having been omitted involve questions falling more distinctly in the field of constitutional rather than international law while others are old cases and were very properly excluded to make room for more modern decisions and other material more useful. Still others do little more than declare or reaffirm principles enunciated in certain cases included. Except possibly as to a few decisions dealing with the nature of international law and its relation to municipal law, the reviewer finds little to criticize in the selections made. The output of important decisions by both national and international tribunals since the World War has been so large that it would seem desirable to make a place for them and for other materials even if this necessitates the omission of older decisions which we have come to expect as a matter of course in case books on international law. The action of the author in keeping down to a minimum his selections dealing with questions of war law will be generally approved. A good index, a list of cases reproduced or cited, tables of treaties and national legislation, a select bibliography and numerous footnotes add to the utility of what will undoubtedly prove to be a very valuable aid to professors and students.

JAMES WILFORD GARNER

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Volume IV: *British India, 1497-1858.* Edited by H. H. DODWELL. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929.—xxii, 683 pp. $8.00.

This substantial volume of over six hundred pages forms the fourth of the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* and the fifth of the *Cambridge History of India.* It is divided into thirty-two chapters, eight of which are contributed by the editor, and six by Mr. P. E. Roberts, Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford. Thus

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two authors are responsible for nearly half the work. Except for the late Dean of Winchester and the late S. M. Edwardes, who have written two each, no other writer has contributed more than a single chapter. As to the scope of the volume: it extends from the appearance of the Portuguese under Vasco da Gama in 1497 to the eve of the Indian Mutiny in 1858. Obviously a work so extensive and the product of so many hands cannot be treated in detail within the limits of a brief review, particularly if one considers in addition the kaleidoscopic nature of the subject. Only a few features can be touched on to indicate the quality of what is offered to the reader.

In certain respects the work has the merits and possible defects manifest in the various Cambridge series. For one thing, abundant references to the sources indicate its scholarly structure. Moreover, while proper account is taken of the researches of others, not a few of the judgments on controverted points are refreshingly independent and the general tone is impartial. Numerous examples might be cited. Among others the note on "the Black Hole" (p. 156) is a piece of sound historical criticism. The character and achievements of Warren Hastings have been fought over for a century or more. Mr. Roberts, weighing the evidence keenly and dispassionately, produces a convincing estimate. While recognizing Hastings' abilities and his notable work he does not overlook his shortcomings in financial administration, his occasional ruthlessness and his inability to work with others. The appraisals of Cornwallis, of Wellesley, of Lord Hastings and of the tragic régime of Auckland deserve attention, and likewise the sympathetic treatment of Dalhousie's problems. There are suggestive ideas in the chapter on "The French Factories in India", and, to mention one more, that on the East India Company is by an acknowledged authority—Sir William Foster.

On the other hand, the reforms of Bentinck and the codification activities of Macaulay receive a treatment scarcely adequate. Possibly the latter may be reserved for a subsequent volume. Portions of many chapters will prove perplexing and forbidding to the average reader. Part of this may be due to lack of selective skill, but part is inherent in the subject—the bristling array of strange names and places that seem to require consideration, the multitude of rulers and claimants legitimate and illegitimate. Then, too, the experimental character of the British measures—which are tried, modified, abandoned and not infrequently resumed in the original or amended form—adds to the bewilderment. Occasional paragraphs of generalization serve as acceptable finger-posts in the jungle. Parts of

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the chapter on Burma read like extracts from a gazetteer. A chronological table is a welcome aid, but a few maps, together with genealogical tables of the native ruling families, are further to be desired. Political and military narrative, trade, constitutional and administrative matters constitute the burden of the theme. Social and cultural conditions are touched on only incidentally.

The general accuracy is such that few queries occur to the reviewer. The old conventional notion about the Bulls of Alexander VI is repeated in spite of E. J. Payne's convincing statement in the *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. I, p. 23. It might be questioned whether the Dutch East India Company was as prosperous as is indicated on page 95. That Scott would not have acted without the consent of Hastings would seem to be by no means certain (p. 307). While Pitt was incapable "of being swayed by mere motives of the lowest political expediency" (p. 309), he, on more than one occasion, allowed political considerations to influence his attitude. The question of the "garbled dispatches" (p. 499) might have been discussed more at length, and Sir Charles Napier's alleged message "*Peccavi,* I have Sind" should have at least been mentioned if only to question its authenticity. The bibliographies are extremely complete: very likely Dr. Sophia Weitzman's *Warren Hastings and Philip Francis* as well as A. P. Nicholson's *Scraps of Paper: India's Broken Treaties* appeared too late to be included.

ARTHUR LYON CROSS

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

America and England. By NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT. New York, Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1930.—x, 254 pp. $3.00.

In view of the popular demand for information on the Anglo-American problem awakened by the London Conference, Mr. Roosevelt has brought together some interesting and timely material on the relations of the two great Anglo-Saxon nations. The contest between these two powers is in one sense a rivalry between mass production and cheap labor. The mechanization of American industry has made possible an output per person which is nearly twice as much as that in Great Britain. The incomparable supply of American resources is likewise a great advantage to the United States. Mr. Roosevelt, true to the traditions of his name, denounces our prodigal waste of natural wealth as a foolish relinquishment of this advantage. He shows that the British have widely sought to gain

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and preserve oil, tin, bauxite, nickel, etc., for the empire. The expansion of American foreign trade to a point equal to that of Great Britain is the outstanding commercial event of the twentieth century. This has not meant cut-throat competition, according to the author, as the two nations specialize in different kinds of wares. In the financial field, New York has not yet displaced London as the world's center. British foreign investments still exceed those of the United States, although current loans from New York surpass those from London. The British metropolis continues to be supreme in commercial banking. In shipping, Great Britain is far in the lead. Mr. Roosevelt believes that the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 will do something to help the depressed shipping industry of the United States by construction loans and mail contracts. In his final chapter, entitled "Partners for Peace", we find the suggestion that the United States and Great Britain should coöperate for the very sensible reason that "as great trading nations both are vitally concerned to see peace maintained so that prosperity may flourish."

The naval rivalry of the two countries is discussed and traced through the Washington and Geneva Conferences. The doctrine of the freedom of the seas is realistically regarded by the author as one of self-interest which we will favor when it suits us and violate when our interests are those of a belligerent. He opposes a treaty to recognize the freedom of the seas, for as we rise in naval strength the doctrine becomes less suited to our interests. There is also the danger that in stressing this demand we may come into conflict with a League of Nations blockade.

Many students of international relations will radically disagree with some of the views expressed in the book. Mr. Roosevelt feels that some of the defects in American policy are "inadequate support of navy and prepardedness; blindness of leaders; slowness to act; defencelessness of Philippines" (p. 8). He deplores the timidity of the government in supporting "legitimate business interests abroad" (pp. 201-202). He is, however, conveniently ambiguous as to what he would do about it. And it is difficult to see how his strong-arm policies, whatever they may be, would improve world opinion toward the United States, which he says, is already "accused of faithlessness in international agreements, of being undependable, selfish, heartless and eager to 'enslave' poor Europe and annex Latin America" (p. 204). He feels that the United States should retain the Philippines because of the "repercussions" from India to Korea which would follow their release. The belief that we should hold on to the unappreciative and unprofitable Filipinos

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for the sake of a sort of international imperialism is current in such backwaters of political thought as the International Settlement of Shanghai. From the standpoint of continental United States, however, there seems to be little wisdom in maintaining this incalculable liability in our national defense for the benefit of a waning imperialism in Asia conducted by the British, French, Dutch and Japanese.

It is when he comes to denounce a certain brand of "idealists" that Mr. Roosevelt loses much of the self-control which characterizes the greater part of the book. He does not make it entirely clear who these idealists are or where they exist. They are irresponsible but frightfully effective persons. Their intelligence cannot be very high, for, according to Mr. Roosevelt, they are unaware of the differences in point of view between the Orientals and Occidentals. But they have paralyzed timid government officials with misguided propaganda regarding China and Central America. The reviewer questions whether the book is entirely fair in describing the officials of the American government as shivering weaklings who can be coerced into erroneous policies by a group of such apparent numskulls as these "idealists" of Mr. Roosevelt's fancy.

The author is not always modern in his treatment of the armament question. When the matter of British trade routes through the Mediterranean is discussed he asserts that "should the three European nations whose coasts are washed by that sea build fleets which in alliance could close the Mediterranean to English ships the integrity of the British Empire would be menaced" (p. 139). This is the language of the pre-airplane period. Should France, Spain and Italy join against Great Britain they could with their air fleets close the Mediterranean immediately to British commerce. In discussing American neutrality in future wars he does not mention the Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the plans to implement it, such as the Capper Resolution. The book is a mixture of realism and conservatism, rather quickly put together but interestingly done.

BENJAMIN H. WILLIAMS

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

The Biography of President von Hindenburg. By RUDOLPH WETERSTETTEN and A. M. K. WATSON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930.—276 pp. $2.50.

Hindenburg is an outstanding example of how a man can be really great—not merely prominent—without being a genius. Readers of

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his memoirs have often suspected this, and now other biographers confirm it. The authors are, in a sense, hero-worshippers but they seem frankly puzzled to make their hero seem so great as they feel he must have been. Here is a career nothing short of magnificent. To how many men in all history has it been given to be the brains and backbone of a monarchy in a great war, to lead the defeated armies back safe and loyal in the midst of revolution, and then to become the honored chief magistrate of the succeeding republic? Yet when Hindenburg speaks the quality of mind revealed seems dull and commonplace; and one can understand, though not agree with, those critics such as Professor Lessing who reckoned him a mere ventriloquist's dummy in the service of shrewder and less scrupulous men (p. 246), "a self-sufficing life, narrowly limited and naively accepting its limitations" (p. 232). But then Professor Lessing had another sort of narrowness and could never forgive Hindenburg for being ignorant of the *Nibelungenlied*.

Why is this somewhat peevish professor given so much space in a book written to praise the man he scorned? Because he expressed at least a half truth. Hindenburg was certainly no "intellectual" and that fact, which might be an asset in America, is a handicap in Germany. Brought up in the narrowest sect of German *Junkers*, of a family more deeply rooted in Prussian soil than the comparatively parvenu Hohenzollerns, he had received a purely military education. His political creed was devotion to king and country, and nothing beyond. He gave apparently no thought at all to foreign policy or domestic problems till the war. Even during the war he totally misapprehended the situation on the "home front" though he understood the eastern and western fronts better than anyone else. "The sufferings and deeds of the army obscured for him the sufferings and deeds of those who had to stay behind. . . . He emphasizes perpetually the necessity of keeping the army in the best shape possible, but he nowhere emphasizes the pressing necessity of a proper administration of home affairs" (p. 123). The great wisdom he has since shown as president arises from many fine qualities but not from an alert intellect. We see only a heavy figure tramping from one end of Germany to another making heavy speeches.

> He is in fact almost more heavy and more serious than most Germans, and we find in him little of wit or of humor . . . it would seem as if he despises the words he is obliged to use, and so unskilled is he in the art of speech that he does not fully realize the effect that may be produced by a word in season . . . much as is to be read about his geniality, we are unable to find many traces of it in the story of his

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> life. . . . In the story of almost every other great man, we can hear of little, silly anecdotes to relate, so that the picture presented is not one of unrelieved greatness—but in Hindenburg's we cannot find many such (pp. 255, 274).

Such a hero imposes a hard task on his biographer.

The answer to the enigma seems to be that character has a greatness of its own as well as intellect. Hindenburg as a soldier reminds this reviewer of Grant, Hindenburg as a statesman, of Cleveland, Hindenburg as a man, of both. He was one of those ponderous men, massive in physique, stubborn and tenacious in disposition, transparently honest, unable to rise above or sink below the level of dogged loyalty and routine devotion to duty. Sometimes these human mastiffs are a welcome change from chattering jackdaw theorists and suave, feline politicians. They have, for one thing, an immense capacity for work, which merely clever people usually abhor. Again, they are trusted when more glib and plausible men are (often unjustly) suspect. Again, they make loyal colleagues, for their idea is service rather than ambition. A French general once pointed out that Hindenburg in his memoirs speaks of "we"; Ludendorff, in his, of "I" (p. 53). Their very simplicity seems at times like the simplicity of a granite mountain.

Another useful quality of Hindenburg was his emotional balance. He was a militarist but never a jingo. War was just a day's work, to be accepted without either regret or enthusiasm. Defeat, revolution and foreign occupation were misfortunes to be endured rather than bewailed. Foreign nations were made up not of devils but of ordinary human beings with whom one might fight or negotiate on equal terms. The hysteria which so often gripped the Kaiser and Ludendorff and occasionally appeared even in the stalwart Bismarck rarely touched Hindenburg. If the words of his public speeches are trite, the spirit behind them is usually admirable. He wastes few bitter words on enemies at home or abroad and appeals with quiet dignity for the coöperation of all Germans. Recent parliamentary crises show that he has not wholly succeeded, but the fault has been with more volatile men whose nerves have driven them into fanatical factionalism. In his private life he has the simple, kindly domesticity of the best type of German, and he could unbend to his intimate friends though he is always the stiff Prussian officer in public.

The biographers write from a liberal German point of view. They hold Germany relatively guiltless in the war, but do not hesitate to put much blame on Austria. They also blame the weakness of Germany's allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, for

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much of the fortune of war. In dealing with Germany's internal conflicts they try to hold the balance fairly, though they obviously hold that Hindenburg's policies have been wiser than those of his opponents to the right and left. The lack of an index to the book is unfortunate.

PRESTON SLOSSON

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Coöperative Movement in Russia during the War. By EUGENE M. KAYDEN and ALEXIS N. ANTSIFEROV. Published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by the Yale University Press, New Haven, 1929.—xi, 420 pp. $4.00.

It is an ancient and honorable principle of historiography that inasmuch as the events of history actually unfold themselves in a certain chronological order, this same order had best be followed by the historian unless there are logical reasons of weight for the adoption of some other plan. In the volume here in hand, the history of coöperation reaches backward into the nineteenth century, and forward into the period of Communist control, but the difference between period and period has not been accepted as the primary basis for the organization of the material. Rather the plan is to work forward chronologically though the history of the coöperative organizations of a single type (say the local consumers' societies) from beginning to end; then to present a parallel history of the organizations of another type (say the unions of consumers' societies); and so on, until the whole field has been covered. The result is that the reader does not get at any one time (unless he uses the table of contents to piece it together) a cross-sectional panorama of the status of the coöperative movement as a whole on the eve of the war, or of its condition after the war had had its way. The brief introductory chapter does not meet this need, and upon the whole the arrangement by parallels seems hardly to be the best one possible in a history which engages specifically to deal with the war period as such.

In attempting to explain the remarkable development of formal coöperation in Russia, Professor Kayden says that the masses had had a thorough training in the principles and practices of association (p. 4). If this is indeed a proper connection of cause and effect, and if the *artel* or labor association deserved to be mentioned as a training-school, should not the land-commune have been mentioned also? The practice of the periodic redistribution of the land

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certainly accustomed the peasants to associative action. Again, the primitiveness of peasant agriculture is cited as one of the reasons for an economic distress which is said to have promoted the growth of the coöperatives (p. 7)—but should not some mention have been made in this same connection of the reduction of the peasant allotments at the time of the Emancipation and of the heavy redemption-dues and taxes which the peasants were called upon to pay? The decline in real wages is stated to have promoted the growth of the consumers' societies (pp. 41-42), but nothing is done to prove the decline, no source is cited, and no attempt is made to examine this wage-question in its application to the peasants among whom the consumers' coöperatives were expanding so rapidly—the peasants who were usually sellers as well as buyers of goods, and among whom there were both sellers and buyers of labor. Also it is stated, with no attempt at proof, that even in the pre-war period private trade was badly organized, and was given to excessive profiteering (p. 41). Finally, inasmuch as the growth of coöperation was by no means uniform throughout the country, it ought to be possible to establish some kind of correlation, region by region, between the weights of the causes, whatever they were, and the extent of the effect. Perhaps this is too much to ask; but somehow one can not help but feel that rather than deal so casually with the question of the general conditions which promoted the development of the coöperative movement, Mr. Kayden might better have omitted this subject altogether.

At the forward end of their history, chronologically speaking, the authors are faced with the complications arising from the fact that the war becomes more and more entangled with the Revolution, and slowly yields place to it as the controlling factor in the situation. Some of the data in this volume reach far down into the revolutionary period—even sometimes through the year 1921; but in the absence of an adequate discussion of the place of the coöperatives in the Communist system of production, requisition and distribution, the later figures can have little meaning. If this changing and complex relationship was not to be thoroughly explored, it would perhaps have been better if the authors had accepted no responsibility whatever for the period of Communist control.

Occasionally this volume offers a generalization for which one would like a better proof or an adequate citation, but the reviewer has discovered little that is demonstrably inaccurate. Mention should at least be made however, of Mr. Kayden's statement that the strike-movement of 1914 was as serious as that of 1905-1906

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(p. 72); actually less than half as many men went on strike in 1914 as in 1905. Again it is said that before the days of coöperation, "the only escape from the poverty and tedium of life [in the village] was the public grogshops" (p. 160); apparently Mr. Kayden has forgotten the "promenade" (*gulianie*), the dances, the games and songs, the occasional festival which turned the whole village into the street.

If this book has its shortcomings, there can be, on the other hand, no question of its great value. The most casual reader of the volume will be convinced of the national and international importance of Russian experience in coöperation; and here is a collection of materials on this subject far richer than any that has yet been offered to the English-reading public. The book is not written with sufficient liveliness to attract the uninitiate, but certainly it offers much to those whose attention has already been engaged by the subject with which it deals. If there are in this country any considerable number of people who are genuinely interested either in the problems of coöperation, or in the domestic behavior of the combatant nations during the war, or in the national history of the people of Russia, then this book will find the public it deserves and the authors and editors will have their terrestrial reward.

GEROID TANQUARY ROBINSON
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Next Ten Years in British Social and Economic Policy. By G. D. H. COLE. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929. —xxi, 459 pp. $5.00.

In forging afresh his own views of socialist policy, Mr. Cole has tried to do what the Balfour Committee should have done but failed to do, namely, to examine the contemporary economic world to discover how far economic and social policies which were appropriate twenty years ago remain valid today.

He sees three economic changes of great significance. The first of these is the economic depression of the world and especially of Great Britain. The old balance of world trade "is gone past recall" (p. 31). Decreasing wages and increasing unemployment place capitalism in a more vulnerable position than ever, and socialism's problem becomes more concrete and economic, namely, the reorganization of industry so as to ensure steady work at a rate of wages and conditions of work regarded as fair by the electorate. Above all, the problem of nationalization, so long the main plank in

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every socialist program, is transformed from one of finance and administration and compensation for a going concern, to one of rehabilitation of a sick industry.

The second change which gives Mr. Cole pause is the alteration in the conditions of industry, affecting both the unit of operation and the kind of work performed by the individual worker. The scale of efficient operation of industry has become larger, and the type of industrial unit is no longer uniform. Neither horizontal nor vertical combinations represent ultimate or exclusive tendencies: "side by side with them there will be many other forms of capitalist combination crossing and often wholly ignoring traditional industrial boundaries" (p. 127) and blurring "old lines of division between industries" (p. 137). It would, therefore, be a mistake for a nationalization policy "to break up business units which stand for the last word in the evolution of modern industrial technique" (p. 139). Accepting these changes in industrial organization, socialists must on the one hand find some way of controlling without the necessity of purchase (and therefore of defining an industry), and on the other, devise governmental units covering geographical areas large enough to permit the most economical developments, a policy likely to involve the abandonment of former hopes of municipal enterprise.

New techniques of production calling for less skill on the part of workers will decrease the effectiveness of trade unionism by increasing the transferability of workers and reducing ability to paralyze industrial units (because of the reduced dependence on skill). Appeals based on craft or narrow trade solidarity must give way to the broader political appeal of a socialist or labor party. "Trade Unionism will change its character" and "become no longer the half-articulate expression of an exploited class, but a valuable piece of social machinery" (p. 173), carrying on negotiation and research on technical labor problems. Work will become less, and leisure more interesting. Any economic system, capitalist or socialist, will more and more be judged by its success in supplying products to use in that leisure rather than by its claims to ensure recognition of the dignity of labor. The admission that "most men's daily work is dull" and that they do not want to find in it any overwhelming interest leads Mr. Cole to change his views regarding guild socialism. He now sees his earlier schemes as "a politically minded person's Utopia" which would have worked only so long as there was an enemy, capitalism, to vanquish, but maintains that there was and is a sound core in the guild idea, namely "its insistence that the worker,

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as a worker, must be treated as a human being, and not as a mere factory hand" (p. 161). This recognition can, however, be obtained by devices which will distinguish between democracy and representation: the Works Council composed entirely of workers, and possessing wide statutory powers of appeal to specially constituted industrial courts, finds its place not as a cog in the administrative machinery of industry but as the "best available means of ensuring that the expert shall know how his devices for economizing effort in production really strike the ordinary man" (p. 170).

The third economic change of significance concerns the methods by which society accumulates its supplies of capital. The growth of investment trusts and the increasing tendency of industries to finance themselves simplify socialist reorganization of industry and the carrying through of reforms involving heavy taxation of the rich. Socialist measures of taxation would probably encourage companies to make even greater provision for their needs by "company saving", but if such provision were not made, legislation might make it compulsory.

It is obviously impossible within the limits of a review adequately to indicate or comment upon the system which Cole builds upon the basis of the changed post-war situation. Some of his main proposals may, however, be indicated. All changes point to the theory which runs as a refrain through his book that "what really matters is not ownership, but control of policy" (p. 142). This control may be obtained in different ways in different industries, and by no means involves the buying out of existing property owners. The key positions must be controlled. In general Cole hopes to achieve this through the control of investment. He proposes that the state should control capital issues in the country for both internal and external use, and that a National Investment Board should itself raise money by the offer of relatively low rates of interest which will appeal to the great mass of middleclass and small savers who are attracted by security rather than by high interest rates. This board will ultimately control the greater part of the new investable funds and will dictate terms to those who wish to borrow. Thus in the depressed industries, the willingness to offer new capital at low rates will be made conditional on a thoroughgoing reorganization by the industries concerned (pp. 81-2): participation in schemes of bulk purchase or coöperative activity (p. 287) or settlement in an appropriate geographical situation (p. 82) might be made a condition of financial help. Through its control of the mechanism of credit (for which Cole makes detailed proposals) the state would

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be able to exert a considerable influence over that part of trade which remains in private hands (p. 291).

Oviously the effectiveness of these proposals depends upon the amount of funds the board succeeds in attracting and upon its policy in allocation. So far as the first point is concerned, Cole's view of the sources of supply of capital cannot be refuted until economic theory develops much farther the quantitative treatment of this problem. He lightly dismisses the dangers of a growing tendency on the part of firms to reinvest their savings. Yet the stronger this tendency (which he regards with favor), the smaller will be the funds available to the National Investment Board. Moreover the large concern can find outlets for these funds not in its own, but in allied businesses and lines of manufacture and thus avoid the control over investment. The recruitment and training of the all-important personnel of the board is but slightly indicated.

Industries directly operated by the state will be administered by commissioners, appointed for a term of years and answerable for policy to Parliament once a year and more often if necessary. It is assumed that it is possible and necessary to separate control of policy from control of administration, the former a matter for determination by a representative body, the latter by experts. In such bodies as those controlling capital and credit, however, the maintenance of this distinction may be difficult.

Among the more novel of Cole's practical suggestions is his proposal for the creation of a National Labor Corps as a means of tiding over the unemployment crisis. This involves the voluntary enlistment of unemployed and their employment at a maintenance wage (p. 53)—or where the work is skilled, at a trade union wage—on work of national importance, such as building houses, making roads and parks and destroying unsightly dumps. The funds for this corps will come out of loans, where the work performed will produce an equivalent and direct monetary return, and otherwise, from taxation. Cole claims that the extra labor cost to the nation will be small, since there is a compensating economy in unemployment benefit and poor law relief. He admits that there will be "substantial costs" over and above this, due to the necessity of supplying the corps with equipment, materials and organization, but thinks that since much of the work it will do will be productive, it is "at the least, very moderate to conclude that it will suffice amply to meet all charges over and above the pay of the workers involved" (401).

The chances that this will be so depend considerably on the nature of the work the corps will do. Cole states it will be set "only to

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work that would not get done by any other agencies" (57). Failure of other organizations to perform any given piece of work may be due to an inability to realize the possibilities of gain (because of the length of the period involved or for any other reason) but it may equally well be due to a failure on the part of the proposed enterprise to yield profits and wages which will be equal to those already received and expected by producers of all kinds. If it be a fact that the economic situation in England warrants a standard of remuneration to all the participants in production lower than that which they are at present receiving or have been accustomed to receive in the recent past, the chances of discovering "productive work" (by which Cole evidently means production of money return) will be diminished so long as existing prices are taken for granted, as for example, he seems to do in his proposal that trade unions should be given the option of employment on skilled jobs at existing trade union rates.

It may be well that the offer by the state to operate some industries or to carry out some kinds of work will be tantamount to the offer of entrepreneur service and of capital at rates considerably below the prevailing average and may thus exercise pressure (when the finished product comes on the market) on other producers to reduce their supply prices: but if (as may well be the case) the wage and profit structure is rigid, reductions in profit will cause the supply of privately offered enterprise to dwindle and the field of "work that would not get done by any other agencies" to widen. Perhaps this is the consummation which Mr. Cole devoutly wishes. If it is, he might have indicated more clearly the criteria which the directors of the National Labor Corps or the National Investment Board would use in deciding, in the absence of competitive money indices, the direction which enterprise is to take. In this, as in his proposal that the National Investment Board is to develop "any industry that seems likely to succeed and to provide employment on fair terms" (p. 81) Cole avoids the central problem, which is precisely a means of knowing what these industries are. He establishes administrative structures but does not provide the economic policies which are the sorest need of the present. There are undoubtedly a few obvious cases such as the generation and distribution of electricity where there are reasons for supposing that private enterprise is deterred from undertaking work which is "productive" in the long run because of the length of time over which calculations have to be made, but he has failed to show that there are many other such fields of productive enterprise capable of being, but not yet exploited with-

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out injuring to an equal extent the development of other industries. It is to be hoped that in a future work Cole will concentrate upon the operation of his more purely economic proposals and perform the great service of casting light upon the economics of employment, that obscure field where cause and effect are as yet undistinguished.

E. M. BURNS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

British Industry Today. By BEN M. SELEKMAN and SYLVIA KOPALD SELEKMAN. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1929.—290 pp. $3.00.

In this volume two American students of labor problems, after having spent some months cruising about on the spot, present a description and appraisal of industrial relations in England. They report an industrial situation on the "tight little island" marked by "labor's changing front" from the radical, simon-pure Marxian Left to the relatively conservative opportunistic Right. "The curtain seems to be falling upon the Marxian orthodoxy". The spotlight centers upon "cooperation—in a common endeavor to raise the workers' standard of life" by the achievement of greater efficiency and economy in the productive system.

The dialectical rationalizations of the Marxians have been abandoned to the communists; in their stead British employers and British workers concern themselves with "rationalization" in the sense of a socialized "scientific management", that is interested not at all in theories of surplus value, and rather less interested in the technical changes that will enable the individual manufacturer to produce at lower unit costs, with resultant enlargement of corporate earnings out of which may (or may not) come larger labor earnings, than in the "engineering revision" of whole industries, on the distributive as well as on the productive side.

The book is an elaboration of this thesis of a change in front. The shift in philosophy—and in tactics—is reflected in (1) the growing habit of substituting conciliation for the strike as a means of maintaining industrial peace, with the result that collective bargaining is more fully developed and less frequently punctuated with strikes than ever before, (2) the development, usually on the premise of trade-union organization and often with trade-union support, of Whitley Councils, company unions and the shop steward movement, (3) the national system of unemployment insurance, and (4) the

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Mond-Turner Conference of 1928 between representatives of British labor and of British capital. The authors devote one or more chapters to each of these aspects of contemporary industrial relations in England.

At the end of an excellent description of the system of collective bargaining that has grown up in Britain between the organizations of employers and employees the Selekmans say that the crucial question now confronting both parties is whether "they can extend the scope of existing machinery beyond wages, hours, conditions and similar issues which focus relationships primarily upon distributing the proceeds of industry, to include the problem of re-organizing industry to make it more efficient" (p. 69). That question is not answered—yet. The emergence of the Whitley Council and the shop committee amounted to an effort to show that an affirmative answer was not fantastic. The effort, to date, can scarcely be said to have been successful, but, as the authors point out, it is too much to expect that pioneer types of industrial organization will be able to weather acute depression without heavy losses. "The real test of the joint industrial council movement . . . may . . . come only when Britain again enters upon an era of revival and prosperity" (p. 103).

Nor is the crucial question answered as a result of the Mond-Turner Conference, clarifying in some ways as that meeting was. The Conference endorsed collective bargaining by and between trade unions and employers' associations and suggested the setting up of certain supplementary machinery for the improvement of industrial relations. This machinery included "a national industrial council for handling industry-wide or inter-industry problems . . . [and] . . . a system of joint conciliation boards" to prevent the outbreak of disputes not settled by machinery already set up by employers and trade unions. More important in the opinion of the authors was the recognition and endorsement given by the Conference to the principle of the rationalization of industry which, it may be remarked by the way, the Conference saw as the chief clue to the solution of Great Britain's fearful problem of unemployment. These principles have not as yet received at the hands of English employers the substantial endorsement they have had from the representatives of British labor. The Trades Union Congress considered that in dealing with the Mond-Turner program British labor might (1) do its utmost "to utilize the prevailing economic stagnation to insure the break-down of the whole industrial machine in the hope of creat-

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ing a revolutionary situation which might be used to abolish capitalism", (2) let the employers run their works as best they could, while labor stood aside and fought here and there in the orthodox way for the orthodox "improvements", or (3) "demand boldly a voice and influence in reconstruction predicated on an explicit concern 'with the prosperity of industry'" (p. 256). The first position the Congress, despite the opposition of the communist minority with its Marxian, class-conflict conception of trade unionism, rejected as futile. The second apparently could not even muster a minority opposition. The third triumphed—the conviction that produced the triumph being that the trade unions could "find more use for an efficient industry than for a derelict one". The unions by active participation can as the authors say "seek so to steer scientific reorganization of industry as to protect the immediate interests of the workers and assure their share of material advantages" (p. 256). In the light of the reactions to it of employer and employee interests the authors' characterization of the Mond-Turner Conference as "a challenge to employers" seems appropriate.

The chapter on unemployment insurance is a discriminating appraisal. The unfairness of the all-too-frequent American characterization of the British system as a dole is made manifest by the authors' reminder that it involves as does all insurance "a monetary benefit given in return for regularly paid premiums". The very low rates of benefit, although open to criticism because of their inadequacy to provide the necessaries of life during unemployment, offer little support, the authors point out, to criticism of the British type of unemployment insurance on the score of soldiering (p. 205). It would seem to require no little enterprise to loaf on seventeen shillings a week! Indeed, the Selekmans go further and express the opinion that British experience indicates that unemployment insurance benefits not only do not promote malingering and fraud, but that they do not tend to pauperize the recipients (p. 204). Finally they wisely remind the reader that any estimate of the system must be made "with a sympathetic appreciation of the ordeal by which it has been tested". Their conclusion is that "given all the circumstances (such as abnormally heavy unemployment, aggravated by changes in world trade which have been terribly costly to England) the insurance scheme has been administered with a high degree of efficiency" (p. 209). And on the credit side of the ledger we must note as one by-product of the insurance scheme the fact that the British people know, or have only to consult the papers to find out,

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exactly how much unemployment they have got from month to month and year to year, and exactly where and in what industries it is most serious. In this republic we don't know or have means of knowing these things. Also on the credit side must be put the British labor exchanges without which not only would the insurance scheme be impossible but also the number of unemployed almost certainly would be larger, for, though no labor exchange can make a job grow where there is no job, it can often find and fill jobs which, without the exchanges, might remain, for a time at least, without available men to step into them. In this respect also we lag behind Britain.

In a world economic scene, set up as unfavorably to England's trade requirements as is the present one, it is inconceivable that there should not be great unemployment on her island and many a creak in the operations of the machine designed to protect the jobless from some of the untoward results of joblessness. The English trade unionists, and even some English employers, say that the most hopeful remedy for this evil of unemployment and for the disease of trade decline as well is to be found in the rationalization of industry.

The Selekmans have done a good job and their book ought to be useful in a country where the chances are that we shall sooner or later be forced to deal seriously with some of the same problems that England has faced. Indeed we now confront an unemployment problem not much, if any, less serious than Britain's. The book is well indexed and carries footnote references to the sources.

P. F. Brissenden

Columbia University

The Ethical Basis of Political Authority. By W. W. Willoughby. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930.—460 pp. $3.50.

Professor W. W. Willoughby has the gift of writing important books. The present volume is not only important but profoundly reassuring. In no unfriendly spirit it may yet be pointed out that the positive or analytical juristic theory connected with Professor Willoughby's name has, by many students, been felt to be open to two major criticisms. Of these the first is a doubt of its utility. Any scientist (and it is unnecessary here to quibble whether "scientific jurisprudence" is, in any precise sense, scientific) is entitled to make his own abstractions and hypotheses for the advancement of his science. Hence Professor Willoughby is fully entitled to make use of

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a something called "the Juristic-State", which is distinct from the actual state known to the historian, sociologist and man in the street. "The predication by the jurists of legal omnicompetence to the sovereign State carries with it no implication whatever either of unlimited actual powers of coercion on the part of those who control the activities of the state or of an ethical right to exercise an arbitrary will as to what commands shall be uttered by the state". There is no contradiction "between the legal absolutism of the jurist's conception of the state and its actually limited powers of coercion". The only question which occurs to one's mind is that of how far such an abstraction, even if it lends itself to neat precision of statement, serves that useful purpose which is demanded of a scientific hypothesis. It is problematical whether a theory which explained more of the data would not better conform to the principle of economy.

The second doubt gives more substance to the first. One wonders whether the disciples of the school will for long be quite as precise as their master in making the necessary reservations or whether the analytic juristic school also, with its theory of a "juristic person, possessing, legally speaking, an omnipotent will", may not end as an additional bolster to the Bosanquetian philosophy of the state as "no part of any larger whole". Even Professor Willoughby himself occasionally scarcely saves himself from falling into the trap which is almost infallibly prepared for less cautious souls. Thus he adopts such phrases as "a philosophy of law and not merely one of sociology", with its implication that a theory of the state is primarily a matter of jurisprudence and not of sociology, instead of a sound sociology and politics being fundamental to a sound study of that partial field called jurisprudence. It is never quite clear whether Professor Willoughby admits that there is any such thing as a study of the state by political science, as distinct from a study on the juristic or the ethical or the historical plane. Again Professor Willoughby declares that Duguit produces "a system of social or ethical philosophy rather than one of law or politics", thereby risking misinterpretation as identifying the juristic theory of politics with the only sound theory of politics and the juristic state with that actual state from which he has elsewhere, with great nicety of reasoning, distinguished it. It can scarcely be expected that simple legislators will remember that Professor Willoughby's theory, being a theory solely of law and not of lawmaking, is not for them; and it may very gravely be doubted whether these abstract suppositions will even be beneficial for the judiciary when acting in

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an equitable capacity or when taking into consideration the real factors of public policy and the common weal.

In view of these criticisms it is the more important that Professor Willoughby very definitely admits that the actual state may be limited both in practice and in ethical principle. "The state is not itself a moral person". "It has no real will of its own". "All governments and laws are but instrumentalities which men employ, just as they employ countless other means to reach the ends which they desire"! States and governments alike are means for giving effect to the principle of justice which "consists in rendering to the individual, so far as possible, all the services, and surrounding him by all those conditions, which he requires for his highest self, that is, for the satisfaction of those desires which his truest judgment tells him are good." Moreover, the national state is not necessarily the final and most inclusive means. "It can scarcely be denied that the welfare of the entire family of nations or of all humanity is more important than the welfare of any single political or national group of people." Far from joining himself to the company of wicked men, such as Dr. Bosanquet, Professor Willoughby is indeed among the righteous. He even perhaps goes too far in his criticism of Hegel, who, at least, for all his state idolatry, had the grace to remark that "the claims of the world-spirit rise superior to those of any particular state".

At two points, however, which are very critical in this book in which Professor Willoughby is outlining his ethical philosophy of the state, as distinct from his juristic philosophy, the skating, though adroit, is over the thinnest of ice. In a treatise on the ethical basis of political authority it might well be thought that the writer would discuss at length the extent to which the individual is morally entitled to oppose his own social ideal to the actual commands of an actual society, and how far an enlightened and social conscience must always dictate conformity to the will of the majority or to the conclusions of the wise. At this critical point Professor Willoughby's argument is deflected from a discussion of the duty of obedience to that of reaffirming the indubitable right of governors to exercise compulsion in accordance with their own conscientious conception of what will tend to the welfare of the citizens (a matter which cannot ultimately be divorced from the probability of obedience or otherwise to the government).

The essential passage in Professor Willoughby's discussion is:

> It must be held that the individual has at times the moral right—nay,

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> that he is morally bound—to refuse obedience to those laws which, for any reason, he deems to be unjust or immoral . . . it is a right only to be justified by a consideration of all the consequences, proximate and ultimate, individual and social, which attend its exercise.

Personally, Professor Willoughby seems to me in this passage, to which he does not add anything, to go too far in the way of radicalism. For "any reason", it would surely be better to read, "any enlightened reason . . . by a rational consideration". When Aquinas declared that he who acts against his conscience, "*sive errante sive non errante*", commits sin, he yet introduced the reservation of the rational nature of conscience. There is a prior moral obligation to be intelligent.

Further, Professor Willoughby succeeds effectively in demonstrating that the state is as much entitled to apply coercion as other social agencies and that in very many cases the effect of civil law is to decrease rather than to increase the total of coercion because it protects individuals against individuals. The question immediately arises how far political agencies other than the state may expediently be entrusted with regulative power and even, in certain provinces, with a superior regulative power. How far is such a prior claim to obedience (for example by a church, or by a national king over a "sovereign barony" or by the King of Bavaria as against the emperor in the eighteenth century) consistent with the "juristic doctrine of sovereignty," as distinct from the doctrine of a sovereign and final arbiter within the sphere acknowledged by the current constitutional morality? There is no adequate discussion here of this issue. On the one hand, Professor Willoughby treats coercion as either "political" (which he identifies with "civil" coercion by the state) or as "social", apparently with reference to coercion by other individuals, rather than by other organized groups. On the other hand, he specifically states that it does not follow that the state or its agencies—to which are arrogated the term "political authorities"—"should necessarily be given a monopoly of the right to exercise coercion".

Professor Willoughby's work is of such standard value that it is to be hoped that on some occasion he will clear up these ambiguities. This book contains an excellent and learned survey of preceding theories—indeed our chief complaint is that there is not more of Professor Willoughby. It is anyhow assured of a place of distinction in the literature of the subject.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN

LONDON, ENGLAND

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The Evolution of War. By MAURICE R. DAVIE. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929.—x, 391 pp. $4.00.

Social Psychology of International Conduct. By GEORGE MALCOLM STRATTON. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1929.—x, 387 pp. $3.00.

The question whether or not, in the long run, war is diminishing, is answered, not too positively, but on the whole affirmatively, in each of the two books before the reviewer. Both of them have some ground for the claim to scientific method and viewpoint. *The Evolution of War,* "a study of its rôle in early societies" by Professor Davie, is a very full compilation, thoroughly documented, of tribal customs pertaining to war that have been recorded in the writings of anthropologists and others, of travelers and scholars, ancient and modern. Many of the observations here collected, as statement, at least, of more or less isolated fact, are certainly interesting. And one is tempted to generalize from them. For example, how lightly esteemed by primitive man is life as compared with property! It is as if Machiavelli were right: " . . . men do sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony". The tribesman, for example, who thoroughly shared in the admiration of his community for the man among them who had to his credit the greatest number of scalps and who had "killed my father", doubtless prized more highly than his father's life, not only the prevailing standard of honor, but also his property. Yet, in a sense it is true, as was held by Locke, that property is part and parcel of life.

Can it be seen, however, to what extent the struggle for subsistence has been a cause of war? Professor Davie's answer is not altogether clear. That primitive man is warlike the facts would seem to show. Life for him is, if not "solitary", yet "poor, nasty, brutish and short". Hobbes was in this respect more right than Montesquieu. But where primitive life is peaceful, to consider the exception rather than the rule, as in the classical example of some of the Eskimos, is the reason for this exception also exceptional? War, says the author, is a competition for life; yet it is given as a reason for the peacefulness of the Greenlanders that, "being chiefly engaged in winning subsistence in a difficult habitat", they cannot, in the words of Nansen, " . . . afford to waste time wrangling among themselves" (p. 47). Elsewhere (p. 147) it is said that in general "the savage is so engrossed in a severe struggle for existence that his life leaves little room for diversion. Hence men like to fight". The

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several ideas thus expressed would seem, perhaps, less mutually contradictory, if they were more thoroughly coördinated. And likewise throughout this book, the wealth of evidence would be easier to read if there were a more convincing marshaling of the facts, and if it were more clearly shown just how these would support the generalizations that are now and then thrown in.

The summary outline of the causes of war as being "hunger, love, vanity and ghost-fear" (p. 65) is a reproduction of a classification in Sumner's essay on *War,* which is followed also in Sumner and Keller's notable four-volume work, *The Science of Society,* the fourth volume of which, it will be remembered, is a case book and bears the name of Davie as joining the other two authors. Davie's *The Evolution of War,* moreover, is dedicated to Keller.

The important conclusion is, perhaps, that:

> the course of evolution reveals a growing tendency to settle disputes without recourse to arms. In the past, however, war has often been the only possible resort, the only adjustment available to meet the situation. It thus offers a good parallel to slavery, an institution which, though rightly opposed by the civilized peoples of today, served in its time as an excellent adjustment. . . . Nevertheless, it must be remembered that war is not an end in itself, as its apologists assert, but is merely a means to an end. Our study seems to indicate that war is a less fit adaptation than other means that have in part superseded it (pp. 231-33).

This conclusion would be supported also by Stratton's otherwise very different book, *Social Psychology of International Conduct.* "Knowing, then, that the facts [of war] are not adamant against us, how shall we move among them?" The answer is to be found, not in a blind condemnation of "our combative endowment", but through a deeper "reëducation". The needed reëducation must be ". . . addressed to our power of knowledge and to more than this power. . . . The motive power is in the desires and in the emotions and sentiments which lend their strength to our desires" (p. 320). There is more said upon the education of the mind, however, than upon the training of the passions. Or which of these objectives is uppermost in the following argument?

> It is not enough to say that . . . war . . . does not pay. . . . Leaving out of account for the moment the individuals who make private profit out of war, yet war still may bring to particular nations what they greatly desire. It often is a successful means of policy; it often assures to the victor great national rewards. . . . France today, sobered regretful France, would not if she could, recall her soldiers slain in the

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> World War and say "Let the Boches have their way with us. They cannot in their utmost arrogance take from us what would equal these brave sons of ours". Some of the French fathers and mothers perhaps might whisper this in their hearts, but never the nation as a whole (pp. 336-37).

This passage is from a section entitled "Taking national profits out of war". If, indeed, it is "wholly reasonable" not only "to confiscate or prevent so far as possible all commercial gains to private individuals or corporations" but also to penalize the nation that chooses war, so that "war, which has so often 'worked' and which still promises to "work", shall have this promise torn out of it" (p. 338), then are the means to this end, by which the author means the institutions of diplomacy, arbitration, judicial decision and an international police, and not mere declarations of anti-war policy, to be founded upon reason or upon desire or equally upon both? Are not the desires of the criminal curbed no less by the reason than by the desire of the community? Is not the community, so far as it lives peacefully, governed by the reason, if not of the many, then, in the last analysis, of the few who are responsible for intelligent direction? Was Socrates right, that all conflict and all evil desire are but ignorance, for does not the following of wrong desire lead always, in the long run, to a miserable end, and does anyone find himself in misery who knows how to avoid it? Was the distinguished physician and psychologist, after all, wrong, who "from his wide experiences in helping others out of their mental difficulties" said, "'You will have to do more than make clear to them the cause of their trouble'". He thus pointed to a false confidence, says the author, which comes readily in a scientific age. But if you show to the sufferer the cause of his trouble so clearly that he is able really to anticipate the evil consequence of the cause, have you not done all that you can do, psychologically, to control his desires? You may help him to a knowledge that is more than ratiocination, but it is none the less a knowledge.

Stratton writes here for social science teachers who "will desire a survey of the international scene from the standpoint of psychology", for college youths and for the general reader. The style is fluent and often delightful. There is coördination of thought. Documentation would be out of place, and in general there is a freedom in expression of opinion, which though slightly annoying at times, is pleasing in the main. A certain repetitiousness is more than compensated for by some passages of creative expression.

WALTER SANDELIUS

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

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BOOK NOTES

Students of the business cycle who wish to test the thesis that cyclical changes in the equipment industries precede changes in general business conditions, and also those who have regarded railroad purchasing as a major influence upon business in general, will be interested in a book which attempts to discover "whether changes in the volume of orders placed by the railroads have tended to precede, to accompany, or to follow after similar changes in business activity generally, and to determine to what extent the railroads have tended to confine their purchases to periods of high prosperity and to cease buying during periods of depression" (p. 3). John E. Partington's *Railroad Purchasing and the Business Cycle* (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1929; xiii, 309 pp. $3.00) covers a period of nearly six decades, from 1870 to 1926. The author has made a very careful search through all of the available sources in order to collect data in regard to purchases of rails, locomotives, freight cars and passenger cars. Even so, the figures collected during the early years are very meagre and it is doubtful whether they can be regarded as a fair sample. Regarding the time sequence between railroad purchasing and general business conditions, the author concludes (p. 193) that "outstanding changes in the volume of railroad purchasing have tended on the whole to precede the upswings and downswings of business as a whole. This was specially true of periods of depression." The conclusion is reached after comparing, period by period, the volume of railroad *orders* for new equipment with such barometers of business activity as pig-iron production, merchandise imports and the indexes of bank clearings compiled by Frickey and Snyder. This alone should place us on guard, for in the modern business world the placing of an order generally precedes by some time the delivery of the goods ordered, while payment for those goods (as measured in bank clearings) occurs at an even later date. In the early period "it was customary to place orders as far ahead as a year or eighteen months before delivery was expected" (p. 51), while as late as 1902 "the practice of ordering far in advance was carried to still greater lengths" (p. 110). Moreover, it is apparent that many of these "orders" were only tentative. If business continued to improve

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specifications were filled in by the railroad at a later date and the "order" became definite; if not, the "order" was invariably cancelled. While this qualification does not invalidate the general conclusion stated above, it makes the study less valuable as a scientific correlation of the fluctuations in the railroad industry with those of business in general. A more serious criticism relates to the method of comparison adopted by the author. Despite the rapid expansion of the railroad industry during the first thirty years of the period studied, and the slower expansion during the present century, no attempt has been made to eliminate the secular trend from his data. Neither has allowance been made for the marked seasonal fluctuation in the volume of railroad orders. The reader would obtain a much clearer picture of the relationship if some statistical correlation of railroad purchasing to the general business cycle had been attempted, but even during recent years, when abundant statistical material was available, the author has confined himself to a visual comparison of the raw data. In regard to the second problem, the author concludes (p. 197) that "more equipment was bought by the railways during periods of [general business] prosperity than during periods of depression, and more was bought during those months when business was improving than in those months when commercial and industrial activity was dwindling." This would lead us to infer that railroads do not consciously expand their purchases during periods of general depression, an inference which receives support from the statement that "the railroads have bought most freely when their earnings were largest" (p. 215). Nevertheless the changes in gross earnings and purchases are not simultaneous, for in all cases but one a change in gross earnings has been anticipated by a similar change in the volume of purchases (p. 215). Taking these conclusions together, one is not clear as to the exact relationship, in point of time, between railroad purchasing, railroad earnings and the general business cycle. As the volume of data increases year by year, it may become possible to make a careful statistical correlation of series representing these phenomena, but meanwhile the author has given us a careful survey of an almost virgin field. The abundance of his references gives some indication of the amount of work he has done, and all students of economic activity will be grateful for the valuable collection of statistics which are to be found at the end of the book. —F. Cyril James, University of Pennsylvania.

An exceptionally interesting and important volume by Benedetto Croce, entitled *A History of Italy, 1871-1915* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1929; 333 pp. $5.00), was first published in

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Italy in 1928 and appears now in an admirable English translation by Cecilia M. Ady. It presents a threefold interest: as a history, as an indictment, and as the expression of a philosophy. As a short history of Italy from the completion of unification to the entrance into the World War it seems destined to occupy a unique place. Too brief to admit of much narration and assuming on the part of the reader a tolerable familiarity with the facts, its rôle is that of interpretation. Its distinguishing features are breadth of view and a remarkable capacity for understanding and describing the many intellectual, spiritual, economic and political factors which entered into and molded the life of the Italian people. The appraisement is everywhere sympathetic but discriminating. Finding in liberalism, socialism and nationalism the three forces which in the main shaped the thought and action of the Italian people during the period under consideration, Croce describes each of them with a rare degree of impartiality and a still more remarkable talent for distinguishing their merits and their shortcomings. His personal sympathies are manifestly with liberalism. But socialism and nationalism are fairly and even sympathetically delineated. There is in the book nowhere any mention of Fascism nor of Mussolini, save in one short passage upon his early career as a socialist. Yet it is a powerful arraignment of Fascism. The indictment against that system lies in the picture Croce paints of the régime which Fascism overthrew. From it one gets a conviction that if Croce's appraisal of Italy's achievements between 1871 and 1915 is to be accepted as substantially correct, or even if his estimate must be considerably discounted as too complaisant, there was no justification for the Fascist revolution and that event must be looked upon only as a political and moral catastrophe. All readers of the book, but especially those interested in Croce as a philosopher, will welcome the revelation it affords of the author and his philosophical system. From first to last the book is marked by a spirit which could be imparted only by one in whom serenity had come to be a distinguishing and even dominating trait. His conviction that life, both for individuals and for nations, is determined by philosophy, pervades the book. There is, moreover (at pp. 242-247), an epitome of his own philosophy, described simply as one of the factors which operated in the life of Italy. Seldom has a great philosophical thinker put into a few words so clear and illuminating a statement of the essence of his thought. It deserves the attention of all who feel any interest in the man, his philosophy or the history of his day.—FRANK MALOY ANDERSON, Dartmouth College.

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The Royal Commission on the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia was appointed by the Bruce-Page ministry in 1927. Its task was a formidable one. It was required to investigate and report upon the powers of the Commonwealth under the constitution and the working of the constitution since federation, and to recommend such constitutional changes as it thought desirable. Its labors occupied two years, during which it took evidence in all the states and from 339 witnesses. (The testimony is being printed separately in several volumes.) The *Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution of the Commonwealth* (Canberra, Government Printer, 1929; xxiii, 371 pp. 10s. 6d.) consists of two clearly-defined sections: first, a historical and analytical description of the working of the constitution since the establishment of the federation in 1901, and second, a series of proposals as to constitutional changes. The descriptive part, which comprises the bulk of the report, is an admirably concise and systematic commentary on the constitution. It will be especially valuable to scholars as a starting-point for almost any study of the Australian federal system. It describes, *inter alia,* the relationships between states and commonwealth with respect to the division of legislative powers, the judiciary, external affairs, defense, taxation, industrial powers and health. And not the least of its merits is that it discusses the economic and financial factors underlying these relationships. Of the important recommendations of the Commission, none are unanimous. On the main issue—whether the federal system should be retained or a unitary constitution adopted—the Commission divided, four members desiring a federal and three a unitary system. The majority made no attempt to define a "federal" system precisely, explaining that they meant a system, like that of the United States and Canada, in which "not only are the powers of the local and central legislatures defined by a charter, but the powers of the local legislatures and executive governments are substantial and significant." The minority expressed the view that the most suitable form of government for Australia is a unitary but decentralized system which "provides for all major national questions being dealt with by the central Parliament, and leaves matters of minor importance, as well as the administration of federal laws to a considerable extent, to local bodies." The Western Australian member favored the restriction rather than the enlargement of Commonwealth powers, on the ground that the interests of the outlying States, Western Australia and Tasmania, were already being prejudiced by existing arrangements. The minority proposed to alter the

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present method of amending the constitution so as to enable the Commonwealth Parliament to amend it merely by an act passed by an absolute majority of both Houses. This, in effect, would create a unitary government; and such a proposal has little chance of adoption by the Australian people. The minority urged, moreover, that powers over industry and commerce and health should not be divided, for all of these matters must certainly in the future be dealt with as nation-wide problems; and the Commonwealth should have full powers to deal with them as such. The majority, on the other hand, felt that if they vested in the Commonwealth all the powers which they thought related to industry and commerce, they would destroy the federal character of the constitution. Accordingly they advocated the deletion from the constitution of section 51 (xxxv) (the conciliation and arbitration clause), which would deprive the Commonwealth of its only existing power over industrial matters. It is worth noting that the Bruce-Page government met defeat precisely on this majority proposal, and its successor, the present Labor ministry, is now placing before the people recommendations in keeping with those of the minority report.—ERIC A. BEECROFT, Yale University.

The first four volumes of *American History Told by Contemporaries,* covering the years 1492-1900, were edited by Albert Bushnell Hart between 1897 and 1901 and for some thirty years have been widely used in supplementing American history textbooks in both high schools and colleges. The success of these volumes, tested as they have been for so many years in actual class-room practice, is ample justification for a fifth volume entitled *Twentieth Century United States 1900-1929* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929; xxi, 917 pp. $3.75), edited by Professor Hart in collaboration with John Gould Curtis. In his first four volumes Professor Hart showed himself in advance of many of his professional colleagues in recognizing the new social history, and for this he deserves full recognition. This policy he pursues in the fifth volume "furnishing evidence that the complete history of our country involves the status of the people of the Nation, their origin, their spread over the land; their division into sections; their races; and the question of immigration." Industry is stressed, and portions of the book are devoted to such vital questions of public welfare as urban and labor problems, public utilities, dependents and criminals. Some attention is also devoted to intellectual life as shown in education and literature. To give a picture of a civilization even in 208 selections is a difficult task, but Professor Hart has come close to

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accomplishing the impossible. Two features of the book stand out —the catholicity and the fairness of the selections. Part I is an introduction to the sources, while the remaining ten divisions range over such fields as the land and its people, government, administrative methods and imperialism, international affairs, domestic problems, human relations, arts and sciences, national leaders, and the World War and its aftermath. Much of the material is from magazines and recent books, but government publications have been called upon and there are even excerpts from well written textbooks. In general the material is exceedingly popular, of the type that should be appealing to the high school student or college freshman; for example, Minister Wu Ting-Fang's view of American manners or Graham McNamee's description of a broadcasting studio. It should be noted to its credit that the book contains selections not only from the highly respectable pens of Elihu Root and A. Lawrence Lowell, but also from those of Clarence Darrow and Max Eastman; it gives pictures not only of John Hay and Henry Cabot Lodge, but also of William E. Borah and Eugene Debs. One notes also with satisfaction that a letter from Walter Hines Page to Woodrow Wilson is followed by C. Hartley Grattan's caustic appraisal of Page, and there are many other evidences of giving two sides of the picture. Obviously there will be much difference of opinion as to the value of many of the selections, but there are few that the social historian cannot defend. The volume should have a useful career.—H. U. FAULKNER, Smith College.

In what he calls a "long and leisurely inquiry", *The Unknown Washington* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930; x, 454 pp. $4.00), Mr. John Corbin attempts to undo Professor McMaster's well-known dictum of many years ago: "George Washington is an unknown man." But Mr. Corbin's endeavor is not like those of Mr. Woodward, Mr. Hughes, and "the modern biographers"; there is nothing of "debunking", except possibly as to the debunkers. On the contrary, there is presented a rehabilitation of the Federalist tradition. Mr. Corbin's *bête noir,* and therefore that of his Washington, is what he calls the Revolution of 1800; although, as Washington died before the "Revolution", what Mr. Corbin really means is the appearance and development of the Jeffersonian Democracy. Two of the eighteen chapters are really biographical; one on "The Inward Washington" and one on "The Republic and Sally Fairfax" deal with Washington's youth and young manhood. In some of the other chapters there is a good deal of biographical matter, but with a thesis, as in the chapter on "Washington and the

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Union", which retells very well the familiar story of Washington's interest in the Potomac country, and, of course, emphasizes the national purpose embodied in this interest. But the larger part of the book is only incidentally biographical. One finds, rather, essays that at times wander far from the life of Washington, known or unknown. "An Air-Hole in History", the first chapter in the book, is an expression of modern doubt as to the success and value of "democracy". A later chapter presents an excellent study of John Adams's political thinking: others have to do with Harrington and with Walter Bagehot. Toward the end one meets with Professors Beard and Laski, Mussolini, and the League of Nations. Evidently the book covers a wide range. There is much that is penetrating and stimulating in Mr. Corbin's analyses. The Constitution failed, in his view, to provide the right kind of cabinet: and Washington himself failed in that he did not develop the consultative function of the Senate under executive leadership. But the heart and center of Mr. Corbin's essays is found in his presentation of the thesis that the Constitution was not intended to be democratic, and that unicameral legislatures, direct primaries and universal suffrage are all alike alien to the ideas of the makers of our Constitution. Finally, out of all his careful study of the period of the Revolution, the Confederation, and the Federalist régime, emerges distinctly Mr. Corbin's belief that George Washington was more than has been supposed a man of ideas, and that he arrived independently and in some cases with priority at most of the fundamental concepts of our constitutional system.—ST. GEORGE L. SIOUSSAT, University of Pennsylvania.

A timely subject is treated by William I. Hull in *India's Political Crisis* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930; xvii, 190 pp. $2.00). However, readers may find the title rather misleading inasmuch as the greater portion of this little book is confined to the debates in and the actions taken by the various political organizations of India in December, 1928. The sketch of the historical background of these events is too brief to enlighten—the whys and wherefores of the turmoil must be gathered from other sources. The author has centered his attention on the struggle over the issue, "dominion status or independence for India", with some references to subsidiary topics such as communal representation and the activities and views of the Indian communists. The account of the All Parties Convention at Calcutta, December 22-31, 1928, suffers from condensation. Without having at hand the contents of the Nehru Report which supplied the basis for the discussions both at this con-

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vention and in the constituent organizations, it is impossible to understand what was going on. But when Dr. Hull takes up the work of the Subjects Committee that prepared resolutions for the Indian National Congress, December 29, 1928-January 1, 1929, he allows himself more space and the story becomes both informative and intelligible. Excellent summaries are given of the speeches delivered at the opening of the Congress by Mr. Sen Gupta and its president, Pandit Motilal Nehru. One can see that the moderates were fighting a rear-guard action and that the victory was truly Pyrrhic. The left wing was moving forward and was soon destined to sweep along with it practically the entire line. Dr. Hull is fair and temperate in his characterization of men and events. However, occasionally he delivers an *obiter dictum* that is debatable. Thus when it is said and implied (p. 1) that India possessed a "pristine ideal of nationalism", nearly destroyed by internecine strife and foreign interference, and that these untoward events "checked the normal growth of union and democracy", large assumptions are treated as facts.—PAUL KNAPLUND, University of Wisconsin.

The present troubles of the British in India increase the value of Miss Sophia Weitzman's *Warren Hastings and Philip Francis* (Manchester University Press, 1929; xxx, 400 pp. 25 s.), since to a very real degree the problems of today are about one hundred and fifty years old, dating back to the days when Warren Hastings attempted to graft many of the features of English administration upon Indian government. That Warren Hastings undertook too much was the contention of Philip Francis who in his efforts to retain more of the native institutions became the almost maniacal opponent of the man who has generally taken rank among the greatest of English governors in India. The controversy between the two men lasted for over a decade and in her efforts to find its whole history Miss Weitzman has ploughed through an enormous amount of material, much of it unprinted. Starting with the conflicts in the council in India she has carried the story up through Hastings' impeachment, for which she makes Francis responsible. In the course of doing so a great deal of light is thrown upon the early administrative history of British India, both by the inclusion of new facts and the re-interpretation of the old. Miss Weitzman is of course inclined to side with Hastings, and indeed the vindictive rancor of Francis is more or less bound to produce the same effect on any student of the episode. On the other hand, because of his unpleasant character, Francis has seldom received justice. His objections to Hastings' policy bear the marks of solid consideration of the problem. While we cannot say

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that Francis' policy of retaining more power in the hands of the traditional native officials would have secured better results in the long run, we can say from the perspective of a century and a half that his criticisms of Hastings were fundamental and valid. It is even now a little early to sing too loudly the song of success of British administration, many of the lines of which were laid down by Hastings. This, however, does not detract from the value of Miss Weitzman's study, which may count among its greater virtues the printing of a full one hundred and seventy-five pages of correspondence and other documents.—C. F. MULLETT, University of Missouri.

An unusually intelligent and useful pamphlet on Chinese affairs—*A Brief Account of Diplomatic Events in Manchuria* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1929; 93 pp. $1.25) by Sir Harold Parlett, C.M.G.—has been prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The whole story of the international history of Manchuria from 1895 through 1928 has been condensed into 57 pages, supplemented with a number of important documents not readily accessible. The interests of Japan and of Russia are fairly treated, in most cases entirely without bias, one of the few exceptions being the statement that the Queen of Korea was murdered at the instigation of the Japanese minister. Unnecessary details have been omitted with such skill that the narrative is quite complete enough for most readers, while the serious student finds the explanations illuminating. The situation is accurately summed up in the words "Japan will not leave Manchuria of her own free will. That is clear. Her statesmen and soldiers have again and again laid emphasis on the sacrifices the nation made in life and treasure during the war with Russia. They now regard Manchuria as their country's first line of defense against the Red Armies and the Third International." On the other hand, the Nationalist Government of China will not be satisfied until Manchuria is freed from Russian and Japanese control, and Great Britain and the United States, as well as other powers, have made various efforts to secure "the open door" for their commerce, which they sometimes have appeared to believe was impeded by the present arrangements.—CHARLES BATCHELDER, New York City.

The Institute of Pacific Relations caused to be prepared for its third meeting in Tokyo, in 1929, a most useful reference book: *The International Relations of Manchuria* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929; xxx, 307 pp. $3.50) by C. Walter Young. It was intended to give in detail in an objective and accurate manner the complicated facts about a situation which has led to war twice in

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recent times and which may lead again to wars into which European powers and the United States will be drawn in spite of their efforts to remain neutral. The interval between 1895 and 1929 has been divided into four periods and the position of Japan, Russia, Great Britain and the United States has been made clear in each of them. Copious footnotes and references make the volume more useful to the scholar and the documents given in the appendices, including various secret treaties, are not readily accessible elsewhere. Rarely is the policy of the United States made clear in other histories, and there are many bits of important information which seem to have been overlooked by most writers. It becomes evident that the Japanese are convinced that their economic interests in Manchuria are vital to their national existence, while China loses no opportunity of asserting her sovereignty. Especially timely are the sections covering the raids by Chinese authorities upon the buildings occupied by Soviet officials, and the hostilities in 1929 between Russia and the Manchurian generals caused by the attempted seizure by the latter of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Accurate research is constantly evident and the book is invaluable to the student of the period, though its style is not attractive to the general reader. The analysis of the various treaties and agreements is skillfully made and the production is most creditable to the author. It is understood that it contributed materially to the success of the Kyoto meeting, when there was apparently much progress toward mutual understanding between the Japanese and Chinese delegates. It is a model of the kind of information which should always be placed at the disposal of the negotiators in international conferences, where there is so often a lack of accurate information about important details. Its usefulness will be permanent, and it may yet be needed in future conferences about the situation in the Far East.—CHARLES BATCHELDER, New York City.

Tsingtau under Three Flags (Shanghai, The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1929; xi, 580 pp. $5.50), by Wilson Leon Godshall, is to be welcomed by the general reader and the student of Far Eastern affairs alike. While much of the material is well known, having been presented in a number of other books including the author's earlier work, *The International Aspects of the Shantung Question,* yet there is much that is new and hitherto unpublished. The author has consulted the sources freely, with one startling exception, *Die grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, especially volume 14, part I. We have in the book under review a fairly detailed history of a port which has, within the past thirty-five years, been under the

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control of the Chinese, the Germans, the Japanese and once again the Chinese. Especially full is the treatment of the "Seventeen Conversations" between the Chinese and Japanese delegations to the Washington Conference, regarding the future status of the port, and of the railroad and other holdings in the interior of the province. The account does not end there. The author reviews the negotiations that continued throughout the remainder of 1922. Of especial interest is the revelation of the lack of coöperation between the military and diplomatic arms of the Japanese government during the latter period of the negotiations. The militarists were reaping lucrative rewards from their position in Shantung and stooped to the meanest tactics, even to the fostering of bandit raids (pp. 444 *et seq.*, especially p. 450) as a means of delaying negotiations and the ultimate restoration of the port and the other holdings in the "hinterland" to China. The author points out that the Japanese military officers were in the habit of receiving commissions from contractors supplying material and equipment to the Japanese municipal administration (p. 445). The chapter on "Japan in Shantung" contains much that is new, in particular with respect to the "cultural propaganda" conducted there by the Japanese (pp. 189 *et. seq.*) together with an account of Japanese administration and exploitation of the railroad and the mines (pp. 196 *et. seq.*). The twenty-one appendices comprise important treaties and agreements that bear directly or indirectly on the status of the port during the past thirty-five years. There is also appended a very full bibliography and an index. The Commercial Press is to be congratulated on the good appearance of the book, the clearness of the type and the freedom from typographical errors.—CYRUS H. PEAKE, Columbia University.

The second edition of *Public Regulation of Competitive Practices* (New York, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1929; xi, 320 pp. $3.00) brings up to date the discussion of federal regulation of price, sales promotion and trade-relation policies contained in the work originally published in 1925: the discussion is set against the background of an introductory account of recent changes in methods of marketing and policies of governmental control. The book also contains a new chapter on "one of the most promising developments in the regulatory work of the Federal Trade Commission" (p. 241) namely, the Trade Practice Conference. The Conference Board contends that this abandonment of the old policy of oppression in favor of the development of self-criticism and self-control was essential to the attainment of the ultimate objects of control, and ignores the common criticism that this procedure has

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led the Commission into a complacent coöperation which is no adequate substitute for vigilant criticism and control. The Board criticizes the policy of the Commission in relation to the suppression of unfair competition for its "failure to formulate definite standards of what constitutes a basis for procedure in respect to each type of questionable business practice" (p. 245). It argues that the consideration of the economic soundness of any practice or its tendency to promote general prosperity or national welfare is "beyond the scope of the Federal Trade Commission and properly so" (p. 243) as well as "quite too vague for practical usefulness" (p. 118). The basic standard "according to which the lines of policy may be drawn to general satisfaction" under existing circumstances "may be taken as the preservation of fair competitive opportunity in trade" (p. 118). Thus the criterion of decision appears to be limited to more immediate consequences of conduct and no effort is made to reveal proper criteria of fairness. Indeed the Board rejects the idea that "the sphere of coercive regulation of business behavior is or should be coeval with the sphere of ethically objectionable business conduct" (p. 134). The inconclusive termination of the Board's excellent discussion of resale price maintenance reveals the difficulty of establishing such criteria: moreover, the Board's own suggestion that the choice must be made according to "sound public policy" concerning "the view taken of the function and importance of distribution in the present economic system and the lines along which it is to develop" (p. 98) suggests that the Board itself cannot escape in the end from that "quite too vague" criterion. The Board contends that the enforcement of the Sherman Law belongs to the Department of Justice and not to the Federal Trade Commission. The past history of the Commission may throw doubts upon its capacity to undertake the enforcement of the Sherman Law, but at least in principle there appears to be a strong case in favor of leaving the Department of Justice with the determination of the legal forms of procedure, and placing upon the Commission the responsibility for dealing with the economic aspects of the investigation. Moreover, section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act contains adequate evidence that it was the original intention of Congress that the Commission should perform this function as well as assist in advising courts and the Department of Justice concerning the restoration of competitive conditions. The study is generally well arranged, incisively expressed, comprehensive and fair. *Obiter dicta* such as reference to "that fundamental principle of American political life that there must be a government of laws and not of

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men" (p. 251), and that election results are an adequate proof of popular approval of economic liberty (p. 3), are a needless shortcoming.—ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS, Columbia University.

Corporate Earning Power, by William Leonard Crum (Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1929; xxiv, 342 pp. $5.00) presents a detailed and systematic analysis of the information on corporate earnings contained in the United States Treasury's Statistics of Income, based on the federal income-tax reports. The extreme period covered extends from 1916 to 1926, though most of the series are for shorter periods, owing chiefly to lack of comparable data. The quantities analyzed include the ratios of net earnings to gross volume of business, to total assets and to "invested capital" (deducting that represented by borrowings, funded or otherwise). Certain of the tables report interest paid, as an addition to net earnings, others compare net earnings with dividends and others attempt to picture the proportion of corporate business done at a profit, and the relative profitableness of corporations of different sizes. The figures are classified by major industrial divisions and subdivisions, and there is also some classification by states. The figures reveal many relationships of interest, even though some of them are familiar. The stability and large operating ratio of public utilities, the relative instability of mining, and the intensified effect of fluctuations in business activity on net income as compared to gross, are all seen, as well as the large number of small corporations earning no return. Earnings of corporate agriculture are apparently low. There seems to be a slight tendency toward lower margins of profit on sales. The comparison of net earnings with dividends contradicts the extravagant impressions current in certain quarters as to the proportion of earnings "plowed back into the business". The volume will be a valuable work of reference for the student of such matters. The work is carefully done, and the limitations of the significance of the various ratios are conscientiously pointed out. The reader will still need to pick his way carefully among the many tables and charts, assuring himself of the precise content of the quantities used before drawing his own conclusions. Otherwise the very low ratio of net earnings to total assets and the much greater rate of return on invested capital would be decidedly puzzling. Earnings of industrial groups are complicated by receipts from investments in other industries, earnings by states are still more confused by earnings from business in other states than that for which the income is reported. And gross earnings for certain years are confined to those of corporations earning a positive net income, for

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other years not. Indeed, one of the outstanding general impressions gained from the book is of the extreme difficulty of making such basic statistics tell us the things we would like to know.—J. M. CLARK.

A book on an important aspect of industrial organization, "The Problem of the Hours of Labor" (*Il Problema della durata del lavoro*, Florence, Vallechi, 1929; 517 pp. 25 lire) by Nello Gangemi, has been published in Italy. The author states in the preface that he has investigated his subject from "a Fascist standpoint", without furnishing any additional explanation as to what he means thereby. Perhaps the reader will be able to detect that for himself in examining the book. After a brief introduction in which the author points out that the frequency of accidents is related to the hours of labor, a fact which seems to have passed out of his mind while he was writing the rest of the book, he gives a detailed and well documented history of the eight-hour movement in the past, enumerates the provisions decided upon in the Washington Conference and for almost 300 pages goes on to expound the application of the law in the various countries of the world. As a result the book is convenient for reference purposes. In following the author's investigation one cannot help feeling that he has set out with the conviction that the eight-hour day is objectionable; and that, consciously or unconsciously, he was influenced in his research by this opinion. Not always is the author clear-cut in his rejection of the eight-hour day: he rejoices over the fact that the Fascist government has established the eight-hour day by law; in general, however, legislation to that effect "is immoral . . . because it is not right to deprive the workers of their freedom to use their capacity [for any length of time they desire]". Indeed in many countries the workers raised a protest against the introduction of the eight-hour day when it was accompanied by a reduction in daily wages. To establish by law, however, that wages should remain the same in spite of the shortened work-day means "to establish a sort of minimum wage, one of the most injurious utopias social reformists have ever dreamt of . . ." On the contrary, "it is absurd [to assume that one can] determine by law wages, hours of labor or the number of workers to be employed without provoking the decay of industry, and hence unemployment and misery. . . . The remuneration of labor tends to equal the product created . . . the ingenious solution of the wage problem according to the cost of living is therefore absurd. . . ." Furthermore, "the adoption of a legal limitation of the hours of labor tends to increase, and not to diminish unemployment. . . . It is true that

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it is still asserted by some that a decrease in wages diminishes the capacity of the working classes to acquire goods . . . [but] in the first place high wages do not give the workers so considerable a buying capacity as one might suppose at first sight, because of the effect the cost of production has on the selling price. . . . High prices discourage consumers . . . so that those industries which are unable to lower prices must perish . . . unemployment becomes inevitable and therefore one is far from having increased the buying power of the workers." In all countries the employers protested against the introduction of the eight-hour day on the ground that it retarded production at a moment when the country was passing through a crisis. The opinion that the curtailment of the hours of labor has caused a diminution of production, except in those industries operating under the piece-work system, is borne out by almost all investigations, whether official or private, national or international. As a result various proposals for revision of the Washington Convention have been advanced, and in most countries, at one time or another, the government has temporarily raised the limit of working hours. The author devotes special attention to the difficulties encountered in the attempt to apply the eight-hour day in agriculture, in the merchant marine and on the railroads, and points out that a distinction must be made between the time the employee spends at the place of work and the hours of actual labor. If, however, the eight-hour day is inevitable it should be introduced gradually, and in any case international legislation should be opposed: "The uniform work day so dislocates international competition as to damage some countries and to benefit others . . . to eliminate this aspect of competition, while other factors [which make for the] economic superiority of a nation . . . remain unaltered, amounts to striking directly at the workers whom one pretends to protect, means to fall into the hands of the international demagogic plutocracy". No one, however, will believe that the author is interested in the fate of the laboring masses, since at no time does he inquire as to the effect the eight-hour day has on the workers as human beings, except when, in the preface, he refers to accidents and when he speaks of the "immorality" of limiting the freedom of the workers by a reduction of their working hours. Neither does he seem to be aware that shorter working hours mean increased leisure which is apt to stimulate consumption and thus in turn to react favorably on production. He never even alludes to this point.—CARMEN HAIDER, Washington, D. C.

Lord Amulree has provided a study of *Industrial Arbitration in Great Britain* (London, Oxford University Press, 1929; 224 pp.

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$4.50), covering the last one hundred and fifty years, which will undoubtedly take its place as a standard history of the subject. One cannot, however, but express some disappointment at Lord Amulree's almost purely legalistic and formal treatment. It is true that a brief attempt is made to account for the failure of efforts to foster recourse to arbitration; but there is no comprehensive analysis of one of the most interesting aspects of British industrial history, namely, the repeated failure not merely of all attempts to introduce compulsory arbitration but also, at least until the war and post-war periods, of all efforts to develop a more formal system of conciliation in contact with government departments, coupled with a high degree of success in the development of voluntary conciliation and arbitration arrangements in the industries themselves. The history of Whitleyism, which might have provided a clue, receives surprisingly brief treatment. Disappointment increases rather than decreases as more recent periods are approached. More flesh on the dry bones of the narrative might have been expected in the case of the Industrial Court with which Lord Amulree had been so closely associated. Yet here, too, he does no more than set out the considerations theoretically affecting the success of such a body without indicating what were the fruits of experience. Particularly striking is the unfinished reference to the National Industrial Conference of 1919 on page 147. It is difficult to see how, without a knowledge of the failure of the Conference and some analysis of the hopes that were bound up with it, any understanding can be obtained of the attitude of workers today toward talk of industrial peace or the possibility of national joint organizations. Where he did not wish to enter into detail, Lord Amulree might well have indicated the many sources (e. g. Fisher's *Wages and Their Regulation in Great Britain*), in which the subject receives fuller treatment. The last few pages of the book contain some reflections upon the possibility, arising from the growth of arbitration bodies, of developing a code of industrial law which would have the wide acceptance now accorded to Common Law. It is curious that in his speculations, Lord Amulree does not take into account the experience of the Australasian courts which have been permanent tribunals existing for over thirty years and whose detailed decisions (already analyzed in several forms) might have suggested to him that the problem is less easily solved than he appears to imagine. Indeed, throughout his study, whenever Lord Amulree departs from his narrative of arbitration in Great Britain for an analysis of arbitration in general and of the advantages and disadvantages of various types

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of industrial negotiation, he might, with advantage, have compared his conclusions with those which seem to emerge from a study of the Australasian experiments.—E. M. BURNS, Columbia University.

Professor Edward McChesney Sait in his enquiry on *Democracy* (New York, The Century Company, 1929; vii, 108 pp. $1.50), indicates the line-up in the existing clash of opinion over the fundamentals of democracy and fixes attention on the more prominent writers and their varying points of view. The work should serve as a readers' guide to the treatises, textbooks and articles on both sides of the subject. The book is divided into four chapters. The first deals with the fundamentalism of democracy, the belief that "notwithstanding the evil propensities of particular individuals, men taken in the mass spontaneously generate the truth, or at least, by some mysterious divination, recognize the truth and then resolutely follow it. According to the first article of the creed the voice of the people is the voice of God." The second and third chapters are devoted to the so-called higher critics, who by argument, satire and ridicule show that the democratic mirage has dissolved, that faith has gone out and skepticism has come in. But Professor Sait notes that in appraising the literature of higher criticism we must distinguish the spurious from the genuine; we must peer behind the imposing façade and see just what the premises contain. The last chapter, entitled "Revised Articles of Faith", reflects the view of those who believe that, though the experiment of democracy shows grave defects, it has not failed. It is with this group that Professor Sait seems to be most sympathetic. One gathers that he would not classify himself as a "higher critic."—MONTELL E. OGDON, Texas Technological College.

The 1923 Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History delivered by President Henry Merritt Wriston of Lawrence College on *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929; xii, 874 pp. $5.00) make available for the first time a scientific treatment of an important phase of American diplomacy that has been the subject of lively political controversy during the life of our present Constitution. This meritorious work treats the subject from two angles and is readily divisible into two parts. The first concerns the constitutional position of the executive agent; the second concerns the employment of executive agents as a matter of national practice. The historical background and the constitutional position of the executive agent receive the careful attention of the author, it being clearly established that long usage, dating back to a period contemporary with the adoption of the Con-

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stitution, sanctions an interpretation of that instrument which would not be reached by the ordinary rules of construction were the question a new one. One chapter is devoted to a treatment of the characteristic congressional opinion of a power exercised by the Executive which Congressmen consider a usurpation of their own power. In the second part of the book each instance in which an executive agent has been sent by the United States is classified according to function, under the following chapter headings: Agents Sent to Open Relations, Agents to Countries with which the United States Had Broken off Relations, Agents to Unrecognized States and Governments, Agents to Colonial and Dependent States, Agents to International Conferences, Agents to Countries where the United States Had No Regular Diplomatic Officers, Agencies Growing Out of the Nature of the Business.—MONTELL E. OGDON, Texas Technological College.

A symposium edited by T. V. Smith and Leonard White, entitled *Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929; xi, 283 pp. $3.00) presents an exceedingly interesting summary and survey of a great research project. Five years ago a Committee on Local Community Research was formed at the University of Chicago for the purpose of making an intensive study of the city of Chicago and its environs. The committee now pauses to ask: What have been the results? A series of twelve papers prepared by nine of the leaders in the undertaking sets forth the answer. And the answer is indeed a significant one, significant for the graduate student, for from the pages of this volume he may well draw inspiration for his own research work; significant for institutions of higher learning elsewhere, for there is here set forth a philosophy of education as well as a program of service to the community which should certainly receive thoughtful consideration; significant, one might add, for patrons and benefactors interested in contributing to the common weal, for within the covers of this monograph is convincing evidence that research in the social sciences richly deserves support.—SCHUYLER C. WALLACE, Columbia University.

Although the selection of material for a book of readings is a highly subjective matter, and one which is rarely accomplished to the satisfaction of many people other than the compiler, students of American politics may well examine the *Source Book of American Political Theory* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929; xi, 644 pp. $3.75) edited by B. F. Wright, for in it they will find a veritable mine of aptly chosen quotations illustrative of the thinking

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of American statesmen and politicians in days past. Particularly is this true of that portion of the volume which deals with the period of our history prior to the Civil War.—SCHUYLER C. WALLACE, Columbia University.

Hailed far and wide as one of the most thorough and exhaustive works of its kind, Dr. James F. Kenney's noble volume, *The Sources for the Early History of Ireland: An Introduction and Guide*, Volume I: *Ecclesiastical* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1929; xvi, 807 pp. $12.50), needs no further praise. Rich beyond any student's hopes, the material condensed into this introductory guide, as he modestly calls it, contains a survey of all the ecclesiastical manuscript sources of Irish history prior to the end of the eleventh century. A second volume will be devoted to the secular sources of this same period. The bibliographical apparatus is as complete as a quarter-century of research could make it; in his treatment of the sources, the method is orderly, never confused; and the proportion observed is masterly. At the end of a scholarly introduction on the history of Ireland (pp. 1-109), Dr. Kenney traces the written sources for Ireland's influence on the culture, intellectual and religious, of the Continent during the early and high Middle Age, through a declining antiquity, through the "Celtic" period of European history, and thence by way of monastic foundations of the seventh, eighth and ninth centuries, to the period of the great expansion of Irish culture, the apogee of which came before the year 1200. An examination of 659 sources constitutes the framework of this tremendous study. Each document is closely analyzed; the title of the same, with its *incipit* and *explicit* given, and all strengthened by a bibliographical account of the source, followed with a *catalogue raisonné* which leaves nothing to be desired on the student's part. Two maps at the end of the volume give the reader a graphic idea of ecclesiastical Ireland during the high Middle Age and of the Irish foundations in continental Europe. Perhaps, for the student who is not wholly interested in paleographical research, the most important part of this extraordinary volume will be the fresh light it brings to the subject of Irish monasticism; for here Dr. Kenney gives us what is in all likelihood the clearest picture we possess of the monastic *familia* with the overlapping prerogatives and jurisdictions of the coenobitic life of medieval Ireland. Dr. Kenney's volume, alone, would justify the *Records of Civilization* of which it is a part.—PETER GUILDAY, Catholic University of America.

In 1920 there were nearly 20,000 small towns in the United States, if we include both incorporated and unincorporated places of be-

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tween 250 and 5,000 population. In these lived about seventeen and a half millions of people, or approximately one out of every six of our national population at that time. This phase of our civilization has been rather severely neglected by our social scientists; consequently, a volume on the subject is eagerly welcomed. Professor Walter Burr, author of *Small Towns* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929; x, 267 pp. $2.50) has a rich background of fifteen years' experience in studying the rural community in the United States, particularly in the Middle West. Popular as a speaker before various civic organizations, and as a writer for the farm press and related periodicals, he has drawn upon accumulated sources of materials in speeches and articles for the content of a considerable part of the book. *Small Towns* is interestingly written and is clearly designed to reach a popular audience. It is to be regretted that the author does not stick more closely to the subject suggested by the title. The discussion is rambling and deals with almost every conceivable phase of the agricultural problem, giving vent to the author's biases. This can be justified only by the widest interpretation of the small town and its surrounding trade areas as constituting the rural community, and therefore its problems representing the core of all national country life questions. The materials directly relating to the small town could be compressed into a comparatively slight fraction of the volume. The contribution is not the significant sort of thing represented by the scientific analysis of the sphere of influence and the problems of the small town as made by Galpin, Kolb and others at the University of Wisconsin. Nor will it compare favorably with the objective studies of the Institute for Social and Religious Research, summarized in their volume on *American Agricultural Villages*. Moreover, Burr's idealism is not of the tempered kind exhibited in Douglass's excellent book on *The Little Town*. However, *Small Towns* is a stimulating volume and well worth the reading of those interested in rural problems. It reflects the vivid personality of the author, who frankly states that "there has been no attempt here to follow trails blazed by others, or to hold to orthodox views concerning the situation. If the book shall provoke discussion and criticism among those who may differ with me, it will have rendered a real service". In the chapter on "New Local Government", the government of small towns is dismissed with the statement that "incorporated villages and townships are for the purpose solely of conducting their own affairs. They have little to do with the representative feature of government." Thus he disposes of a very important and poorly organized sphere

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of government, relating to the welfare of one-sixth of our population, and influencing the surrounding rural community through schools, health and such matters. A vigorous and thoroughly warranted attack is made upon county government as "the most expensive government in the world, and it is the most inefficient government in the world". The solution suggested is the opinion of Richard S. Childs to the effect that "the county manager plan is the route by which we shall open up this dark continent of American politics, and the deep-reaching benefits of modern science, which today are administered only in the technical departments of great well-managed cities, will be carried to the towns and the open countryside by the efficient rural municipalities of tomorrow."—WILSON GEE, University of Virginia.

The raw materials for a social and economic narrative of the World War are rapidly being made available, and the task of writing that narrative will be considerably eased by *An Economic Chronicle of the Great War for Great Britain and Ireland* (published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by the Yale University Press, New Haven, 1929; xvi, 397 pp. $3.00) by N. B. Dearle. The author has wisely extended his treatment to include not only the period of the war but also the immediate years of reconstruction down to the end of 1922. In form the book is exactly what it is entitled, a chronicle. Mr. Dearle has with astonishing thoroughness gone through the years, 1914-1922, day by day and denoted in a sentence or two what happened on particular days. Despite the fact that social and economic history, here interpreted broadly, does not lend itself easily to such a mechanical approach, the results are satisfactory. From dozens of sources a handy compendium of facts has been compiled, the skeleton of the living history that is to come. One may learn that on October 12, 1914, aliens were forbidden to change their names, that on January 1, 1917, retail food prices had increased 87 per cent over July 1914, and, more generally, the variation of unemployment in figures and percentages. Criticism of such a book is not easy, yet one may inquire why the author felt it necessary to indicate events like the abdication of the Czar or the existence of the Pope's peace proposals in a large, heavy type. Again many of the jottings are meaningless or at best extraneous for the avowed purpose of the book, namely, "a chronological record of the chief economic movements and events". Such inclusions, however, need not be taken as seriously weakening a pioneer work of great usefulness.—CHARLES F. MULLETT, University of Missouri.

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